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Abstract  
Far from acting defensively to preserve the social relations and red ideologies that 
originally gave it power, the Chinese Communist Party is leading a social and economic 
transformation that could be expected to lead to direct challenges to its authority. The surprising 
degree of change in the Chinese socio-economic transformation and the fact that this 
transformation has been going on for forty years now and has not yet resulted in fundamental 
challenges subverting its rule have inspired my study. The overarching theoretical enquiry in my 
dissertation resonates with one of the most important theoretical questions in political sociology: 
how does the state maintain compliance from the governed in periods of rapid social and 
economic transformation, and how does the logic of its governmentality change along with its 
priorities? My work is built on the Weberian and Gramscian tradition of understanding state rule 
and highlights the individual’s rationale of “believing” and “consent”, but also takes account of 
the Foucaudian “governmentality” the state uses to maintain its rule and investigates the 
underlined rationality. Empirically, I take advantage of the pension changes among China’s social 
welfare reforms, decipher a two-way story of statecraft in authoritarian regimes and explore 
whether there may be room for cognitional counter-conduct from the public. My work 
demonstrates that the Chinese state works through benefit allocation, propaganda, 
experimentation with policy and many other approaches, in order to shape public expectations 
and justify its rule. However, the state’s well-designed statecraft needs to enable individuals to 
make sense of their experience and must resonate with their “common sense”. Individuals can 
update their knowledge from personal interest, information from government policies, signals 
from current society (their peers) to decide whether to stay loyal or choose non-compliance. In a 
situation when active counter-conduct such as resistance is not possible, individuals may choose 
cognitional rebellion and falsify their public compliance. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chinese society since the beginning of the nineteenth century has been subject to a 
number of momentous transformations. It has experienced imperial aggrandizement, state 
collapse, integration into global markets, imperial occupation, political revolutions, and 
transformations in its class structure. Important as each of these has been in Chinese history and 
in determining the shape of contemporary Chinese society, the current effort of the authorities 
to engineer an unprecedented social and economic transformation since its economic reform and 
opening-up from 1978 without loss of control is among the most attractive phenomena for 
social scientists. The specific social and economic challenges–changes in economic endowment, 
ideological foundation, and social (re)distribution–during the transitional process provide a good 
opportunity for social scientists to examine theories of social change and regime domination. For 
instance, in Huntington’s discussion of modernization and political order, he argued that a 
mismatch between social modernization and institutional modernization tends to produce social 
frustration and political instability (Huntington, 2006). China’s “reform and opening-up” process 
strongly stimulated economic growth and social modernization, and gave rise to an 
increasing demand for public participation. This transformation in the market, recalling 
Polanyi’s description of “great transformation” (Polanyi & MacIver, 1944), incurred an 
accelerated commodification of human capital, natural resources and other non-market values, 
such as social practices, family functions, and so on.  
However, the corresponding political institutions did not provide adequate channels for 
public participation. As shown in Figure 1, the rapid development of the Chinese economy1 is in 
sharp contrast to the generally static nature of its political institutions2. In addition to the gross 
increase in size of the economy, the economic structure has also changed; more diverse 
ownership of economic entities has emerged and contributes to the economic growth. For 
instance, until 2015, civilian-run enterprises contributed to more than 60% of GDP, providing 
around 80% of urban jobs, and attracting 70% (or more) of the rural migrant labour force (Bank, 
2017). Moreover, as indicated in Figure 2 and Figure A17, the modernization of China’s 
economy and society took place together and very rapidly, which had taken Western countries 
centuries to achieve. Its socioeconomic modernization can be judged not only from its rapid 
 
1 Economic data source: CEIC data (https://www.ceicdata.com/en). 
2 Polity data series: the “Polity Score” captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-pont scale ranging from -10 
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity Scores can also be converted into regime 
categories in a suggested three-part categorization of “autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5 plus three 
special values: -66, -77 and -88), and “democracies” (+6 to +10). 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html). 
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urbanization process involving large numbers of international and domestic migrant workers, but 
also its rising level of education and spread of literacy, which may have led to changes in public 
consciousness. Thus, applying Huntington’s formula to China’s transition, would predict identity 
erosion, inequality and corruption, among other typical issues of socioeconomic transformation, 
to disrupt society and lead to political instability. Moore’s comparative study contains similar 
concerns drawn from the lessons of China’s rural revolution; if “something happens to threaten 
and destroy the daily routine” of most people, there may be a “revolution from below” (Moore, 
1966, p. 204).  
 
Figure 1. Economic Development and Polity Type 
 
Nevertheless, fundamental disruption has not occurred, even after the turbulence around 
1989. More importantly, far from acting defensively to preserve the social relations and red 
ideologies that originally gave it power, from the very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) has in fact led the social and economic transformation that could have been expected to 
directly challenge its authority. In other words, the central authority actively took the opportunity 
and the benefits of modernization as brought by the social and economic reform, while also 
absorbing the risks brought by the trade-off between the opportunities and challenges of 
dramatic transformation. It is the surprising degree of change in the Chinese social and 
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economic transformation, and the fact that this drastic transformation has continued now for 
forty years without rousing the radical challenges that might have subverted the authorities’ rule 
that have inspired this study. China’s case brings up intriguing questions: how does the state 
maintain compliance from the governed in periods of rapid social and economic 
transformation, and how does the logic of its governmentality change along with its 
priorities? 
 
Figure 2. Education and Urbanization Development 
 
Generating compliance: governmentality  
Building on Weberian and Gramscian traditions that emphasise the importance of public 
consent, my dissertation enriches the theoretical discussion by highlighting the role of the 
population in state governmentality and focusing on the issue of “dealing with the 
people” so as to maintain its authoritarian rule. Empirically, my work deploys the case of the 
multi-wave pension reform in China during its reform period, deciphering a two-way story of 
statecraft in authoritarian regimes and the room that may be made for cognitional counter-
conducts from the public. Before discussing the analytical paradigm of my project, I want to 
elaborate on two questions: theoretically, why governmentality matters for tracing the question 
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of legitimation and ruling of the modern state; and practically, what conditions in China’s case 
bring challenges to state governance and existing explanatory schemas. 
Theoretical setup and context 
Relational power: the modern state’s legitimation issue and its governmentality  
The interaction between state and individual is a typical power relation where the state 
needs to maintain its authority and expects compliance from the governed. Under certain 
conditions the population renders to the authority co-operation and obedience—which provide 
enough stability for the authority to withstand shock and failure. In other words, cooperation 
from the public imposes constraints on the governance of modern states; governments need to 
acquire legitimacy in order to develop, operate and reproduce themselves effectively. At a point 
in their interactions with the state the public may change its compliance. People who have 
suffered during the interactions, due, for instance, to the state’s misbehaviour, or experienced 
dissatisfaction with the social policies, may choose to resist. 
Many political sociologists argue that the essential theme of state “ruling” is the issue of 
consent. The Weberian tradition regards the legitimation of the government as an essential 
factor for sustaining people’s compliance, since the state’s rule fundamentally depends on 
consent rather than any fear induced by coercion alone. States cannot do whatever they want and 
expect their citizens to acquiesce; constant and crude coercion may cause a revolution from 
below and eventually state collapse. As Weber (1978) pointed out, consent from the public is 
necessarily rooted in people’s belief. The consent that signals the people’s active acceptance and 
compliance may take the form of ideological trust or spontaneous supportive actions. However, 
beliefs are not arbitrary and can be manufactured by exogenous powers. Gramsci’s hegemony 
theory (Gramsci, Hoare, & Nowell-Smith, 1971) suggests that the interaction between the 
population and the state is never a simple watertight match. People’s seemingly “spontaneous” 
attitudinal or behavioural consent are result from some invisible and subtle ideological, cultural, 
or institutional infiltration from the state. In other words, in the state-society relationship the 
state can reconstruct and use people’s knowledge, politics and even daily life in a way that 
favours the authority. The other side of the story is that resonating beliefs must be rooted in the 
experiences of individuals (Gramsci et al., 1971). Any inquiry into consent must grapple with 
both the expectations of citizens and the behaviour of states, and the fit of both with one 
another. Thus, although the state generally holds more institutional resources than individuals 
do, it is not all-powerful; its legitimacy can be earned or lost. A “legitimacy crisis” ensues when 
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the regime is finding it difficult to managing the equilibrium between state governance and the 
people’s expectations. 
The idea of “governmentality” answers the questions of whom to govern and how to 
govern. As a form of state rationality, governmentality can be recognized as a power relation 
between “man and things” (Foucault, 2009, p. 97); state governance therefore involves 
governing “a sort of complex of men and things” (Foucault, 2009, p. 96). The objects of the 
governance include not only men and their complex relationship with things (such as resources), 
but also things’ relationship with other things, such as customs, dependency, habits and so on. 
The instruments, such as statistics and biopolitics, that a government uses to achieve a better 
being of the population (such as the population’s wealth, longevity and health) involve and act 
directly on the population itself. State governmentality can be identified as institutions, 
regulations and procedures: it can also be identified as a tendency of changing forces which 
reveals the state’s sophisticated understanding of the people, and as the efforts that it makes to 
figure out proper ways of managing changes and consents, and the process of knowledge 
development (Foucault, 2009, p. 109). Through the dynamic governmentality that has been 
designed and adjusted by the state, the boundary of the state, the boundary between being 
“public” and being “private” is revealed. A thorough investigation of governmentality will 
unpack not only the way that governmental activities unfold their effect, but also how the 
individual’s subjectification process is shaped by statecraft, and how the risks of resistance from 
the public affect statecraft in return. Unpacking its governmentality, therefore, is important in 
addressing the legitimation and issue of ruling of the modern state. 
In empirical investigations of governmentality, which indicator is appropriate in 
identifying the nature of the state’s power over the people? Many concepts have been used to 
describe the ruling of authority over the people and could indicate the success of the state’s 
governance. Commonly used terms include the ones mentioned above: “legitimacy”, “consent”, 
or other concepts such as “political trust” and “compliance”. The conceptual details of such 
notions are also debated by various scholars. For instance, the approach to conceptualizing 
“legitimacy” can be from the standpoint of legalism and normativity, as in issues of legality, or a 
particular normative definition of justice or procedure (e.g., Lord & Beetham, 2001; Smoke, 
1994). It can also be analysed from the standpoint of belief, following Weberian notions (Weber, 
1978). As stated, my work is built on the Weberian and Gramscian tradition of understanding 
state rule and highlights the individual’s rationale of “believing” and “consent”, but also takes 
account of the Foucaudian “governmentality” the state uses to maintain its rule and investigates 
the underlined rationality. What then is the best way of integrating these approaches into one 
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analytical model? Compliance, which covers both positive/active consent and the passive or 
even coerced acceptance against state authority of the population, seems to be a good 
indicator to measure the state’s rule over its people in general. In this sense, the concept of 
compliance is more appropriate than consent in capturing the “willingness to defer to political 
authority regardless of the reasons”, or “with multiple motivations” (Grimes, 2008; Levi, 1997). 
In the following section I further discuss the theoretical model constructed on the inclusive 
measurement of “compliance”.  
The statecraft used in different regimes consists of choices built from an authority’s own 
political, social and economic scenarios. Compared to their democratic counterparts, 
authoritarian states have more of a reputation for using oppression and violence in sustaining 
their authority. But no regime that relies only on oppression and violence can stabilize its 
governance and maintain its resilience in the long term (Gramsci et al., 1971). Dimitrov (2013), 
in his study, implied that, in a mature communist regime, the use of repression actually declines, 
and patronage is distributed to a wider segment of the population, citing the Soviet Union after 
the death of Stalin. If this is so, an authoritarian regime also needs to employ various strategies 
and skills to manufacture “spontaneous” consent from the public. Moreover, such a regime in a 
prolonged transformational stage, like China in the past 40 years, requires significant public 
compliance to maintain overall stability.  
Challenges brought by transitional scenarios and the state’s toolkit 
China’s transition is one form of the large-scale institutional changes in communist 
regimes that started in the late 20th century. The process of de-stalinization, liberation and 
democratization involved the deformation of central planning and a transition of state socialism. 
In these post-communist states, the newly emerged market has led to a change in the 
distributional principles and in the rate of return on financial, productive and human capital, and 
has also altered the social structure. Meanwhile, the boundaries between state, market and society 
have been redrawn and negotiated through interactions between different sectors. Challenges to 
the legitimacy of the Chinese government have followed one another since the economic 
reforms of 1978. Economic development has increased people’s income, and also changed the 
public’s expectation of the state-individual relationship; people’s loyalty towards the state 
authority has become complicated. On the one hand, the benefits brought by economic 
development were able to help the state to buy public support; on the other, economic 
development brought people a keener consciousness and more demands for other rights, and 
therefore threatened the public’s acceptance of the state’s authority. Moreover, the transition 
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process extended from the economy to the society: 40 years of development in the economy has 
led to an expansion of social inequality along with the entrenchment of a social class system. The 
transitional scenarios brought by marketization, privatization, and institutional reform have led 
to some fundamental changes in distribution, redistribution, and social justice. 
In addition to the large-scale economic-social reforms, the transition of socialist regimes 
features another key point, due to the special ideological foundation and historical legacy of 
China. As a communist government, the authorities rely heavily on the “red ideology” in the 
political culture, which was also one of the main sources the CCP’s legitimacy during the civil 
war period and the early years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). With 
markets penetrating every aspect of social life, communist ideology has also been reformed in 
the post-Mao era, particularly in recent years to fit the new social and economic scenarios. For 
instance, the illusion of government omnipotence persists and coexists with mixed attitudes to 
liberal notions. Many people buy into the story that individual merit is highly encouraged while 
“waiting, relying, and demanding” (with regard to government help) is criticized (M. E. 
Gallagher, 2011), and the spirit of devotion and equality from the revolutionary period has been 
undermined. In other words, the transitional process also shows a de facto shift away from the 
revolutionary communist legacy that originally gave it power: a state-controlled planned 
economy, semi-universal welfare provision and a communist ideology, etc.  
Social welfare provision is one of the most important areas of change, partly because it 
can be directly perceived by the public. In this area there has been a noticeable trend which has 
led to some degree of public discontent due to the fear of loss of social benefits and an increased 
welfare burden on some social groups. Before the economic reforms of 1978, China was 
experiencing the “creation of a socialist egalitarian society promising a relatively stable livelihood 
at the expense of economic development” (Leung & Xu, 2015). Work units (Danwei) acted in 
urban areas as administrative social integration sections, as well as providers of public goods (Lu 
& Perry, 1997). Urban work units provided not only jobs for life but also pensions, housing, 
education and health care to employees and their dependants. More than 80% of the urban 
labour force was covered by the Danwei system (Leung & Wong, 1999). At the stage of state 
socialism the state’s patriarchal role underwrote a collective welfare mechanism that collectively 
secured social rights (Xie, 2016). Corresponding to the economic reform, the state promoted 
social reforms that helped to shift the state’s welfare burden and boost efficiency. The ongoing 
reform in welfare provision threatens life-time employment, pensions, health and the housing 
system in urban areas (B. Li & Zhong, 2009; Wong & Ngok, 2006). Very many employees of 
state-owned enterprises were laid off during the marketization process. The newly established 
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basic health insurance scheme also required contributions from individuals and employers. 
Furthermore, the hospitals started to employ market-competition principles in their operation. 
Individual workers found that their total welfare contribution accounted for quite a large 
proportion of their salary (Ringen & Ngok, 2017). Many of these reform plans were understood 
to add up to a withdrawal of governmental responsibility and emphasis on the roles of the 
market and the family. The schemes do not treat equally members of different age groups, 
occupation groups and political identity groups; some enjoy more than others. 
Facing all the dramatic social and economic changes described above, the state needed to 
spend some time on generating public compliance to prevent a serious crisis of legitimacy and 
even regime change caused by bottom-up revolts against the transformation. Theoretically 
speaking, the skills in the state’s governance toolkit include propaganda, repression, absorption, 
allocated benefits and so on. In practice, what we can observe of the state’s efforts to 
manufacture compliance is different “strategies” that involve either one or several skills. For 
instance, in promoting certain policies, a state could combine economic benefits with 
propaganda (comparable to the “social construction of target populations” (A. L. Schneider, 
Ingram, & Deleon, 2014)), while coercion and information censorship could also be used to 
attain its goal. The toolkit of maintaining compliance for an authority also changes depending on 
the various challenges in different periods. For example, in Mao’s era when the party class 
identified struggle as the main problem in China, an ideological campaign was the central 
approach to producing loyalty and consent. In the “opening up and reform” period, many 
scholars argue that the Chinese authorities has used performance-based legitimacy and maintains 
its rule by providing material security (Zhao, 2001).  
Some scholars highlighted the institutional features and tricks in China’s governance. For 
instance, Andrew Nathan used the term “authoritarian resilience” to describe the situation 
whereby the Chinese government has reconsolidated itself in the midst of the political instability 
and potential governance crises. He attributed the authority’s resilience mostly to the 
“institutionalization” of the state, such as the normalization of succession politics and the 
meritocratic promotion of bureaucrats (Nathan, 2003). Scholars such as Yan (2017) emphasized 
that the capacity of the state to absorb and assimilate is one of the main instruments that keeps 
the state and the party stable. Perry (2017) contended that, by strategically using symbolic 
resources such as the traditional culture, the state shapes the higher education institutions and 
wins the allegiance of social elites. Other descriptions in existing studies include “a balancing act 
involving the supply of carrots and sticks” (M. Gallagher & Hanson, 2009), a “Guerrilla Policy 
Style” (Perry & Heilmann, 2011), “nationalism ideological articulation” (Bernstein, 2013; Gries, 
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2004) and so on. One common issue in existing studies is that statecraft is treated as a set of 
static and isolated skills rather than a comprehensive, sophisticated design. The role of “the 
ruled”—people, or population, is also missing or not emphasized in shaping the specific 
governmentality. 
In this dissertation I argue that the strategy used by the state to respond to the potential 
crisis brought closer by social and economic transformation and to generate public compliance 
even though it drifts away from the communist legacy is hybrid, organic, and dynamic. In 
particular, I emphasise that public compliance is not only acquired through buying off the public 
with governmental performance and transferred benefit, but is also manufactured through an 
ideological foundation, such as nationalism, which has been rebuilt by the authority. China’s 
authoritarian governance has been an active process which is constantly adapting to new social 
and economic situations, especially since the notorious repression in the late 1980s. On the one 
hand, the state captures public expectations and adjusts its own strategies to meet them; on the 
other, the state intentionally shapes the public’s expectations and manufactures compliance to 
keep its reforms working. For instance, in the field of social welfare where the process of 
privatization might cause severe discontent, the authority has employed a mixture of 
retrenchment and generosity and designed diverse schemes for different social groups in order to 
effectively “divide and govern”. Moreover, the state has carefully employed propaganda skills 
using traditional culture and the ideological legacy of the socialist period, in order to legitimize its 
choices and engender consent from the public. Based on the arguments above, my dissertation 
enriches the Weberian legitimacy theory by examining how the Chinese authorities whilst 
experiencing far-reaching social and economic changes over the past 40 years have maintained 
legitimacy and generated public compliance. The dynamic and organic state strategies identified 
in this research also enrich the discussion of authoritarian resilience by highlighting the role of 
the public (and its active consent), and the constraints that it imposes on the effectiveness of the 
state’s governance and production of legitimacy.  
Dealing with the people: governmentality that generates compliance 
The fundamental assumption in this research is that, the nature of state power is a 
relational concept. States provide security, resources, solidarity and identity through benefit 
allocation, propaganda, education and many other approaches, in order to shape public 
expectations and justify their rule; while individuals can update their knowledge about the state 
from personal benefits, public policy and current society (their peers) and decide whether to stay 
loyal or rebel. To better understand the logic of the state’s rule and its choices of various forms 
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of statecraft in dealing with its population, in this section I decipher state’s governmentality and 
explain the analytical logic of my work with a semi-modelled clarification.  
Coercion or consent: why coercion alone cannot do the work  
What are the existing theories about the state’s choices for generating compliance? The 
state, as Gramsci argued, is an entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whomever it rules (Gramsci et al., 1971). The state is a combination of 
dictatorship and hegemony in which the state power relies on both political society (force) and 
civil society (consent). In other words, there are two general approaches that the state uses to 
deal with its subordinates in modern society: using either force and coercion, exercising 
dictatorship; or using consensus building, cultural hegemony and maintaining moral and 
intellectual leadership (Kohli, Shue, & Migdal, 1994). A coercion-based approach is very efficient 
in maintaining short-term stability and long-term fear, while consent-based governance enables 
the state to enjoy more compliance and the “expression of these subaltern classes who want to 
educate themselves in the art of government” (Gramsci et al., 1971, p. 126). In the spectrum of 
coerced compliance and voluntary compliance, authoritarian states have the reputation of using 
oppression and violence to sustain their rule. Therefore, in the context of an authoritarian 
regime, an inevitable question arises: why would the state need to manufacture consent if it can 
use coercion or force to stay in power? The questions “Why can’t coercion alone do the work”, 
or “Why is manufacturing active compliance from the population important for rulers in 
authoritarian regimes?” have been studied in many empirical and theoretical works. 
Empirically, we do see some authoritarian regimes, or regimes at an authoritarian stage, 
showing significant use of coercion and force in their rule. For instance, mass terror, repression 
and indoctrination were frequently used in totalitarian periods by Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, or military 
regimes such as Franco’s Spain and Pinochet’s Chile. Compliance generated by fear was 
common in these regimes. But any regime that relies only on oppression and violence cannot 
stabilize its governance and maintain its resilience in the long term. The integrated global 
economy and the development of the internet has also made mass killing costly and less 
attractive for autocrats. In recent years, we observe more non-democratic regimes using 
sophisticated statecraft to hold on to power. For instance, some imitate the format of democracy 
and hold elections to obtain normative legitimacy, while their election processes exhibit 
wholesale bribery, illegal competition and information manipulation. Wedeen’s case of Asad’s 
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cult in Syria argued that rhetoric and symbolic display reduces the need to rely on sheer 
repression as a mechanism of control (Wedeen, 1999). 
Studies also employ formal models to demonstrate the unsustainability of using violence 
in non-democratic regimes and justify an authority’s choice of hybrid statecraft to maintain 
compliance. By combining the manufacture of consent with coercive tools, the state can 
maintain a stable hegemonic position vis-à-vis the population. Repression/violence are among 
the most extreme ways to crush protest/revolution and alter public opinion through physical 
coercion (Gregory, Schröder, & Sonin, 2006). However, repression is not a once-and-for-all 
solution. In Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni’s working paper, they present a formal model of 
protest under authoritarianism (Kricheli, Livne, & Magaloni, 2011). Their two-period signalling 
model shows that, although regimes which are more repressive in the first period can better 
deter civil opposition, they are more likely in the second period to experience cascade since 
protests’ information revealing potential is maximized in these regimes. In addition, the work of 
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010), Svolik (2012), Egorov and Sonin (2011) shows that the 
authority may experience a greater threat from its military allies once the repression is over.  
Thus, in most cases, the authority tends to consider integrating different tactics in 
preventing revolution and gaining compliance after rational assessment by the governed. 
Scholars citing theoretical and empirical evidence have identified many specific combinations. 
Wintrobe (1990, 2007) modelled two instruments—repression and loyalty—that dictators used 
to stay in power, dividing such regimes into four categories—tinpots, tyrants, totalitarians and   
timocrats—according to their different objectives and correspondingly invested instruments. For 
instance, totalitarians always aim to maximize their power; therefore they combine high 
repression with a capacity to generate loyalty; while tinpot dictators prefer to maximize their own 
benefits under the constraint of minimum power, so their investment is low on both counts. 
Although theoretically feasible and easily achieved, eliciting compliance through a redistribution 
of benefits—irrespective of whether the distribution is to the ruling alliance or to the remaining 
population—needs credible commitment from the authority (e.g., Boix & Svolik, 2013; 
Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011; Myerson, 2008). Such commitment in non-democratic regimes is 
often fragile without relevant institutional guarantees; and fragile commitment from the state will 
discount the effectiveness of its effort to allocate benefits for the sake of compliance. 
In addition to buying compliance through material means, a more sophisticated way of 
generating voluntary compliance is to wisely use information and manipulate through 
censorship, guidance by propaganda or knowledge construction. For instance, a state authority 
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may allow free social media so as to obtain the information about the population that the state 
needs, even though the information may also be used by the society to coordinate its protest 
(Egorov, Guriev, & Sonin, 2009). To avoid a potential backfire from the free media, the 
authorities may also actively send out biased signals through their own propaganda to mislead 
the public in evaluating the state’s capacity (Edmond, 2013). Chen and Xu’s work (2017) 
presents a new view: that allowing people’s information communication in society actually helps 
the authorities to obtain material and prevent coordinated revolt from the public.  
To return to the main question of this sub-section, how useful are these sophisticated 
tactics compared to simple violence? Guriev and Treisman’s work in 2015 proposed a 
comprehensive argument about the different ways in which modern dictators could help 
themselves survive. In a game of political leaders trying to convince citizens (some of whom are 
informed elites) of their competence, a “dictator can invest in making convincing state 
propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress 
attempted uprisings” (Guriev & Treisman, 2015, p. 4). The authors show that the portfolios of 
states’ techniques differ in the competence of the leader and result in multiple equilibria, while 
“violence either is a last resort when all else has failed, or is used sparingly when it is possible to 
conceal it, since competent dictators do not need to use repressions and reverting to repressions 
immediately reveals the dictator’s incompetence to the public and ultimately results in his 
downfall” (Guriev & Treisman, 2015, p. 33). To summarize, violence alone cannot do the work 
of maintaining governance for an authority which wants to rule in the long term. The modern 
state enjoys considerable choices of statecraft that enable it to stay in power without much 
challenge from the population. 
Generating compliance: a two-actors model and the state’s options 
Following the discussion of the context and theories above, I present the analytical 
paradigm of my research. The paradigm adopts a holistic viewpoint, integrating both consent-
oriented statecraft and coercion-based statecraft and highlights the state’s strategic selection of 
statecraft based on its objectives and constraints. My research focuses on an interactive model 
which consists of two actors: the state authority and the population3. A population ruled by an 
authority may express compliance, non-compliance, or collective non-compliance such as 
coordinated rebellion and revolution. The ultimate goal for the state is to remain in power; in 
other words, to ensure that the population is compliant. Putting the population’s reaction on a 
 
3 Since this dissertation deals with the state-society/individual relationship, I don’t include bureaucrats in the model 
as many studies using a similar approach do.  
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continuous scale, the state would prefer sincere support (active consent) to forced obedience, 
while the public’s collective non-compliance is more dangerous for the state than a single 
individual’s public non-compliance. There are cases where an individual’s private non-
compliance goes unnoticed or is tolerated by the authority as long as it doesn’t turn into public 
non-compliance or, worse still, public collective non-compliance. The objective of the 
population in the model is to optimize its living conditions, economically, socially and politically, 
though the ranking of importance of these different aspects of living standards differs for 
different social groups. The engine of this interactive model’s operation in my work is not simply 
the objective economic situation, as in Wintrobe’s pioneering model, but the general design of 
the ruler, which is constantly updated according to its understanding of the current situation, the 
public and its own objectives, or simply as, “governmentality”. 
The state as ruler enjoys resources (such as economic or organizational resources) that 
could be used to achieve its objectives, but it may not master every detail of the population. 
Although named compliance, the population’s acceptance of the authority’s rule differs in 
degree. In Figure 3, I present a thought map of the means and outcome of statecraft of modern 
state. The upper panel displays the various possible statecrafts the state could use in a continuum 
of hard-soft approaches. In the bottom panel, I demonstrate that in the scale of outcome of 
statecraft, public reaction could vary from sincere believer who present their full consent, to 
forced compliance for which the population would choose alternative options rather than the 
incumbent authority if they are given chances, and to collective non-compliance which could be 
dangerous to the state’s rule. Both of the typologies do not exhaust all the possibilities, but act as 
a guidance of the interactive relation between the state’s actions and the potential outcome from 
the public.  
A population has true believers who are sincere loyal to the incumbent ruler. It has 
supporters who accept the governance, while not necessarily holding the beliefs that the true 
believers hold. It should be noted that these two categories of “supporters” may not be easily 
identifiable from their daily behaviour, but they may choose altogether differently when 
presented with alternative options of governance. The population’s obedience may also be 
generated by interest exchange, or coercion, as commonly identified in existing studies. The 
compliance categories are not mutually exclusive—they may be generated simultaneously in 
response to either a single item or a package of statecraft. As presented in the following table, 
the state can either construct social knowledge through propaganda, education, or manipulated 
information, building consensus through policy experiments, or use interest exchanges to buy 
the population off. It may also use coercive approaches such as censorship and force to maintain 
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public compliance. Again, these tactics can be used by the state either alone or as a package; and 
if necessary can also be tailored for different social groups. 
 
 
Figure 3. Thought Map of Compliance Typology and Respective Statecraft 
 
Constructing social knowledge is among the most sophisticated but commonly used 
tactics for generating compliance. Education is a traditional approach that can impose specific 
knowledge when an individual is in being socialized and forming his/her value system. Even 
individuals who have established a relatively stable value system can have their existing 
knowledge reshaped by a strong input of information from outside. Modern techniques allow 
the state more possibilities of promoting its ideology and shaping public opinion. Online 
platforms have become more and more popular in the propaganda toolkit in addition to 
conventional media such as newspapers, TV, radio broadcasts, books and journals. The 
mouthpiece of the state can publicize well-constructed information about policy, social facts and 
excuses for the state’s latest moves. The state may also employ internet trolls or hire real 
people—such as the “50 cent party” in China’s case (Han, 2015; Simon, 2014) —to lead the 
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online public opinion and diffuse pro-government arguments. These seemingly “soft” tactics can 
in fact signal the repressive capacity of the state. As H. Huang (2015) has shown in his work, the 
capacity to broadcast propaganda and the capacity to repress rebellion are positively correlated. 
Consensus building through policy experimentation differs from other compliance 
generating processes in its way of highlighting the adaptations of state governance and the 
dynamic process of governmentality. It is especially useful in cases where the population is 
divided, the regional features are distinctive and the policy that the state wants to promote is 
somehow controversial. In China, policy experiments are among the most commonly used 
strategies; it takes a moderate approach to policy changes and allows enough space for the 
central government to practise “trial and error”. Referred to as “crossing the river by feeling the 
stones”, policy experiments are of great importance in avoiding radical changes in national 
policy. Policy experimentation is frequently used in social welfare reforms due to the 
geographical variation and social and economic diversity between provinces. The reform of a 
social welfare scheme can be very costly for the central government if it wants to collect 
comprehensive information about the population. Moreover, since most of the current social 
welfare schemes in China are fragmented and specific to certain social groups, it is impossible to 
push any thoroughgoing social reforms. Therefore, the central government regularly uses policy 
experimentation when it implements new policies. For instance, in healthcare, about 60 cities 
from 1994 onwards participated in the reform in basic urban social health insurance. In 
education, a pilot policy of abolishing fees for rural compulsory education was initiated in 2006 
and expanded to other non-pilot areas in the two years afterwards.  
Benefits allocation is another commonly used strategy in exchange for people’s 
compliance with the state. As I elaborated in the theoretical set up section, the benefits can be 
material rewards, such as incomes, bonuses, tax reduction and so on. They can also be welfare 
benefits, such as access to certain subsidised programs. In some cases, it can be political 
incentives, for instance permission to joining a Party (membership), or be promoted within the 
bureaucratic system. The governed decide on their consent and support after reviewing the social 
and economic benefits received from the authority. Constructed on the social and economic 
outcome of governmental behaviours, some scholars refer to the population compliance 
generated by benefits allocation as a specific source of state legitimacy—performance legitimacy.  
Censorship is not as direct as pure violence, nor as sophisticated as the knowledge 
construction approach; but it still can achieve the goal of generating compliance because of its 
value in increasing the information asymmetry between the individual and the state (Bennett & 
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Naim, 2015; McMillan & Zoido, 2004). By blocking publication, filtering the internet, bribing the 
owners and journalists in the “independent” media and even threatening these content producers 
with jail, the authority can prevent the spreading of unfavourable information. Not only can the 
capacity of the state be shown in the process, but more importantly, it discourages any prospect 
of coordinated protests and aggravates the pluralistic ignorance in the society. The strategic use 
of censorship which adjusts to different levels of social tension can bring the state more benefit 
than the use of free media (P. Lorentzen, 2014). 
In my dissertation, I focus on the rationale, context, design & implementation, and the 
potential effect of the various statecraft in generating public compliance. Most importantly, I 
highlight the soft statecraft and ordinary people’s potential counter-conduct (falsification in 
constructed public compliance) on this thought map, underline the social nature of state 
legitimacy and governmentality. In other words, my work argues that legitimacy as a social 
phenomenon rather than normalized procedures, and my evidence presents how people are 
socialized, in which ways their subjectivity been shaped by history/social culture/state policy, 
how their expectations and the social nature of legitimacy been taken account in the 
governmentality rationale.  
Constraints, choices, and state-individual interaction in transitional situations 
In ruling the population, the state faces two constraints when it seeks to generate 
compliance and minimize the non-compliance in society. One is the state’s own resources for 
dealing with popular revolt/revolution. The resource constraint is closely related to state’s 
economic capacity, organizational capacity and the military capacity. Available resources can be 
used to fund such means of knowledge construction as education and propaganda, or can be 
used for economic/social/political benefits that can buy off compliance. Resources can also be 
used to censor unwanted information or fund state apparatus such as the police, the military and 
prisons. All these investments will help the state remain in power: the population remains 
compliant and collective non-compliance and regime change are kept at bay.  
As in an interactive power relation, the second constraint that the state faces is the 
information asymmetry regarding people’s desire to be non-compliant, both individually and 
collectively. The story from the population’s side in its power relationship with the state is that 
they would expect to optimise their living situation. In theory, if the living conditions enjoyed by 
individuals meet their expectations, they will repay the state by compliance. In this sense, 
individuals’ objectives can be understood as the price of their compliance with the state (it 
should be noted that, although the state might prefer sincere loyalty, this does not necessarily 
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entail a higher price). If their expectations are not met, individuals may choose non-compliance 
or revolt, which will also carry certain costs to themselves. But the people’s intention to rise up 
and their doing so are not crystal clear to the state. In theory, the possibility of the people’s 
collective non-compliance is a function of their capacity, motivation and coordination, which are 
supported by traditional social movement theories about the resources, grievances, political 
opportunities and social networks of the activists (Le Bon, 1897; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Meyer 
& Staggenborg, 1996). The state, therefore, needs to tackle all these aspects in order to reduce 
the collective non-compliance of the public. 
Under the two constraints above, the state chooses a hybrid solution from its toolkit 
which includes both tolerant approaches—such as consent construction and benefit allocation—
and intolerant approaches—such as censorship and force—to maximize the compliance from 
the governed. Each of these tactics has its distinctive effect on the public. The state’s intolerant 
statecraft may be useful in whittling down the capacity as well as the coordination of the 
population’s rebels. However, it may also cause non-cooperation/noncompliance in the long 
term and increase people’s motivation for further revolt/revolution. Tolerant strategies such as 
propaganda, education and benefit allocation may not be as efficient as force, but can be useful 
for undermining the motivation of the prospective rebels. The knowledge construction approach 
tends to gain more stable compliance than the strategies based on benefit exchange do. 
However, radical loyalty could turn into radical opposition if ever the believers’ expectations of 
the authority are disappointed. The tolerant and intolerant approaches are strategic substitutes 
limited by a specific capacity at a certain time, while become strategic complements when 
obtaining information from the population. When the state’s resources are given at a certain 
time, the state can increase its investment either in strategies of force or strategies that could 
manufacture public consent. When seeking certain information from the population, a state must 
complement any increase of force by efforts to create consent in order to avoid further challenge 
from the governed.   
As I have suggested above, the state rationale and its implementation of statecraft faces 
the risk that its tactics to maintain state legitimacy will backfire in the population: all these 
techniques, no matter how sophisticated or powerful, must make sense with individuals’ 
experience and resonate with their “common sense”. The resulting backfire can be dangerous for 
tolerant strategies that are designed to shape people’s ideology. For instance, in a situation where 
people’s personal knowledge and public knowledge mismatch, the state’s efforts to constructing 
knowledge may result in discontent rather than advocacy. The state may add force to supplement 
its governance and have its intentions executed, for example, pushing reforms while censoring 
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opposed opinions. However, when individuals cannot say what they think, they may falsify their 
reported/public consent and the accumulated falsification of political attitudes may produce 
“cascades” (Kuran, 1991). In this case, any initial small-scale protest, if it can ever be formed, will 
act as an important signal for the whole society to update its belief with regard to the state 
(Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1993, 1994). The possibility of room for people’s counter-conduct 
therefore leads to further implications about the state’s action and, forces the state to include the 
estimated population reaction in its decision-making process. 
A state’s conduct, or governmentality, in dealing with its people is not just a static design. 
It is a dynamic process of governing and using the best possible portfolio of statecraft practices 
in response to changing conditions. This feature is especially easy to identify when dramatic 
social/economic changes occur. For instance, the perception of an individual’s expectations of 
redistribution, as well as their estimation of the general expectations of the society as a whole, 
will change when a reformed distribution is under way. In this case, the government’s demand 
for information regarding the public’s expectations and the distribution of public opinion can be 
especially strong. The increased demand for information then needs a decent amount of 
tolerance in the authority’s approach to minimize the cost ascribed to the information 
asymmetry. Meanwhile, following economic development, a shift of the capacity curve will 
permit an increase in both the investment in force and the manufacture of consent. In this case, 
the equilibrium point of various forms of statecraft shifts, and the specific direction of the shift, 
or the portion of each strategy, depends on the slope of each constraint line.  
This paradigm clarifies the way in which the two-way story of state-individual interaction 
in modern society works and how a rapidly changing social and economic scenario may prompt 
a state to adjust its governmentality. The analytical paradigm is designed to be as comprehensive 
as possible to capture all the possible options in the state-individual interaction and can be 
formally developed in the future. My dissertation project can be seen as the first step in 
illustrating the theoretical schema with empirical evidence. I also suggest some possible future 
developments in the concluding chapter. 
Structure of the dissertation  
The process of addressing the production of compliance and maintenance of legitimacy 
in transitional China, as well as the logic change behind its governmentality is complicated and 
requires a sophisticated design to address it properly. In my dissertation, I not only focus on the 
practices of the state and the changing expectations of its citizens, but also I highlight their 
fitness with each other in a transitional social and economic scenario. My empirical chapters use 
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evidence of the Chinese government’s efforts to maintain its governance while leading a rapid 
social and economic transformation. These empirical chapters elaborate on different pieces of 
my analytical paradigm, and also dialogue with each other in many ways. In Chapter 3, I identify 
the state governmentality which reveals, through the trajectory of the social welfare changes in 
China, knowledge construction combined with benefit allocation. In Chapter 4, the specific 
statecraft that has been identified involves policy experimentation combined with propaganda in 
a pension reform for enterprise employees. Chapter 5 concerns the issue of falsified compliance 
in China’s population, using various approaches to ascertain its existence, variations and 
mechanism. In addition, I discuss the implications of this cognitional counter-conduct of 
individuals for their actions and for the legitimacy of the state in the long run. In terms of 
methods, I employ a combination of institutional analysis, national survey data, social and 
economic statistical data and in-depth interviews (which will be further discussed in each 
chapter). These methods together make it possible to unpack the broad question of state 
legitimacy in the context of the social transition in China. The structure and a synopsis of each 
chapter is presented as follows. 
Chapter 2: Review of the literature 
In Chapter 2, I present a rationale for investigating governmentality in modern society 
and review the current theoretical discussion on the legitimation of the state, while highlighting 
the special context of transitional authoritarian regimes. My theoretical setup is built on the 
Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy, together with Foucauldian governmentality and 
statecraft, in which I focus on the consent in population’s belief and the statecraft used by the 
state to manufacture the consent. With these theoretical assumptions in mind, I focus on 
countries without representative institutions and the rule of law (normative legitimacy). The state 
legitimacy and governmentality in these countries differ from their democratic counterparts in 
many ways. The different socioeconomic and historical constraints in these countries has largely 
changed the logic and presentation of the maintenance of legitimation and the use of statecraft. 
Governance in these regimes relies more on ideological legitimacy through knowledge 
construction and censorship, performance-based legitimacy and, beyond doubt, coercion.  
The issue of state legitimacy and governmentality gets more complicated when a regime 
is experiencing a radical transition promoted and led by the authority. Therefore, in the second 
part of the literature review, I consider the studies on transitional state socialism and the specific 
trade-off between opportunities and challenges available to China by its social and economic 
changes. More importantly, I examine the existing studies on authoritarian resilience and 
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summarise the governmentality that has been identified as responsible for preventing the 
regime’s failure, despite these dramatic social changes. 
Notwithstanding the effective statecraft of the authorities, individuals as an important 
part of the two-way power story enjoy some degree of agency when it comes to changing the 
power equilibrium. Normally, people as they perceive external social and economic changes 
adjust their political attitude and behaviour accordingly, but in certain conditions, they may 
choose to take action and affect the policy process through a range of approaches (such as 
voting and protesting). In the third part of the literature review, I investigate the power 
interaction between the state and individuals especially in the Chinese context, with a focus on 
the agency of individuals and the options open to them when faced with such macroscopic 
notions as “policy”, “state” and “transitional society”. I probe the mechanism at the individual 
level through theoretical discussions on the formation of political attitudes and behavioural 
change, together with the potential for counter-conduct in an individual’s toolkit. 
Chapter 3: Revealing the governmentality by the case of pension reforms 
The logic of whom to govern and how to govern can be revealed by the design of 
governmental programmes, the way that social problems are defined and divisions/distinctions 
are established and the knowledge produced to shape people’s ideologies. In Chapter 3, I 
examine some designs for policy experiments/schemes and the techniques that have been used 
intentionally by the Chinese government to shape the public’s expectations, before discussing the 
rationale behind these practices. As I observed above, of the social and economic changes during 
China’s transition, social welfare provision is one of the most important areas that the public can 
directly perceive and it is also an arena in which we can vividly see the close interaction between 
the state and the public. My substantive case in this chapter, therefore, focuses on social policies 
relating to old-age benefits, an area that reveals the state’s purposeful design in modifying the 
distribution of public goods and redrawing the roles of the government and the public. Because 
people are not likely to give up their existing benefits, any state that plans to make changes in 
this respect must proceed carefully. In China’s reformed welfare system, the social right to 
income and social security are now defined more frequently on an individual basis, rather than 
collectively through work units and people’s communes, as they were in the previous system. 
The question of “who gets what and how they get it” has gradually been connected to individual 
endowments, such as social status, political identity, social capital, and so on. Therefore, it is time 
to ask how the new system allocates pension benefits to different social groups now that the 
  31 
institution has drifted away from the old communist system; and what the rationale is behind 
various policy experiments/adjustments carried out by the government. 
In the first part of Chapter 3, I trace all the social schemes related to the old-age benefits 
in China since 1978 and make comparisons between the policy schemes according to the 
different political status of the recipients. To precisely identify the different entitlements to  
benefits across segmented pension schemes, I collected statistical data from China Labour 
Statistical Yearbooks, Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbooks and other datasets, compared variations 
such as the eligible population, participating population, coverage rate, pension benefit per 
person per year, incremental rate of pension benefit of welfare provision and so on. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the strategy of differentiation in the government’ welfare allocation to 
minimize the fiscal burden, is first to sacrifice the social benefits for employees of state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) and later on those for public institution employees, while providing 
modest/slim welfare benefits for social groups that can be bought off with minimal expense. 
Meanwhile, the government officials, as the core elites of the governing class, have constantly 
enjoyed the most generous social benefits. Evidence that support this argument is observed from 
policy shifts to and from various pension schemes, such as the retrenchment policy reform for 
SOE employees; expanded coverage for rural residents and migrant worker from rural areas; and 
a reformed contribution ratio in the pension scheme for public institution employees. To 
summarize, the resource allocation strategy in China’s segmented pension reform favours the 
core elites and distributes limited fiscal resources to social groups which cost least per unit. 
If this new differentiation system is becoming entrenched, how did the state frame and 
justify its new policies and, through them, the legitimacy of the state itself? In other words, what 
kind of knowledge about pension benefits was produced and promoted by the state when it tried 
to persuade the public to accept the reform? In the second part of Chapter 3, I investigate the 
knowledge construction from the content of the policy statements and official newspapers by 
fleshing out the use of discourses, differences in sentiment and the order of prioritization when 
the large-scale welfare retrenchment took place for the employees of enterprises and public 
institutions. I use quantitative text analysis (QTA) to show that the persuasive discourse from the 
government produced intentional belief and knowledge about pension benefits, and the 
allocation of responsibility and accountability. It also constructed specific images of deserving 
and undeserving beneficiaries. The text data mainly come from the official news data in the 
People’s Daily dataset.  
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The QTA analysis focuses on two specific pension reforms: the pension reform for 
enterprise employees in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the pension reform for rural residents 
in the 1990s (as pilot projects in local regions) and late 2000s (as nationwide policy for action). 
The successive waves of pension reform for enterprise employees were closely connected with 
the economic reform of state-owned enterprises and reallocation of state-individual 
responsibility for old-age welfare. The state needed to persuade the enterprise employees that 
they had to take care of themselves and make clear what they should expect from the state. The 
pension pilots launched by local authorities for rural residents in the 1980s and early 1990s also 
served to promote the one-child policy, while those in the late 2000s accompanied the process of 
rapid urbanization. To reform the rural pension schemes, the state had to convince the public 
why rural residents deserved greater pension benefits.  
Evidence from the official newspaper shows that the logic of reconstructing the public’s 
knowledge and expectations regarding the redistribution of social benefits and the locus of 
responsibility between the state and individuals, mainly focused on reiterating the principles of: 
“contribution and reward”, “rights and obligations”. As a consequence, individuals’ personal 
lives were socialized and initiated in a broader system than the previous one, which had been 
based on work units or localized systems. People’s personal interests were materialized and 
assessed in relation to the performance of society, or the state, as a whole; and the government 
sought to persuade them that they could receive rewards only by contributing to others. 
Chapter 4: Evaluating the effectiveness of statecraft with a sub-reform 
If the state is as easily capable of manipulating policy design and promoting social policy 
reform as it appears in Chapter 3, are these strategies effective in changing the public’s attitudes? 
In this section, I use causal inference and investigate the effect of the government’s strategies of 
combining experimentation and propaganda in a specific policy reform in China.  
As indicated in Chapter 3, the context of China’s social policy reform is that the old 
social welfare system based on enterprises and financed from the state-budget was gradually 
changed to fit the nature of a market economy. The provision of social welfare in particular 
emphasised “purchased rights” and “individual contributions”. Individuals and families, society 
and commercial organizations were called upon to play larger roles and fulfil the responsibility 
abandoned by the government when the state was retreating from the front line. However, the 
public has not reached a consensus regarding the relative positions of the state and individuals in 
welfare provision. The inertia inherited from the tradition of state socialism constantly reverts to 
portraying the state as the main party responsible for welfare provision. Therefore, the 
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privatization of welfare provision by either relieving the state of its burden or sharing 
responsibility for it stands in stark contrast to the previous concept of the state-individual 
relationship. People do not seem to have adjusted to the rapid change and the loss of their 
existential security may cause anxiety and deep concern. The situation may become even more 
critical if we factor in the increasing consciousness of the value of a social right to decent 
education, health, pensions and so on. The expectations of the public and the state’s approach 
appear to be at odds. The authorities therefore have been pressured to take steps in their reforms 
that will adapt them to maintaining public consent. 
I addressed the research question of this chapter by taking advantage of a quasi-
experimental pilot scheme in China, the enterprise employees’ old-age social insurance scheme 
reform, and designed a counterfactual difference-in-differences (DID) analytical approach which 
looked before and after a policy intervention at its effect on the welfare preferences and regime 
support of the public. The pilot policy was implemented in 2001 or 2003 in selected provinces, 
then expanded to other provinces in 2006 or 2008. Policy experimentation can help downplay 
the controversy of reforms by relaxing the pace of implementation and minimizing the public’s 
confusion and anxiety. In the process of policy experimentation led by the central government, 
local governments’ promotion of the reform tends to follow the typical dependency on 
communist official propaganda which exaggerates the omnipotent role of the state, while also 
trying to avoid the risks entailed in the reform. In other words, articles in the official local 
newspapers described the pilot policy as closely associated with the generosity of the state, which 
may have increased people’s expectations of the state’s duty to take care of individuals’ social 
welfare. In other words, there was a mismatch between the official propaganda and the policy 
content. 
Using individual data from two rounds survey, I employ DID method to leverage the 
causal relationship between the statecraft and the individuals’ change in attitude. The empirical 
result reveals that the pilot policy launched by the central government has had significant effects 
on citizens’ understanding of the privatization of responsibility in general, and society has 
accepted the underlying individual responsibility for taking care of the social risks that face older 
people. The length of experience of the policy has amplified the attitudinal change and clarified 
individuals’ expectations of the government’s role. In addition, the analysis confirms my 
hypothesis on the interactive effect of the local official propaganda and the pilot effect. The 
official propaganda effect that emphasizes an omnipotent government has successfully 
moderated the treatment effect of the pilot scheme on the general public’s understanding of the 
privatization of welfare responsibility. Beyond the public’s attitudinal change regarding welfare 
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responsibility, I also found that the influence of local propaganda interfered with the pilot policy 
and had a contradictory effect on people’s political trust. Controlling for other factors, short-
term exposure to the local propaganda may increase the public’s confidence in state institutions, 
but long-term exposure actually reduces political trust. The result highlights the fact that the 
Chinese government’s experimentation effort can in the short term generate a significant change 
in people’s attitudes and build a certain consensus which favours the reform, while words of 
praise on the government’s greatness from the official newspapers increase people’s political 
support. However, the disjunction of the policy content and propaganda content actually 
backfires on institutional trust in the long term.  
Chapter 5: Note the cognitional counter-conduct of the public 
In spite of their well-designed statecraft, the authorities run the risks of falsified 
compliance from the governed. People’s apparent compliance carries the seed of transformation 
within it. They can reflect on the idea of “state”, “politics” and the “state-individual relationship” 
in their interactions with the public power. These reflections as seeds of ideological rebellion will 
play an important role in shaping the expectations and consent of the general people in the long 
run, such as the distrust risk brought about by the disconnection between propaganda and policy 
content mentioned above. Therefore, Chapter 5 is designed to investigate possible cognitional 
counter-conduct in authoritarian regimes and what falsified compliance implies for the future of 
a regime. To make the conceptualization and measurement easier, I take falsified compliance in 
authoritarian regimes as the hidden discontent and disdain towards the authorities in people’s 
voiced consent. Falsified compliance can include political trust of the government and the 
incumbent leader, compliance (or not) as regards political uncertainties during the reform, 
attitude to the official propaganda, and so on. Empirically, it is not easy to find people’s real 
attitudes, especially in answers to questions which may be quite sensitive. Therefore, I used a 
combination of interviews and a (design of) experimental survey to address this problem and 
subsequently changed the research material into a combination of observational data and 
supplementary interview data in response to external constraints (a more detailed explanation is 
to be found in Chapter 5).   
The data reveal rich details of falsified political compliance, various mechanisms that lead 
to a change in people’s public/private faces and the heterogeneity across social groups. My 
analysis show that people’s compliance regarding different representatives of the state changed 
substantially with specific issues and the atmosphere at the time. Although the central 
government, the party and the top leader enjoy more approval, even in private conversations, 
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people sometimes refuse to bear the political cost at the individual level. In addition to the 
political institutions, private political knowledge and public discourse sometimes run along 
different tracks. However, even though many people can identify the disconnection between 
public and private knowledge, as well as the discontinuity with official discourse, many choose to 
live with it without further questioning. Why would many people still choose (intentionally or 
unconsciously) to rearrange their public/private face regarding certain political/societal issues? 
The reasons can be traced from the existing cultural, historical and educational factors that have 
socialized their ideas from the beginning. It can also be identified in the external forces imposed 
by the state and the society and the resulting fear, political apathy and group ignorance in the 
population.  
Does falsified compliance vary among people in different social groups? Although my 
qualitative data cannot make an inference for the general population, the people from my sample 
with different endowments, experience and capital do present different patterns of political 
compliance. For instance, education can bring someone more socioeconomic capital, as well as a 
certain illusion of autonomy, but it also imposes a binding power when individuals face a threat 
from the state. Regarding generational differences, the past experience of the older generation 
may turn some of their “unthinkable issues” into “unthought issues” for the next generation. 
What, then, are the implications, for one’s actions and the potential breakthrough of individual 
subjectivity, of falsifying one’s political attitudes? My evidence shows that, although many people 
are pessimistic about all kinds of political participation, some tend to keep their awareness, 
consciousness and rationality despite the pressure from the state and society. 
In the final chapter, Chapter 6, I revisit the research question with a cross-reference with 
the evidence drawn from each empirical chapter, discuss the contributions and empirical 
implications of my work and lay out some possibilities for further investigation.  
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Chapter 2  Literature review 
In this chapter, I present a rationale of my project with reflective discussions of the 
existing literature. To be more specific, I begin by illustrating the existing theoretical discussion 
of legitimation of the state and showing why governmentality in modern society needs 
investigation. I present the special context of transitional authoritarian regimes, and the way 
institutional characteristics shape the state’s efforts to maintain the public’s compliance. 
Following the theoretical setup, in Section 2, I demonstrate the substantive features of 
transitional state socialism and the relevant theories both in general and as applied to China. By 
elaborating on the social changes in transitional societies, I clarify the opportunities and risks that 
authority faces in its governance, highlighting the required skills as scholars see them. But how 
about the other side of the power relationship—the “people”? In Section 3, I address the 
individual’s subjectivity facing state power, how personal attitudes and actions are shaped by 
governmentality, and the possibilities of “counter-conduct” that people in general have as well as 
people in non-democratic regimes. 
Section 1 Why legitimacy matters and how the existence of the public 
shapes statecraft? 
Understanding state power: “legitimacy” and “governmentality” 
A Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy and consent  
Any power relation reveals the need of the dominant side to maintain its authority. The 
power relation between the state and the individual, which has been a fundamental topic in 
political sociology and political science, is a typical dominant-dominated power relationship. For 
a modern state, its survival requires order, stability and effective governance; all demanding 
considerable co-operation from its population. While differing in content, several classical 
studies share the logic that the legitimation of the government secures enough co-operation to 
maintain the system’s capacity to withstand shock and failure (Giddens, 1981; Lipset & Man, 
1960; Tilly, 2017). From legitimacy, the subordinates in a power relationship can obtain moral 
grounds for co-operation and obedience and the power or authority gets the right to expect their 
compliance. 
Max Weber offered the most influential definition of legitimacy in political sociology. He 
wrote, “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness 
to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent 
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prestige”(Weber, 1978, p. 382). By combining a descriptive and normative typology of 
legitimacy, Beetham identified three distinct elements of a general concept of legitimacy: in his 
definition, it conforms to established rules, which can be justified by reference to beliefs shared 
by both dominant and subordinate groups, and there is evidence of consent by the subordinate 
to the particular power relation (Beetham, 1991). Developed from the Weberian tradition, Lipset 
(1959) gave a clearer definition of the legitimacy of political systems, stating that this term 
“involves the capacity of a political system to engender and sustain the belief that existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society”. Linz (1988) also 
defined legitimacy as “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political 
institutions are better than others that might be established and therefore can demand 
obedience”. 
The importance of “belief” is also true in a Gramscian analysis of power relations, since 
social groups or institutions are fairly capable of generating a hegemonic order by modifying the 
common sense of them. “Manufacture consent” lies in the core of Gramsci’s concept of 
“hegemony” (1971), which refers to the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence 
exerted by the dominant social class over others. The state’s main function in the modern period 
is educative and formative; it can train individuals to accept the existing production processes 
through influencing their “common sense”. In this way, the state can diffuse its power through 
civil society. Unlike “political society”, which works through force, “civil society” operates by 
constructing consent through schools, the media, and so on. As Gramsci said, “they (civil 
society) operate without sanctions or compulsory obligations but still exert a collective pressure... 
and obtain objective results in the evolution of customs, ways of thinking, morality, etc.” 
(Gramsci et al., 1971, p. 242). In addition, when a state is experiencing “transformation” and the 
“redefinition” of a previous ideological and institutional hegemonic structure, it may help itself 
by re-articulating ideological factors and rebuilding a new world-view for the governed (Gramsci 
et al., 1971).  
In practice, the consent of subordinates can be manufactured with obvious or subtle 
persuasions. For instance, Burawoy extended Gramsci’s discussion of cultural hegemony to the 
micro dimension of the factory (Burawoy, 1982), and specified that “the economic process of 
producing things constituted as a game is simultaneously a political process of reproducing social 
relations and an ideological process producing consent to these relations” (Burawoy, 2012, p. 
194). His work suggests that unlike a despotic regime, using arbitrary coercion which could 
create uncertainty for its subordinates, a hegemonic regime will persuade its subordinates to 
accept the idea that the social structure is a game and to hand over consent. Like the Gramscian 
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elaboration, the concept of consent manufacture through persuasion is also found in studies of 
communication, such as that of Herman and Chomsky (2010). These writers developed a 
propaganda model to describe the situation where the media select specific information to shape 
the public’s consensus regarding certain issues. They acknowledged that “it is much more 
difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the media are private and formal censorship 
is absent”, than the system “in countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state 
bureaucracy, [with] monopolistic control over the media, often supplemented by official 
censorship” (Herman & Chomsky, 2010). Nevertheless, they still managed to identify the societal 
function of five structural control mechanisms that the media employ to deny public’s access to 
alternative views in the US. 
Sources of authority and state rationality 
If legitimacy is crucial for the modern state, then why exactly are people willing to entrust 
(or change) their consent to the state and to support it? Discussions of the source of authority 
are indispensable if we want to investigate the different mechanisms used by modern states to 
exert power over their populations. Weber distinguished three ideal types of legitimacy. a) 
Traditional legitimacy rests “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and 
the legitimacy of those exercising authorities under them” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). Under 
traditional legitimacy, the subordinates offer their support to the authority as laid down in 
enduring ritual; b) Charismatic legitimacy rests “on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism 
or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed 
or ordained by him” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). Subordinates offer their consent with a genuine 
belief in the personality of the authority; and c) Legal-rational legitimacy rests “on a belief in the 
legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). In the modern world it has tended to outdo the other ideal 
types. To be more specific, competitive elections form the basis of legalized government in 
liberal democratic countries. Offe (1987) specifically argued that the rule of law, representative 
democracy, and provision for “civilian security” through the welfare state are three components 
of the modern state-citizen relationship. In this relationship, the state turns to the “people” as its 
ultimate source of authority, while the citizens, having lost both the feudal forms of paternalistic 
“welfare” and individual economic autarchy, depend upon the state (Offe, 1987). Offe’s work is 
an approach to understanding the relationship between the state’s behaviours and individuals’ 
choices in giving consent. Similar explanations can be found in Lipset’s work (1994), which 
states that legal-rational authority can work because of a popular acceptance of the 
appropriateness of the system of rules under which they have won and held office. 
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Among Weber’s three types of authority, bureaucracy is the core feature of the rational-
legal authority because it constitutes the most efficient and rational way in which human activity 
can be organized and because systematic processes and organized hierarchies are necessary to 
maintain order, maximize efficiency, and eliminate favouritism (Weber, 1978). It benefits from 
the process of rationalization and is indispensable for modern states, enterprises and many other 
organizations in modern society. A typical bureaucratic system has many unique characteristics: 
hierarchical organization, formal lines of authority, division of labour, officials with expert 
training, and so on. As Weber wrote, “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of files, 
continuity, unit, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs–
these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administered organization” 
(Weber, 1978, p. 978). Inside the bureaucracy structure, bureaucrats or officers are positioned 
hierarchically, and their actions are regulated by strict rules. Each of them is assigned proper 
duties and their cooperation makes possible even large-scale organizational operations. Its 
efficiency, power and strict hierarchy make the operation of bureaucracy especially appropriate 
to state administered benefits; which also provide the society and state with rationality and 
efficiency.  
The Foucauldian state: Governmentality of the modern state 
In capturing the nature of the state rationality and state politics, Foucault also grounds it 
on “power”, but focuses on the techniques that the state use to rule the population. Foucault’s 
approach to deciphering state power focus on its technologies, governance objects and 
calculation, or, in his words, ‘‘the state is nothing more than the mobile effect of a regime of 
multiple governmentalities’’ (Foucault, Davidson, & Burchell, 2008). Foucault developed his 
view of governmental rationality from the philosophy of Perrière and Machiavell and rescaled 
the meaning of governance. State governance is governing a sort of complex of men and 
things; the objects of governance include not only men and their complex relationship with 
things (such as resources), but also the relationship of things with things, such as customs, 
dependency, habits, and so on. Foucault also recognized that government has a purpose: it 
arranges—or, in his word, “disposes”—things for a particular end, a suitable end for each of the 
things to be governed (Foucault, 2009, p. 99). In line with the things of various types, the ends 
for the state fall into multiple types. For instance, increasing state wealth, maintaining a 
reasonably-sized population, sanctioning obedience to the laws, and so on. What is important for 
the state is the tactics that might be employed to attain the various targets. 
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The governmentalized state developed from the late 16th and 17th centuries and in the 
18th century the emergence of the population problem brought into play the art of government 
when the traditional family model disappeared before the exponentially increasing size of the 
governed. Instruments such as statistics were devised for governments to use in pursuit of a 
better “being” (with reference, for example, to the population’s condition, its wealth, longevity, 
health, etc.); in other words, governmentality, in acting directly on the population, made it both 
the target and the tactic. Governing the population obliges the state to pay attention to both the 
individualized interests of each person and the interwoven interests of the entire population. 
However, from the viewpoint of the governed, even though the population is aware of its own 
needs and aspirations, it is in most cases basically ignorant of ongoing governmentality. I will 
discuss individuals’ reactions and choices confronted by various forms of statecraft in Section 3.  
How then are the details of governmentality to be depicted? Foucault recognized three 
dimensions of meaning for governmentality as state rationality. “Governmentality” refers to “the 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics 
that allow the exercise of state power … having the population as its target, political economy as 
its major form of knowledge, and the apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. 
Governmentality can also be identified as “the tendency, the line of force, that… has led to the 
development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses and the development of a series of 
knowledges. Moreover, “governmentality” can be understood as “the process, or rather, the 
result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative 
state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually ‘governmentalized’” (Foucault, 
2009, p. 109).  
The governmentalization of the state became prevalent at the start of the 19th century, 
and has since become constantly modified and redefined. When the government changes its 
practices, the state itself is also reconstructed. The tactics of government allow the continual 
definition of the “state’s domain, what is public and what private … [the] state’s competence”, 
and most importantly, the “survival and limits of the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 109). In other 
words, the state’s governmentality provides a window for scholars to make backward inductions 
about the design and realization of state power. 
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Legitimacy and governmentality in non-democratic and transitional countries  
Importance of ideological legitimacy, censorship and technological statecraft 
Countries without representative institutions and the rule of law differ in many ways as 
regard state legitimacy and governmentality. The distinctive socioeconomic and historical 
constraints in these countries have largely shaped the logic and presentation of statecraft. 
Current theories propose that the governance in these non-democratic regimes relies more on 
ideological legitimacy—through knowledge construction and censorship—and performance-
based legitimacy than it does in their democratic counterparts.  
Ideological legitimacy can be drawn from traditional, religious or other established forms 
of belief and provides authorities with a reasoned right to rule. As Douglas (1986, pp. 45-46), “to 
acquire legitimacy, every kind of institution needs a formula that founds its rightness in reason 
and in nature ... for a convention to turn into a legitimate social institution it needs a parallel 
cognitive convention to sustain it”. Ideological legitimacy also provides the governed with an 
interpretative schema of order. Empirical studies in East Asian countries have verified that the 
Confucian scholar-official still functions in the psycho-cultural construct of East Asian societies 
(Tu & Du, 1996). Shin’s study (2012), based on the Asian Barometer Survey, also argued that 
most East Asian countries with a Confucian legacy tend to adopt a “paternalistic meritocracy”, 
take a pragmatic approach regarding economic development and overlook the procedural 
meaning of democracy.  
In non-democratic regimes where state censorship is easier to implement and state 
propaganda is much more powerful, the reliance on ideological legitimation is heavier than 
elsewhere. In these regimes, authority commits to ideas and uses ideas rather than normative 
procedures to derive policies. For instance, Linz argued that in authoritarian regimes, the 
leadership is constrained by “ill-defined but predictable norms, limited pluralism, [and] 
distinctive mentalities” that fall short of a “full-blown ideology” (Linz, Greenstein, & Polsby, 
1975, p. 297). Ideological indoctrination (combined with mass terror, as in Nazi Germany, 
Stalin’s Russia and Maoist China) compresses the space of societal interaction, and closely 
supervises the amount of information that individuals may access. As Thompson described it, 
“‘lonely’ people” due to a lack of “individual autonomy”, “find fulfilment in the totalitarian 
ideology that offers a pseudo-community, with the ‘mission’ to build a new society in which 
scarcity is abolished and human happiness achieved” (Thompson, 2002, p. 82). The elements 
used by the state to persuade its people that the authority has the right to rule change over time 
and with the challenges the state encounters. They may be summed up as collective honour, 
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moral merits or the legacy of tradition and can also be egoism’s rational choices. In China’s case 
after the “reform and opening up” in 1978, when the social and economic scenario shifted away 
from the old communist system it used to rely on, scholars were keen to figure out the new 
world-view that the state used to manufacture consent along with other skills for maintaining 
legitimacy. I give more details of the substantive context of China’s transition and the theories 
explaining the Chinese government’s statecraft in Section 2. 
The development of technology provides authoritarian regimes with more tools for 
implementing “meticulous governance”. For instance, e-governance and big data4 have made it 
easier for the state to collect information about the population and conduct risk evaluations; 
GPS technology had yielded more precise measurements of the territory; AI skills enable the 
police to identify and locate criminals in a crowd. With better technology, the state could 
manage, model, share and transfer data, turning the “uncontrollable” into “controllable”. For 
instance, with a smart supervision system, big data can analyse the correlations between events of 
small probability and improve the prediction of social risks, thereby reducing the unpredictability 
of public crises. This makes it easier for the state to manage a mobile and fragmented society. All 
these skills extend the state’s infrastructural power into every aspect of society and individual 
lives, navigate for the state’s governmentality and help implement the state’s will.  
Performance-based legitimacy and welfare provision in non-democratic regimes 
Some scholars (such as White, 1986) argue that socio-economic performance can also be 
a form of legitimacy basis for the government, even though no well-constructed theoretical 
schema has been used in sociology.5 Performance legitimacy differs from other ideal types of 
Weberian sources of authority in that it is constructed from the outcome of governmental 
behaviours. The population decides on its consent and support after reviewing the social and 
economic benefits received from the authority. Among the Weberians, Lipset (1959) has touched 
on the importance of state performance to a regime’s stability, where state performance “means 
the actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of 
government as defined by the expectations of most members of a society and the expectations 
of powerful groups within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed force”. Yet, he 
separates performance, which he relates to the “effectiveness” of the government, from 
legitimacy, since he believes that “effectiveness is primarily an instrumental dimension, legitimacy 
 
4 “The project instruction on ‘Big data driven management and policy making’ Project (2017)” (Chinese), 
http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/publish/portal0/zdyjjh/info69876.htm. [Accessed 2019-06-12]. 
5 The notion of “performance legitimacy” is frequently mentioned in political science studies and also used in the 
literature of organizational sociology.  
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is more affective and evaluative” (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). However, Zhao (2009) insists that 
instrumental performance directly shapes the evaluations of the public. Nannestad and Paldam 
(1994) also identified the “vote-popularity function” in explaining public support for the 
government as one of the functions of the economic and political outcomes. 
Generally speaking, we can split the performance-based legitimacy of the state into three, 
corresponding to the political, economic and social fields in modern society where the authority 
can act to gain and maintain legitimacy with the public. The regime can consider providing civil 
liberties such as free speech, an independent press, the rule of law and genuinely competitive 
elections, among others. It can also provide other products, including economic benefits and 
social welfare.  
The three types of performance are naturally different. The political rights6 issued by the 
authority refer to “the rights that involve participation in the establishment or administration of 
a government and are usually held to entitle the adult citizen to the exercise of the franchise, the 
holding of public office and other political activities” (Merriam Webster). Political rights 
generally include the right to vote, to be elected, to organize political associations, and so on. 
They are protected by the constitution and are necessary for citizens’ effective participation in 
politics. Habermas (1994, p. 2) argued that political rights are “positive liberties”, since these 
rights “guarantee not freedom from external compulsion but the possibility of participation in a 
common praxis, through the exercise of which citizens can first make themselves into what they 
want to be—politically autonomous authors of a community of free and equal persons”. 
Through the rights of association, free speech, the press and many other practices, citizens can 
insert their own interest as political input and influence the formation of government, the 
making of policies, and so on.  
Economic rights such as work, property and economic security promise people access to 
the benefits of development and material resources. Some scholars have stated that economic 
rights are a “basic need” of individuals and should be protected even before the issue of 
adequate political rights (e.g., Donnelly, 1981; R. Howard, 1983; Shue, 1996; Streeten, 1980). 
Beetham (1995, p. 44) argued that, “in a world rich in resources and the accumulation of human 
knowledge, everyone ought to be guaranteed the basic means for sustaining life”. A broad sense 
of economic rights implies more than basic needs or survival; individuals should be permitted to 
pursue larger profits within the institutional structure. In other words, the fulfilment of 
economic rights triggers a distribution of resources. 
 
6 Political rights are generally related to civil rights despite some subtle differences between them (Marshall, 1964). 
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  In modern societies, the benefits brought by social protection, assistance and insurance 
are classified as individuals’ social rights, whatever the regime. The concept of social rights 
derives from sociologist T. H. Marshall’s work “Class, Citizenship and Social Development” 
(1964). His theory identifies three elements of citizenship—political, civil and social. One 
significant and valuable point in his theory is that the concept of social rights enabled him to 
introduce the positive notion of liberty into citizenship: rights to welfare and resources, such as 
the rights to health, education and a dignified level of social and economic wellbeing, regardless 
of economic standing (Plant & Jones, 1991). Social rights are inherently different from political 
rights and civil rights since they refer to claims on the redistribution of resources and claims to 
benefits guaranteed by the state, but not claims made against the state (Cornwall & Gaventa, 
2000). The principle of social rights addresses such questions as “Who should provide social 
services and which groups should get what kinds of social resources?”. Therefore, social rights 
are more probable issued in regimes where the authorities are hesitating to issue political rights. 
These three kinds of rights are very important to the authority’s rule. However, a 
sustainable level of legitimacy does not always need them all to be guaranteed. Moreover, we 
might expect a conscious or unconscious shift in the legitimacy-base when the state perceives a 
potential crisis of legitimacy. We see many combinations of performance legitimacy in practice. 
In countries without competitive elections and other political rights, the government may work 
on other benefits in order to gain support and maintain the stability of the state. For instance, in 
the absence of proper political rights less developed countries usually prioritise economic growth 
and development (Young, 2008). Communist regimes generally provide a high level of social 
welfare: a comprehensive educational and health care system, security of employment and stable 
prices, modest but steadily rising living standards and upward career mobility, all of which are 
sustained by high and steady rates of economic growth within a framework of public ownership 
and central planning (White, 1986). Lipset noted that “non-traditional authoritarian regimes are 
more brittle than democratic ones”; and “if autocracies fail economically and/or socially, their 
lack of legitimacy will facilitate a breakdown” (Lipset, 1995, p. 9). 
Theoretical studies in political science shed more light on the reason why the state is 
more likely to deliver social rights in non-democratic countries. Some scholars highlight the 
paternalistic role of the authority in explaining the public welfare in those regimes (Beck, 1997; 
Leung & Nann, 1995). A functionalist approach may expect the state to provide certain social 
services in exchange for people’s loyalty (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Rimlinger, 1971). 
Karshenas and Moghadam (2006) argued that many non-democratic countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa have since the 1960s achieved quite remarkable improvements in their 
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health and educational indicators, which have contributed to the legitimacy of the new post-
colonial nations. Therefore, welfare provision can be used as a tool for social control, or to 
maintain social stability and legitimacy (Cook, 1993, 2013; Nechemias, 1980; Nullmeier & 
Kaufmann, 2010) and even works as a way to promote economic development (Rudra, 2008). 
Many scholars have pointed out that the public support for Chinese government is 
constructed upon the performance of China’s economic progress since the transformation from 
the former state, which was partly founded on an equalitarian system of social welfare. In the 
early stages of China’s “reform and opening up”, the state imported the market principle to drive 
development and address such political consequences of radical communism as the “Great Leap 
Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution”. At the time, the economic benefits brought by the high 
rate of economic growth led to an increase in public support for the state. Meanwhile, the social 
rights that accompanied the planned economy were more or less discarded. From the beginning 
of the 21st century, the persistent substantial slowdown in the economic growth rate has 
provoked questions about the formal theoretical model of “economic performance legitimacy” 
(C. K. Lee & Zhang, 2013). The growing consciousness of public rights and the changing 
demographic scenario of the society indicated that the government’s legitimacy could be 
compromised by widespread public dissatisfaction if government failed to provide basic social 
welfare (Booth & Seligson, 2009). Some scholars suggest that the expansion of redistributive 
policies, such as delivering pensions and health insurance, hence became important tools for 
consolidating the legitimacy of the state (Meng & Zhu, 2015).  
Transitional state and potential legitimation crisis 
The issue of state legitimacy and governmentality become more complicated when a 
regime is experiencing transition. Legitimacy can be earned and brings a “legitimacy crisis” when 
it is lost. Lipset distinguished two general kinds of legitimation crisis generated from the “crisis 
of change”. This occurs “during a transition to a new social structure, if (1) the status of major 
conservative institutions is threatened during the period of structural change; and (2) all the 
major groups in the society do not have access to the political system in the transitional period, 
or at least as soon as they develop political demands” (Lipset & Man, 1960, p. 78). As examples, 
a type (1) crisis occurs during the process of transformation from an aristocratic monarchy to a 
democratic republic and a type (2) crisis can be identified from the emerging of the bourgeoisie. 
The difference between these two types is that the first is a systematic crisis of custom while the 
second is specifically related to the effectiveness of the current system. As Lipset noted, “after a 
new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of 
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major groups (on the grounds of ‘effectiveness’) for a long enough period to develop legitimacy 
upon the new basis, a new crisis may develop” (Lipset & Man, 1960, p. 82). 
Habermas had a specific view of legitimacy and legitimation problems in the capitalist 
world. He argued that, in advanced capitalism, the state has two main roles: “on the one hand, 
the state apparatus regulates the entire economic cycle by means of global planning; on the other 
it improves the conditions under which capital is exploited” (1976, p. 366). The state as a ruler 
needs mass loyalty to perform these roles. However, the political system cannot itself ensure 
loyalty to its policies. Through the interdependency of the cultural system, economic system and 
political system, the problem of a motivation crisis—“syndromes of civil and familial-vocational 
privatism”—“ultimately shifts to a legitimation crisis in the political system of capitalist 
countries” (Jürgen Habermas, 1975, p. 75).  
Because a transitional regime is more susceptible to legitimacy crises, the state must be 
more cautious and has dynamic (changing) ideas of governmentality. Even though China 
features a different polity and culture, the legitimation problem applies equally to China as to the 
West. The common factor in regard to Lipset’s two types of crisis, for Habermas’s capitalist 
states and my case of China after 1978, is that all of these cases are dealing with social 
transitions. As I outlined in Chapter 1, the transitional process of China’s economy and society 
did bring many problems for the authority. China is not necessarily experiencing a legitimation 
crisis; however, the government is working to manage its legitimacy in order to prevent a crisis 
from emerging (Sun, 2004) and adjusts its statecraft accordingly.  
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Section 2: Transitional State Socialism and authoritarian resilience: why did 
the dramatic social change in China not incur a regime failure? 
In discussing governmentality and statecraft, the answer to “what’s special about China’s 
case?” involves three important aspects of the state. First of all, as an authoritarian regime, it has 
no rule of law, no normal legitimacy and the state is more capable than a democratic one of 
using unconstitutional power. The second aspect concerns the special ideological foundation and 
historical legacy of China: as an heir of communism, the authority relies heavily on the “red 
ideology” in the political culture. Finally, starting from the early 1980s, the state has been leading 
a large-scale socioeconomic reform by bringing the market principle into all the dimensions of 
social life. The transition process brought by marketization has entailed fundamental changes in 
distribution, redistribution and the notion of social justice in Chinese society. I have discussed 
the specific constraints posed by authoritarianism on the governmentality of the state in Section 
1. In this section I further elaborate on the feature of a communist regime in transition (taking 
China as an example) and discuss the respective governmentalities.  
Transitional state socialism in general and in China: similarities and differences 
The late 20th century witnessed large-scale institutional change in communist regimes. 
The process of de-stalinization, liberation and democratization distort central planning and a 
transition to state socialism. Identified as redistributive (Polanyi & MacIver, 1944), “state 
socialism” features a centrally directed distribution of goods and services by a structure of social 
organization from lower production units to the centre and back again. Within state socialist 
regimes, the political, economic and social affairs of the whole country were monopolized by the 
undivided power of the Marxist-Leninist party-state (Kornai, 1992). As a special form of society, 
state socialism enjoys its own institutional mechanism regarding development, production 
relations, redistribution and social welfare. For instance, Kornai identified the shortage economy and 
soft budget constraints that guide the reproduction and distribution of state socialism; and finds that 
the soft budget constraint syndrome is usually associated with the paternalistic role of the state vis-à-vis 
economic organizations and private firms, non-profit institutions and households (Kornai, 1992). 
In his definition, the shortage economy suffers from general, frequent, intensive and chronic 
shortages in all spheres of the economy and results in low efficiency, technical backwardness and 
conservatism.  
The basic principle of state socialist regimes is that material resources are distributed 
through central planning and a political identity system. Taking China as an example, the state 
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organizes and governs individuals through work units (Danwei, a place of employment) in urban 
areas and people’s communes (Renmin Gongshe, an administrative institution) in rural areas. These 
economic and administrative systems pose some serious challenges to continuous governance: 
the collective ownership hinders efficiency and incentives for improving productivity; the 
scarcity of resources cultivates an inequality manipulated by the privileged group, in other words, 
the unsustainability of the institutional setting, led to pressure for reform for state socialist 
countries in the late 20th century (Szelenyi & Szelenyi, 1994; Zhou, 2011). In China, importing 
the market principle was also an important way of overcoming the political consequences of 
radical communist movements, such as the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural 
Revolution”. 
In both East European and Asian countries, the economy takes the lead in the transition 
process. The new economic mechanism of a market-rational or market-oriented model operated 
first in Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union and China. As Szelenyi and Kostello (1996, p. 1089) 
noted, “the crucial change of circumstances was that private economic activities became legal”. 
Private initiatives rose and entrepreneurial activities increased in the expanded market. In China, 
the economic reform in rural areas began with the adoption of a household responsibility system 
and urban areas followed by promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship. The agricultural 
market, industrial market and labour market grew out of “plans”. Meanwhile, the prices were 
freed and determined solely by the market in many Eastern European countries. The mass 
privatization of state enterprises under the political mandate formed the driving force for 
recovery and growth in the early 1990s. At the same time, China’s Township-Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) in rural areas operated in the form of local government-controlled firms that to a certain 
extent liberated and decentralized the property rights (Y. Huang, 2001; Qian, 2002). As Bian 
concluded, China’s reform has involved a gradual process in which public and private economic 
institutions intersect with each other; economic segmentation links the state monopoly sector 
and the private sector; and a dual logic of market competition and interest politics underlies the 
reform and stratification processes (Bian, 2002; Bian & Qiu, 2000).   
Beyond all the similarities, China had some specific features that have shaped the process 
and performance of its transition. The differences also triggered lively and fruitful debates in the 
theoretical explorations of the social scientists. One of the most important differences is the 
degree of fulfilment of state socialism. Unlike the Soviet Union, which expanded its public 
welfare to the whole urban and rural labour force, before its economic reform China primarily 
favoured the workers of the urban state sector (Walder, 1995). The urban labour force enjoyed 
guaranteed employment (the “iron rice bowl”), egalitarian distribution and cradle-to-grave 
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welfare coverage (K.-l. Ngok, 2010), whereas in rural areas public welfare was basically a co-
operative system. Through this system, welfare responsibility was shared publicly and 
collectively, in what was called the Maoist moral economy (Perry, 1999). Pei (1996, p. 135) 
differentiated these Soviet and Chinese types as “complete state-socialist economies” and 
“incomplete state-socialist economies”, arguing that the difference in the scope of the socialist 
welfare state at the micro-level deeply shaped the response. 
In addition to the different level of involvement in state socialism, China's reform, unlike 
that in many post-communist countries, de facto observed a continuity of polity as well as a 
continuity of official ideology. As discussed in Section 1, ideology can be used to provide 
legitimacy for the state. It defines the rightful source of authority, provides criteria of collective 
interest, group identity and common knowledge. The communist regimes rely heavily on 
ideological legitimacy. For instance, the revolutionary ideology and communist ideals gave the 
CCP legitimacy during the civil war period and the earliest years of the PRC’s formation. It 
replaced the traditional idea that the political authority came with the “mandate of Heaven” and 
theorized the CCP’s right to rule with “historical materialism, class struggle and scientific 
socialism” (Guo, 2003, p. 8). The idea that socialism is more advanced and is destined to replace 
capitalism is promoted and believed by the top leaders, intellectuals and civilians.  
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union indicated to some an “end of ideology”, 
China never gave up its reliance on ideological legitimacy of communism (Holbig & Gilley, 
2010). David Lane (2007) compared the degree of political and economic reform in all 
transitional countries, including those of Latin American, saying that China conducted “great 
economic reform” but “limited or no political reform”. Moreover, unlike its Eastern European 
and former Soviet Union companions, China in its official discourse regarding the reform 
insisted on the self-perfecting correction of its own communism even though the Party is aware 
of the fading of socialist ideology (Gilley & Holbig, 2009). Political reform is never a choice for 
the top authority and the “reform and opening up” was more like an effort to “strengthen the 
normative and functional basis of one-party rule and the party’s capacity to govern” (Holbig, 
2008, p. 18). The idea of  “pragmatism” (such as “It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so 
long as it can catch mice”) promoted by Deng Xiaoping said nothing about the change to 
communist ideology and the primary leadership of the party which actually brought new life to 
the “worn-out socialist tenets” (Holbig & Gilley, 2010, p. 405).  
Moreover, instead of completely abandoning traditional culture as in the first 30 years of 
the PRC, the refurnished ideological legitimacy in China after the “reform and opening up” was 
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and still is justified by many notions from traditional political culture. Concepts such as the “rule 
by virtue” (ren zhi, 仁治), “popular consent” (min ben, 民本), “established rules” (he fa, 合法), 
“benefiting the people” (li min, 利民) and “equal distribution” (jun fu, 均富) have been used to 
justify the rule of the CCP (Guo, 2003, p. 17). The concepts of top leaders, such as “Three 
Representations” (in the Jiang era), “Harmonious Society” (in the Hu era), “Eight Honours and 
Eight Disgraces” (in the Xi era) are all vivid examples (Holbig, 2008). Therefore, a more 
consistent political institution and ideological inertia indicate the strengthening dependence on 
routine during the transformation process.  
Current transitional theories: market transition and societal transition  
The emergence of a market led to a change in the principles of distribution, the rate of 
return on human capital, the social structure and the formation of “transitional theory” in 
sociology. Sociologists have debated the paths, motivations, effects and prospects in regard to 
the transition from state socialism in Eastern Europe, East and South-East Asia and the former 
Soviet Union. Several groups of theories stand out among these explorations, including 
transitional market theory and transitional society theory. 
The market transition theory and related debates focus on the way in which economic 
institutions change and the emergence of the market leads to a change in the mechanism of 
social stratification. In understanding the dynamics of institutional change, some studies have 
taken a teleological approach and debated whether the transition process is turning into a new 
capitalism. In constructing a “neo-classic sociological theory”, Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley 
sought a Weberian interpretation of the transition process in the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union and addressed the making of capitalism without capitalists (1998). 
Burawoy echoed Polanyi and labelled the transition process a second transformation, in which 
the socialist countries have descended into capitalism (Burawoy, 2000). Other scholars have 
rejected such an approach, which implies a common trajectory and common destination for the 
state (Heyns, 2005). Stark (1991) suggests that post-socialism transformation is a path-dependent 
re-adjustment of current institutions to fit into new circumstances. Mario Nuti cited the example 
of Belarus to explore whether a reformed “market socialism” could be a resilient and sustainable 
alternative to capitalism, or in his words, “a command economy without central planning” (Nuti, 
2000, 2007). Oi and Walder argued that the Chinese economic transition is de facto a process of 
decentralized redistribution where the market mechanism has been used to complement the 
process and the state is still on “this side of the barricade” (1999). Whatever the nature of 
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China’s economic reform, the economic benefits it has brought to the public have contributed 
considerably to the acceptability of the authority. 
Other writers have concentrated on the causal process through which the emerging 
institutions have transformed the existing societal structure. They have engaged in lively debates 
regarding the social inequality in transitional socialist societies (Cao & Nee, 2000; Nee, 1989, 
1996; Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996). Ivan Szelenyi’s (1978) theory of social inequality in state 
socialism asserts that the state sets the price of labour from an administrative perspective and 
through this it obtains a surplus from non-market trading. Social inequality is thus generated 
during the state’s redistribution process, which in return causes discontent and instability among 
the disadvantaged social groups such as rural residents. Constructing his theory on Szelenyi’s 
hypothesis, Victor Nee used China’s case, arguing that the “market-based power, incentives and 
opportunities” led to a decline in social inequality, since the “transition to a market-like economy 
should result in higher returns to human capital characteristics” (1989, 1991, 2000). To 
contradict Nee’s conclusion, Bian and Logan (1996), for example, bring evidence that the urban 
unit system persisted and maintained a return rate of political capital and Rona-Tas has 
contended that the redistributive power was transformed into the private property of bureaucrats 
(Rona-Tas, 1994). 
In order to synthesise the debate and construct an inclusive theory, Szelenyi and Kostello 
attributed the resulting social inequality to different types of market penetration: local markets, 
socialist mixed economies and capitalist-oriented economies (1996). They treated the process of 
“Hungary and Poland from the mid-1960s until around 1980 and, with some differences from 
the East European cases, in China between 1977 and the mid-1980” as the emergence of a local 
market where and when the equalizing effect could be observed (Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996, p. 
1088). Later on, in Eastern Europe between 1980 and 1989 and in China after 1985, the socialist 
mixed economies dominated and market competition began to play a greater role, leading to a 
dual system of inequality (Szelenyi & Kostello, 1996). In all the Eastern European countries, the 
privatization of public property became state policy after 1989 (while in China the public sector 
has been maintained briefly). Szelenyi treated these as capitalist-oriented economies in which 
inequality was generated mainly by the market. 20 years later, Jackson and Evans (2017) used 
comparative longitudinal data, suggesting that the new transfer institutions that developed in 
central and Eastern Europe after the move from socialism to the market have led to a decline in 
social fluidity. 
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Some studies on transitional state socialism focus on the social structure change per se 
and the bottom-up pressure that drives the reform. Sun’s research on China calls for greater 
attention to be paid to the transformative relationship between the state and the society. He 
stresses that the changing political and economic systems have a profound effect on the possible 
formation of civil society and the rebuilding of society (2004, 2005). Howard’s research (2003) 
displays similar concerns about civil society in Russia and Eastern and Central Europe. A 
growing interest in theories investigating societal transition is the process of the solidification of 
social classes: we are observing clearer class boundaries and class identities and also witnessing a 
decline in social mobility. Part of the reason for this may be the imbalance of social rights 
between social groups. In other words, people of different positions and endowments enjoy 
different access to resources and many of them have begun to appeal against this injustice. As 
Sun described it, the entire society is in a situation of “fracture” (2006). Extended sociological 
research has highlighted the lack of motivation of social change from the bottom, due to the 
blocking of social mobility and the deteriorating political environment (Yu, 2011). 
In addition to the above transitional theories, scholars have also paid special attention to 
the subtle and perplexing change in the mainstream culture and public opinion in transitional 
societies. People’s attitudes to redistribution, development and the state-society relationship are 
heavily influenced by their life experiences, demographic factors and the institutional changes 
that have socialized people’s perceptions and attitudes. Thus, scholars have made multi-
dimensional and seemingly contradictory discoveries. 
In their work on Russia’s reform, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1997) found that the 
citizens in post-communist Russia do not embrace the ideology of a free market democracy and 
that their attitudes to politics and the state are deeply shaped by the socialist legacy. White’s 
study, using data from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine from 1993 to 2006, pointed out that while 
there is generally a positive attitude to the political changes, the social and economic 
shortcomings of the transformation have led to public disapproval (White, 1986). Evidence from 
Eastern Europe also supports this observation, since “literally over a single night, all the things 
that had been taken for granted were no longer valid” and many people suffer from a “serious 
identity crisis” (Ekman & Linde, 2005, p. 357). The socialist institutional settings not only 
equalized everyone’s income and social risk, but also cultivated a strong belief in an omnipotent 
government. Munro took the discussion a step further and argued that the persistent scenario of 
the socialist legacy has also deeply shaped citizens’ political behaviour (Munro, 2006). 
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But there are also some different trends. Ukraine and Russia, despite the widespread 
suffering caused by the reforms, still harbour the belief that the liberal recipes of marketization 
and privatization could work, if they were properly implemented (D. Lane, 2007). Even the 
traditional left wing has accepted the neo-liberal rhetoric and private property introduced by the 
reform policies. Gallagher (2011) deciphered some similar phenomena in China’s reform era and 
found that individual merit is highly encouraged while “waiting, relying [on] and demanding” 
governmental help is criticized. The official propaganda promotes the notion that “the market 
economy doesn’t pity the weak” and people should take responsibility for their fate. In addition, 
Gallagher’s work implies that a significant group of people in fact buy into this new ideological 
formulation. 
From the previous discussion, we can identify that transitional state socialism poses a 
special context for the society and the state. Human capital, natural resources and many other 
non-market values are dragged into the accelerated commodification process. Social inequality is 
expanding while the social classes are solidifying. For individuals, the persisting illusion of 
government omnipotence is mixed with a sense of liberal notions. For governments, their 
infrastructural power is re-adjusted while the political structure is maintained.  
Transitional scenario in the social welfare area: the communist legacy and 
privatized social rights 
The institutional transformations of state socialism in the past few decades have caused 
another theoretical challenge—fitting the post-communist welfare states into the existing 
typologies of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) seems to be particularly complicated. 
Some studies have made an effort to understand welfare provision in non-democratic contexts 
by adapt mainstream theories. For instance, in Titmuss’s (1974) and Wilensky’s (1974) 
typologies, Soviet Russia was comparable with other countries according to such standards as 
productivity-based social policy or mass participation conditions. Lipsmeyer also examined six 
Eastern-Central European countries in which the right-left ideologies “conflict” and showed 
how this shaped the social policies (Lipsmeyer, 2000). However, the distinctive variations of the 
main explanatory variables in these theories cause many problems. Most governments in non-
Western countries lack the procedural legitimacy of their democratic counterparts. In addition, 
the civil society in these countries is fragmented and much weaker in pursuing people’s social 
rights (Ferge, 1997, 2001; Paluckiene, Taljūnaitė, Blom, & Melin, 2000).  
In addition to the inconclusive welfare theories, we have seen little attention to the 
transition of social welfare among all the theories surrounding the transitional events in China. 
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The shift in social welfare provision away from the communist legacy following the privatization 
of the economic reform is among the most important changes that have occurred in China. 
Moreover, because these changes are directly related to people’s daily lives, they are obvious to 
the public. Scholars have investigated the outcomes of the transition process in regard to 
healthcare, unemployment and poverty, among other issues. But we still need a systematic 
examination of these outcomes with clear awareness and assessment of the unique combination 
of the state-individual relationship and the legacy of socialism in transitional societies. Among 
the current studies, there is too much focus on institutional changes instead of the interactions 
of the main actors: the public and the state. Few have asked how the government prevents the 
social welfare reforms of developing into a legitimacy crisis and maintains people’s consent to 
their present social rights. Therefore, my research focuses on the social welfare transformation 
during this specific period, to discern the role of state power through a) the interactions of the 
public and the state in allocating the responsibility for welfare; b) its knowledge construction on 
welfare benefits, social justice and redistribution. But first of all, how is the welfare reform in 
China after 1978 looks like?   
The social welfare reform in urban China which was set in motion only in the early 1990s 
lags slightly behind the economic reform. The main welfare plan for urban enterprise employees 
in the 1980s and early 1990s was to “reduce welfare expenses, minimize the welfare 
commitments of SOEs and privatize public services” (C. K. Chan, Ngok, & Phillips, 2008, p. 
241). The economic reform brought huge pressure on social welfare. The fund-raising burden 
was mostly on local governments and affiliated institutions such as hospitals and schools. 
Individuals and families, if the work unit could not support them, had to rely on their social 
network or bear the hardship alone. At this stage many people who could not adjust to the new 
economic relations were disregarded and simply excluded from decent housing, education and 
medical care. The welfare structure in urban areas at this point was fragmented, localized and 
parsimonious.  
Simply to address the problems caused by the economic reform, the social policy reform 
made a sluggish start in the SOEs in 1993. The pressure came from the reconstruction of SOEs 
and the population of laid-off workers. From 1995 to 2002, the total number of SOE workers 
dropped steeply from 112.6 million to 71.6 million following the selling and bankruptcies of 
SOEs (C. K. Chan et al., 2008). The government therefore had to establish a new welfare system 
that tackled the problem of so many SOEs retirements and the newly emerging private 
enterprises following the market economy. From the mid-1990s, we can see a trend of 
marketization and privatization in welfare provision, fund-raising and regulations. Moreover, the 
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connection between welfare accessibility and employment was strongly promoted by the 
government. The idea that welfare benefits should be restricted to those who contributed to 
society excluded many disadvantaged social groups from a decent standard of living and in early 
2000s. This disparity and social injustice caused considerable problems. Entering the late 2000s 
and 2010s, the government realized that unfair social redistribution was becoming critical and 
the social reform in this stage took the direction of selectively expanding its coverage.  
The social welfare reform in rural China is less obvious and less dramatic than its urban 
counterpart—marketization and privatization in the rural economy did not dramatically impair 
the welfare of rural residents in the 1980s. This was mainly because the welfare provision in rural 
areas was much more sparse. Before the economic reform the constrained state could not 
provide comparable compensation for the large numbers of rural residents (more than 80% of 
the total population in the 1970s and more than 60% in the 1990s), and its development plan 
was to “prioritises industrialization”. However, the social welfare in rural areas drew policy 
makers’ attention in the Hu-Wen administration (from 2003) and it gradually received more 
policy support, such as the “New Rural Collaborative Health Insurance Scheme” (Council, 
2002), the “New Rural Old-age Social Insurance Plan” (Council, 2009), and so on. In the same 
period, the large scale migration of rural workers into the cities in a rapid urbanization process 
raised the issue of reforming the welfare of migrant workers. Entering the 2010s, the 
government began to promote more integrated welfare plans (such as “Urban-Rural Residents 
Basic Old-age Social Insurance Scheme” (Council, 2014)) which covered both rural and urban 
residents, in order to reduce the previous inequality of the dual track welfare system. 
Thus, we can see that the transformation of the socialist basis of welfare, especially in 
urban areas, has been largely affected by the progress of economic reform and the social 
problems that this brought. Examples can be found in the reform of the SOEs and the following 
pension reform for enterprise employees, or the cancellation of the rural healthcare programme 
in the 1980s. Moreover, the changed content of the new welfare system, for instance, the format 
of welfare provision, contributors, and calculation of risks are dominated by a mixture of 
organizational relationships (such as work units, or rural communes) and market-based relations. 
The government may not be capable of anticipating all the chronic problems, but at least it is 
constantly adjusting its tactics and policy directions to improve its management of the new social 
conditions. 
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Authoritarian resilience: why did the dramatic change not cause a regime failure? 
Having reviewed the dramatic changes in socialist China during the reform era, I am 
fascinated by the following puzzle: how does the Chinese government handle the legitimacy 
challenges brought by the significant social changes? As I noted in Chapter 1, many famed 
theories argue that dramatic social changes seriously threaten the dominating regime; for 
example, the dis-match between social modernization and institutional modernization, as 
Huntington sees it, tends to produce social frustration and political instability (Huntington, 2006, 
p. 55); or Moore’s argument that if “something happens to threaten and destroy the daily 
routine” of most people, it may trigger a “revolution from below” (Moore, 1966, p. 204). 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2013) theory of “inclusive” and “extractive” institutions even argues 
that China’s “extractive” institutions may cause instability in the long term. 
However, despite experiencing some dramatic and significant social changes, the Chinese 
government has not only survived but also adapted itself and remained the unchallenged 
authority. Some studies ascribe this to its institutional tricks. For instance, Andrew Nathan uses 
the term “authoritarian resilience” to describe how the Chinese government has reconsolidated 
itself from a potential crisis of political instability and governance. He attributes this resilience 
mostly to the “institutionalization” of the state, such as the normalization of its succession 
politics and the meritocratic promotion of bureaucrats (2003). In contrast with some scholars 
who suppose that China’s reform did not bring adequate opportunities for political participation 
for the public, Nathan treats the local-level elections in work-units (T. Shi, 1997), village 
elections (Manion, 1996), letters-and-visits departments (Xinfangju), people’s congresses, and so 
on as evidence of public participation that has strengthened the CCP’s legitimacy among the 
public as a whole. Steve Tsang (2009) took the further step of developing a framework of 
“Consultative Leninism” to describe the way that China’s new political system keeps the 
authority in power. Tsang summarized a few key characteristics of this framework that have 
evolved from the Leninist political machinery. For instance, the authority designs continuous 
governance reform to pre-empt public demands for democratization, devoting sustained efforts 
to enhancing the Party's capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion (Tsang, 
2009). In this framework, the authority also promotes pragmatism in economic and financial 
management, replacing communism with nationalism. 
Scholars such as Yan (2017) have emphasized that the state’s capacity to assimilate and 
absorb is one of the main instruments keeping the state and the party stable. Through political 
absorption and assimilation, the state can effectively shape a pro-party political identity and 
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mobilize pro-party political participation. For instance, Yan (2017) traces many political practices 
on the part of the government to absorb the new social groups generated by the economic 
development during the reform era. One successful practice was to promote rural business 
proprietors to village party secretaries in the 1980s and 1990s (for a similar argument see (Tsai, 
2013)). Compared to the older generation, these newly emerged local leaders pursuing 
entrepreneurism are more adaptable to the new situations brought by the transition. In addition, 
Perry (2017) argued that, by strategically using symbolic resources such as the traditional culture, 
the state shapes higher education institutions and wins the allegiance of social elites. Other 
descriptions in existing studies include “a balancing act involving the supply of carrots and 
sticks” (M. Gallagher & Hanson, 2009), a “Guerrilla Policy Style” (Perry & Heilmann, 2011), 
“nationalism ideological articulation” (Bernstein, 2013; Gries, 2004), social control through 
“informal institutions” (Mattingly, 2019) and so on. The work of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 
(2005) suggests that the regime is efficiently distributing such public goods as infrastructure, but 
not political rights or freedom of the press, in order to achieve basic support and avoid the risk 
of being challenged. 
These inspiring studies provide various perspectives on the Chinese government’s tactics 
through radical socio-economic transformations. Nevertheless, a common issue in existing 
explanations is that statecraft is treated as a set of static and isolated skills rather than a 
comprehensive, sophisticated design. Moreover, the role of “the ruled”—the people, or 
population, is missing or not emphasized in shaping specific governmentality. My study, which 
seeks to identify the dynamic and organic state strategies, will, it is hoped, enrich the discussion 
of authoritarian resilience by highlighting a two-way story between the state and individuals: the 
way the state works to manufacture the public’s compliance and the constraints it lays on the 
effectiveness of the state’s governance and reproduction of legitimacy; the way that individuals 
can find room for counter-movement and how the existence of possible counter-conduct in 
return shapes the state’s choices and the rationale of governmentality. 
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Section 3 Individual subjectivity: “being shaped” and “counter-conduct” 
As I have constantly emphasised in the introduction and in the present chapter, the 
interaction between a modern state and its population is dynamic, organic and relational. State 
needs to maintain its authority and expects compliance from the governed, who repay the 
authority with their co-operation and obedience. As a rule, people perceive external socio-
economic changes and adjust their political attitudes and behaviour accordingly, but in certain 
conditions, they may choose to take action and affect the policy process in many ways. In this 
section, I investigate the interaction of the power relation between state and people, with a focus 
on individuals’ agency and options in the face of macroscopic notions such as “policy”, “state” 
and “transitional society”, above all in China’s situation. I pay special attention to the mutual 
process and probe the mechanism of the population’s “counter-conduct” (as described below) at 
the individual level.  
State power and the population as the state’s strength  
The circular “state strength” and a capillary model of power  
“This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth 
on him which he must recognise and which others have recognized in him. It is a form of 
power which makes individuals subjects” (Foucault, Quote from (Daldal, 2014)).  
Foucault’s work on power reminds us how the state-individual power relationship turns 
people into subjects. State power can effectively change an individual’s ego, identity, self-
awareness through the incidents of everyday life. For instance, in his archaeological analysis of 
“police”, Foucault demonstrated that the truth of “police” is that “man” acts as its subject. 
Moreover, “man” is thereby motivated to devote himself to “[making] possible the perfection of 
the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 322).  
But how exactly can a state achieve the objectification of its population? Foucault 
identified three modes: dividing practices, scientific classifications and subjectification through 
the process of self-formation and self-understanding (Foucault, 2009). From the viewpoint of 
the state, it’s important for people to be virtuous, to be obedient and to be workers and not 
idlers: the good quality of the state depends upon the good quality of its people (Foucault, 2009: 
p322). The objective of the state is the control of and responsibility for men’s activity insofar as 
this activity constitutes a differential element in the development of the state’s forces and a 
constitutive element of the state’s strength (Foucault, 2009, p. 322). In this case, there is a circle 
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which “starts from the state as a power of rational and calculated intervention on individuals and 
comes back to the state as a growing set of forces, or forces to be developed, passing through 
the life of individuals, which will now be precious to the state simply as life”; both the state’s 
strength and individual felicity (i.e. people’s “well-being”) are embedded in it (Foucault, 2009, p. 
327). Therefore, what we see as the population’s happiness, wealth, and satisfaction ultimately 
become the strength of the state. 
The circular strength of the state through the people is embedded in the societal, 
economic and institutional relations, working in a subtle and capillary way. For instance, in a 
liberal society, the social relations are infiltrated by the economy, the civil society becomes a sign 
of the economic connections throughout the population. Civil society therefore works as a 
governmental technology, or as the correlate of a technology of government, the rational 
measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as a process of 
production and exchange (Foucault et al., 2008, p. 296). The Chinese state may not display its 
power through civil society, but it showed its changing strength through other forms of state-
individual relations. In China’s transition process, we can observe an emerging shift from the old 
unit-/commune-based connection to organizational/political status and the occupation-based 
economic connection. The art of governmentality had to change accordingly. In the old 
connection, each person’s anti-risk rationality towards uncertainties (economic and social) was 
organized in institutions, but the marketization reform has added an individualized anti-risk 
rationality. In this case, state power through institutions and through economic technology 
combined has allowed the authority to be more capable of managing the population’s desires and 
choices. 
The state may also use some rhetoric and symbolic practices, such as spectacles to 
achieve its dominance and control over the society (Wedeen, 1997).  In Wedeen’s case of Asad’s 
cult in Syria, the state power works through spectacles in the way that the leader was deified as 
omnipotent while also pan-individualized. The previous feature operates to produce power and 
state building since “the systems of signification are consumed, upheld, contested and 
subverted” (p.18); while the latter feature generates the community and build the nation since the 
leader is no one, but everyone. Individual’s belief and rationality is reshaped in the process of 
collective performance, during which “everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a 
supporter of the system” (p.76).  
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Being shaped: how individuals incorporate policy changes 
Existing studies have proposed many explanations of the way that the individual 
processes state power and the mechanism of manufacturing public compliance by state 
governmentality. One of the most important indices of people’s compliance is their political 
attitudes to the state, shown as ideological loyalty, institutional trust, or active political 
participation. Political attitude also plays a vital role in analysing people’s political behaviour: as 
their expressed compliance, electoral choices and decisions to take non-compliance action. Many 
studies have confirmed that people’s attitudes, opinions and preferences are sensitive to 
exogenous structure change, either as institutional change or from policy. What then are the 
specific channels that lead to change in an individual’s perception? Or, in other words, what are 
the specific channels through which the state power shapes the population’s ideas? 
The most frequently identified approaches to discovering the public’s way of 
incorporating external changes are the exposure-acceptance model and the self-interest model 
(Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011; Tang, 2005). Geddes and Zaller (1989) found that individuals’ 
information about a policy (measured by their level of education, information about politics, 
political involvement, and so on) indicated the degree to which they had been exposed to the 
state’s persuasion and framing. The exposure is among the state’s strategies to influence citizens’ 
political awareness and preferences, in return for helping to maintain the state’s governance 
(Stockmann, 2009). For instance, the study by Zhu and his colleagues indicates that citizens may 
hold a negative attitude to local corruption if the citizens are under the influence of state-
controlled media (J. Zhu, Lu, & Shi, 2013). The self-interest path can easily be identified from 
policies relating to the distribution or redistribution of resources. Taking social welfare policy as 
an example, the expansion of educational benefits in China (abolishing school fees in 
compulsory education) has enhanced welfare for rural residents (X. Fan & Fu, 2009), by 
addressing not only the state-individual relationship but also the rural/urban gap. Households 
which receive the benefits have largely increased their expectations in regard to the government’s 
financial obligations and their support for the central government (Lü, 2014). Miller, Hesli and 
Reisinger (1994) found that for citizens in post-Soviet states, the perceived improvements in 
individuals’ economic conditions correlated with a preference for greater personal responsibility 
for individual well-being rather than a preference for an omnipotent government.  
Apart from these two approaches, networking, spatial and temporal factors also matter in 
hanging political attitudes when exogenous institutions change. After analysing longitudinal 
attitudinal and network data, Lazer and his colleagues (2008) noted that individuals tend to shift 
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their political views to the political views of their associates. Wallace et al (2014) even verified 
that localized political events such as organized marches and protests can also shape such 
political attitudes as political efficacy or political alienation. In addition, studies have shown that 
these mechanisms can be mediated or enhanced by people’s demographic factors, individual 
experiences and personalities. The demographic differences include religious differences, 
distinctive occupations, social capital, and so on (C. J. Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Murphey, 
2013; Yep, 2004). Hale and Colton’s study (2017) on the cascading defection from regime 
support revealed that individuals who have had more negative experiences with the regime are 
more likely to defect than those with more positive experiences; the early and eager movers in 
such a cascade are young males without higher education. 
Counter-conduct and cognitional rebellion 
“Counter-conduct”: why and how it is possible 
The interactive nature of power relations determines that resistance is coextensive and 
contemporaneous to any functioning power. In this sense, Foucault used conduct and counter-
conduct to describe governmentality as state power and the resistance of the population 
respectively. Foucault did not use concepts such as “revolt,” “disobedience,” “insubordination,” 
“dissidence,” and “misconduct,” because they were, in his view, “either too strong, too weak, too 
localized, too passive, or too substance-like” (Foucault, 2009, p. 200). Conduct and counter-
conduct emphasises the idea of the same thing being utilized and re-utilized in state-
population interaction, analogous to describing the state’s strength and its circular working 
through the population’s well-being. In Foucault’s example of techniques of Christianity, he 
argues that one of the most important aspects of Christianity’s “pastoral” power is that it has a 
sophisticated understanding of the congregation’s imagining of the world, their inner secrets, 
their expectations of reality. The respective counter-conduct against the pastoral power similarly 
relies on the form of the tactical elements being used in conduct.  
The substantial side of the interactive power story can be understood in the way that, in 
the context of transitional China, its specific economic, social and political structure actually 
promises some space for individuals’ choices. The societal, economic and organizational 
relations that people are entangled in can, in return, provide opportunities for individual’s 
counter-conduct against state power. Informal institutions such as social networks, as well as 
cultural and ideological factors, acting as important mechanisms shaping organizational and 
individual actions. Hence, people can employ their resources, experience and understanding of 
opportunities to bargain with formal institutions and other social groups. Bargaining attempts 
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from individuals, in return, shapes the statecraft that can and will be used by the authority and 
the observable situation of state-individual relationship. 
What’s in people’s toolkit? Participation, everyday life resistance and counter 
common sense 
It may be asked, “What’s in people’s toolkit of ‘counter-conduct’”? First of all, the 
change in individuals’ political attitudes can manifest itself as public opinion and make a 
difference in changing the political process. Going one step further away from ideas, people can 
also take active roles and directly participate in the political process. These actions are also of 
great importance in displaying the public’s consent, approval and support to the state and its 
policies. Although recent sociological studies have not paid much attention to this process 
(Burstein, 1998; Manza & Brooks, 2012), we can still speculate about the behavioural choices 
that people may make, with the help of “public participation theory” or “resistance theory”. 
Moreover, we can even learn something from Gramsci’s discussion of “common sense”.  
Generally speaking, public participation is achieved in democratic circumstances where 
citizens enjoy constitutional political rights and freedom as well as the sufficient capacity to 
understand and be involved in politics. In the broad sense of participation, furthermore, the 
subjects of participation can expand into groups or organizations that are intended to affect the 
policy-making process (Freeman, 2010). According to Quick and Bryson (2016, p. 1), “public 
participation in governance involves the direct or indirect involvement of stakeholders in 
decision-making about policies, plans or programmes in which they have an interest”. Citizens as 
stakeholders join the policy making process and are willing to take part in managing the state, 
society and political affairs. As a process of engagement in governance, public participation 
generally refers to formal political actions, such as voting, campaigns, hearings, etc. But a broader 
sense of political participation also implies citizens’ actions—we may think of demonstrating, 
boycotting, appealing, and so on. Political participation in any form matters as a fundamental 
part of the public-government relationship in democracies (N. Roberts, 2004). The participation 
process can also enhance public trust and provide a foundation of fairness, justice and political 
rights for the public (X. Wang & Wan Wart, 2007). 
In non-democratic regimes where individuals’ political rights such as voting and 
organizing are not de facto fulfilled, scholars tend to argue that the normal approaches to public 
participation are not working (Arnstein, 1969). Individuals are not granted substantial rights to 
decide the policies that may deeply affect their own lives. The political game is played by a small 
group of people through a top-down decision process.  
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However, there is evidence to suggest that citizens in non-democratic regimes still have a 
certain space to play some part in the policy-making process. He and Warren (2011) developed 
an ideal type of deliberative authoritarian model. They argued that in authoritarian countries such 
as China, there are multiple approaches to public participation such as citizen evaluation forums, 
village elections and local approval voting. Local participation channels include village elections 
(Epstein, 1997), independent deputy elections in local People’s Congresses (Fishkin, He, Luskin, 
& Siu, 2010), and so on. In particular, in the Legislation Law passed in 2000, public hearings 
were promoted as part of the decision-making process for new legislation. Local government 
also put forward many innovations to secure public participation, such as deliberative pooling in 
Wenling City,7 and the internet-based public hearing process in Hangzhou8. Other forms of 
public participation include online political forums of the “Local Leadership Message Board” 
kind and the Mayor’s Mailbox, where people can post their concerns regarding local social and 
economic problems. Although they have been shown to be selectively responsive (Distelhorst & 
Hou, 2014; Su & Meng, 2016), both these new channels provide valuable possibilities for 
individuals to voice their demands and indirectly shape the policy-making process.  
Outside the formal public participation approaches, contentious politics theory suggests 
that people can also use certain other options to signal their political preference. People may join 
a collective action to push the authority to make changes: strikes, appeals (Shang Fang, 上访) and 
lawsuits are all in their action toolkit. Besides, the widespread application of the Internet across 
the world provides people with favourable conditions by arming them with convenient and 
efficient channels through which to express themselves. Even though the exact figures for social 
conflicts and protests cannot be addressed here (Tong & Lei, 2010), it is obvious that the rise of 
mass incidents9 (Qun Ti Xing Shi Jian, 群体性事件) in China has drawn the attention of scholars 
in various academic fields. According to the “Annual Report on China's Rule of Law No.12 
(2014)” published by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the total 
popular contentions with more than 100 participants reached 871 cases from 2000 to 2013. The 
collection of diverse public reports by Chen Chih-jou identifies 1097 “mass incidents” in China’s 
mass protest from 1997 to 2007 (C.-J. Chen, 2009).  
 
7 Wenling Department of Propaganda, 2003  
8 Hangzhou Municipal Office of Legislative Affairs, 2007 
9 The concept of “mass incidents” is defined broadly as “any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms 
because of internal contradictions”, including mass public speeches, physical conflicts, the airing of grievances, or 
other forms of group behaviour that may disrupt social stability. It is frequently used in official discourses referring 
to social conflicts. (http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/16/china-land-grab-undermining-
democracy) [Accessed 2017-12-20] 
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In non-democratic regimes, the less sensitive objects and claims relating to social policies 
actually promise people a good deal of space for debates and contentions. The invocation of 
social rights is also more likely to gain broad-based support. Since the claims over social rights 
are relatively easy for the state to respond to, in countless cases people’s claims and actions have 
put pressure on current policies and eventually encourage a policy change in China’s context. 
Peter Lorentzen and Suzanne Scoggins (2011) suggest that “rights consciousness” emerged in 
some cases in which the activists’ attempt was directed against the central authority with the aim 
of stopping or preventing the central authority from ruling arbitrarily. Kevin O’Brien, Lianjiang 
Li and their colleagues (2006) argue that farmers in China are making claims about their own 
rights, which is evolving “into a more far-reaching counter hegemonic project”. Paik Wooyeal 
and Lee Kihyun considered the case of the “Minor Property Housing (MPH)” phenomenon and 
stated that the peasant is not a passive loser who seeks “justice from above, but a proactive 
winner who sometimes becomes aggressive enough to follow an illegal course and collude with 
local officials as land developers do in the non-MPH land development” (Paik & Lee, 2012, p. 
272).  
Moreover, James Scott (2008) identified a less risky and less costly form of resistance 
than the traditional forms of violence, revolution and social movements: everyday resistance. 
Everyday resistance as a weapon of the weak basically refers to informal and non-organized 
resistance such as poaching, squatting and desertion. Developed from Scott’s concept of infra 
politics, Vinthagen and Johansson (2013) have provided a clear identification of everyday 
resistance, it is individuals’ mundane or unconscious actions in their daily life, everyday resistance 
is a practice rather than an intentional action expecting a certain outcome. They also suggest that 
scholars should take a historical view regarding such practices rather than a “separated, 
dichotomous or independent” interpretation (Vinthagen & Johansson, 2013, p. 39). In addition, 
these practices are intersectional in terms of power relations and heterogeneous and contingent 
according to their context and situation. As a form of resistance, everyday resistance also reflects 
the power relations between the resisters and the targets. Therefore, scholars should figure out 
who is following such practices and who are the targets (Johansson & Vinthagen, 2016), as well 
as the place, the strategies and the sequences.  
The reason why everyday resistance matters is that, it is a practical way of expressing 
discontent and reconstructing state-individual relationships. This practice is especially important 
when individuals find that they lack political opportunities, resources and the ability or even 
knowledge to engage in identifiable resistance such as a protest. For instance, Ying’s study (2003) 
of rural resistance records the case of a villager who pretended to be mute in order to escape a 
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fine for breaching China’s one-child policy. People may also use the strategy of repeatedly 
(sometimes rascally) venting their grievances to obtain sympathy and benefits when negotiating 
with local officials (Duara, 1991). Other “everyday resistance” includes actions akin to fake 
obedience or purposely free riding.  
In addition to everyday resistance, Gramsci’s concept of common sense (1971) provides 
a unique vision for exploring other possibilities of people’s counter-conduct. In Gramsci’s 
hegemony theory, he argues that quite a few of the state’s efforts to manufacture consent rely on 
the complex and contradictory nature of people’s common sense. Common sense is generated 
from past ideas and history and serves the role of a convenient toolkit for people with which to 
understand the world where they have been socialized. In particular, in times when dramatic 
social and economic changes happen, we cannot easily figure out what is new in the transition 
and unconsciously turn to our taken-for-granted common sense to interpret the unfamiliar 
landscape. Common sense can, however, be borrowed and manipulated by the state to 
manufacture consent and manage its legitimacy. For instance, the Chinese traditional culture has 
left a long shadow of family-state structure in Chinese recognition, which claims that the state is 
an extension of a family or clan. Therefore, it is easier for people to accept the official discourse 
of nationalism since they prefer to regard domestic affairs as inner-family business, and the 
country as a victim during the “century of national humiliation” could be interpreted as personal 
humiliation.  
Nevertheless, as Gramsci emphasized, people’s common sense also carries the seeds of 
transformation within it. Common sense is not rigid, although it draws on past ideas and 
traditions; rather it keeps being reconstructed and refashioned by external pressures and 
continues to evolve to give meaning to new developments, solve new problems and unravel new 
dilemmas (Gramsci et al., 1971). The mobile nature of common sense offers space for a “war of 
position”, within which people can reflect on the idea of “state”, “politics” and the “state-
individual relationship” to which we used to say “of course”. For instance, the retrenchment of 
the state’s welfare responsibility may cause people to be suspicious about the so-called “socialist 
parental” state. When people experienced frustration in terms of their appeals for pension 
benefits may result in inner ideological conflict regarding “fair/good government”. These 
reflections as ideological rebellions will play an important role in shaping the expectations and 
consent of the general people. When enough people start to question the idea that preserving 
“harmony” is beneficial for “our state” and “our family”, it is possible that a request will emerge 
for the state and the people to have an equal position. 
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To take individual’s counter-conduct one step back—to cases where public non-
compliance is hard or impossible to achieve—people might in some cases falsify their 
compliance and consent when faced with mistreatment from the state or perceived discontinuity 
in the policies. They might choose to hide their true attitudes/preferences rather than reveal 
them in public; sometimes people may intentionally construct their public/reported 
preferences/attitudes. In many situations, the falsification of public preference could be 
fundamentally dangerous for the authority since it may lead to a “cascade” when least expected 
(Kuran, 1991, 1997). Hence, the falsification of public opinion is in many ways fascinating to 
investigate, especially in circumstances where falsification as a cognitional rebellion is the only 
option that people have against the state authority. 
Among the institutions and arenas that generate falsification, the authoritarian states, 
especially the ones with past or current experience of transition from a communist era, have 
attracted the attention of many. The transition from the communist period (or, as many have 
called it, the “totalitarianism period”) has caused many cracks in people’s belief in the state. For 
instance, as in Khrushchev’s 1956 revelations, or as in East Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
ideal communist type is found to have been a lie; a passive compliance therefore became 
common in both the general population and the elites and the degree of discontent was not 
revealed until the final call for regime change. China’s special scenario of a transition communist 
country hence provides a valuable chance of investigating questions such as “Why and how do 
the subordinates disentangle the reported consent and private attitudes/choices? How do 
different mechanisms work for different social groups? What is the threshold of tolerance and 
the acceptable cost of the public’s having to face controversial governmental reforms?” In the 
final empirical part of my dissertation, I explore some of these problems with cross-validated 
empirical evidence.  
To summarize, in this chapter, I illustrated the rationale of my investigation on 
governmentality in modern states by examining the current theoretical discussions of state 
legitimation and state rationality, the special context of transitional authoritarian regimes and the 
possible counter-conduct of individuals in the power relationship with the state. My theoretical 
setup is built on the Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy as well as Foucauldian 
governmentality and statecraft, which respectively highlight the consent in the population’s belief 
and the statecraft used by the state to manufacture public compliance. Countries that lack 
representative institutions and the rule of law differ from their democratic counterparts in many 
ways with regard to state legitimacy and governmentality. I present the existing discussions (and 
substantive examples of transitional socialism, China’s in particular, in Section 2) on governance 
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constraints and options in these regimes. Their characteristics—such as relying more heavily on 
ideological legitimacy through knowledge construction and censorship, performance-based 
legitimacy and coercion—impose both challenges and opportunities for individual resistance. 
The governmentality that constructed specific societal, economic and organizational relations 
can be used by the population to reshape the political process, whether through formal political 
participations or informal contentions. Moreover, potential counter-movements as matters of 
the individual’s common sense can become a hotbed for “cognitional rebellion” (for example, 
falsified compliance) that in return brings state governance a legitimation challenge. 
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Chapter 3 Who deserves social benefits and how? Differentiation 
and knowledge construction as statecraft in pension reforms 
The task of capturing the tactics used by the state in maintaining its legitimacy from 
observable policies is complicated, especially as regards social policies that change frequently and 
differ for various social groups. However, the governmentality logic underlying whom to 
govern and how to govern are shown in the design of governmental programmes, the way that 
social problems are defined and divisions/distinctions are established, and the different kinds of 
knowledge produced to shape people’s ideologies. This chapter, therefore, probes into the 
different designs of policy experiments and schemes and the techniques intentionally used by the 
Chinese government to shape public’s expectations and manufacture public consent. More 
importantly, I discuss the rationale behind these practices.  
Among the social and economic changes during China’s transition, social welfare 
provision is one of the most important areas that can be directly perceived by the public, and 
also an arena in which we can vividly see a close interaction between the state and the public. 
The “trade-off” between opportunities and challenges of promoting a welfare reform, for 
instance, in pensions or health, is that it provides opportunities for the state to manage the 
budget, increase efficiency through privatisation and so on; at the same time, it also brings 
challenges due to the fact that some sectors will disappear during the process, and the allocation 
of social benefits will face a possible major reshuffle. To best capture the details from a specific 
area of social policy, my empirical work in this chapter uses the substantive case of pension 
policy change during the social welfare reform conducted by the Chinese government after the 
“reform and opening-up” in 1978. I focus on social policies relating to welfare for the elderly 
(such as old-age insurance, pensions, and so on) considering that this area is one that can reveal 
the state’s purposeful design in modifying the distribution of public goods and balancing the role 
of the government and the public in welfare provision. The existence of multiple programmes—
such as basic social security, old-age insurance, and pension plans—also suggests that social 
policies relating to old-age benefits are in an area where many negotiations are possible. People 
are less likely to give up their existing benefits; thus, the state needs to devote greater effort to 
the changes that it plans. 
The first questions I answer in this chapter are “How is access to welfare resources 
distributed among different social groups, and how does the distribution change along with the 
reforms?” In the reformed welfare system of China, the social rights to income and social 
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security are now more frequently defined on an individual basis than they were in the previous 
system. They used to be defined collectively through work units (Danwei, a place of employment) 
and people’s communes (Renmin Gongshe, the highest administrative levels in rural areas). Unlike 
the old system, in the new system, the issue of who gets what, and how they get it has 
gradually become connected to individuals’ endowments, such as their social status, political 
status, social capital and so on. Hence, a logical and basic inquiry for researchers is “How exactly 
the pension benefit across different social groups was allocated when the institutional setting 
shifted away from the old communist system. From the late 1990s, the government promoted 
various pension scheme reforms, under which people with different occupations have their own 
distinctive accessibility to various welfare benefits. For instance, the reform of basic pension 
scheme for enterprise employees distinguishes the individual contribution rate levied on different 
age groups, a scheme which is exclusive to employees from other sectors such as public 
institutions. Identifying how and why the state distributes certain benefits but not others, and to 
some groups/regions but not others, may help to answer the questions regarding the state’s 
overview of population-based governance and its tactics of resource differentiation.  
If a new system is being built up, how does the state frame and legitimize its new policies 
and maintain its own rule? In other words, what kind of truth and knowledge about pension 
benefits is produced and promoted by the state when it tries to persuade the public about the 
many policy experiments and reforms? The underlying epistemological assumption is that what 
we know about society is never entirely consistent between individuals or uniform over time. 
Sociologists have long discussed the process of “socialization” during which the norms and 
ideologies about society are gradually internalized for each individual. The state is among the 
powers that provide input for the socialization process; it is equipped with various tools to 
intervene in political socialization, such as education, the public media, and legal systems 
(Glasberg & Shannon, 2010). Thus, the state can produce certain truths and knowledge that 
shape the way which people understand their society and the blueprint they can expect. For 
instance, what is appreciated and condemned? What is the virtue desired of a “good and 
responsible citizen”? What is a proper relationship between citizens and state regarding welfare 
responsibility? What should citizens expect to get from the government when faced with such 
social risks as unemployment, illness and ageing? and Why should some social groups be 
awarded more social benefits than other social groups? These knowledge constructions may not 
be easy to directly identify from individuals’ attitudes and behaviour since the individual’s 
socialization may be affected by many inputs. But we can trace the construction process from 
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the content of the policy statements and official newspapers by fleshing out the use of 
discourses, differences in sentiment, and the positions of priorities.    
To address the question of resource differentiation, I trace the social schemes related to 
old-age benefits in China from the early 1950s (with a focus on the period after 1978’s “Reform 
and opening up”) and sort comparisons among the different policy schemes that were available 
to  people of different political status (Hukou10, occupation, party membership and so on). For 
instance, in the 2010s, there have been several parallel pension plans, because distinct schemes 
have been devised to cover people of different status. There are pension plans tailored for 
government employees, for employees of public institutions, employees of enterprises, urban 
non-salaried residents and rural residents. The political status which combines residential and 
occupational difference is crucial for Chinese people seeking access to these differentiated 
welfare benefits. I give detailed evidence of such differentiation in the allocation of pension 
benefits. To figure out the way that the state legitimises and promotes its social policies, I collect 
text data from relevant articles in official newspapers. The rich text in these collections provides 
vivid evidence of the government’s strategic employment of language, concepts and sentiments. 
By classifying topics and estimating category percentages (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013), I have 
been able to identify what kind of message was being sent through the descriptions of the 
policies. For instance, whether collectivist discourses would be more frequently used in 
promoting a policy that expands the coverage of pension benefits; would more individualist 
discourses be used when issuing a retrenchment-oriented policy. In addition, to better 
understand the techniques of persuasion, I identified what is “praised” and “denounced” in the 
policies promoted by the state by analysing the tendency of the sentiment in the official 
discourses.  
How do entitlements differ: differentiation in benefit entitlement 
Welfare benefits, as a type of scarce resource (or public good), can be used by the state in 
exchange for loyalty, forming coalitions, or breaking down a population’s coordination in 
collective action. In theory, the distribution of welfare benefits can be the result of the 
authority’s intentional manipulation, negotiations between interest groups, and the influence of 
socio-historical factors (for instance, demographic and geographical features that may 
respectively lead to the varied distribution of health issues, and change the distribution of certain 
 
10 China’s “Hukou” system is a family registration programme that serves as a domestic passport, regulating 
population distribution and rural-to-urban migration. It is a tool for social and geographic control, enforcing an 
apartheid structure that denies farmers the rights and benefits that are enjoyed by urban residents. 
(https://www.thoughtco.com/chinas-hukou-system-1434424) [Accessed 2016-1-21] 
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health care benefits). Therefore, it is difficult to image a welfare regime in which everyone enjoys 
exactly the same social benefits—we are more likely to see various welfare schemes and 
programmes tailored for different social groups and regions, some enjoying more social benefits 
than others (Frazier, 2010). Hacker in his book “The divided welfare state: The battle over public and 
private social benefits in the United States” (Hacker, 2002) described the coexistence of public and 
private social benefits which are unequally distributed to different populations in the US. Some 
programmes are fully funded by public expenditure, and some programmes benefit the recipients 
through tax breaks and credit subsidies. There are also programmes that are promoted and 
regulated by the government while is totally funded by private contributions—normally from 
higher earners. In China, we also find multiple welfare schemes and programmes, as detailed 
below. 
A mechanism that leads to the coexistence of multiple programmes may not be the same 
for regimes with distinctive political institutions and paths. In the US’s case, Hacker identified 
the timing and sequence of policy development during which the public-private social benefits 
are constructed through political debates. Business interests play a central role in shaping the 
landscape of welfare distribution. In an authoritarian regime such as China, the central 
government enjoys more power in the process of policy making and resource allocation. Even in 
a typical policy experiment which is assumed to be more flexible and open-ended than the one-
off policies, the central government would set the direction and guidance, and then local 
governments would enjoy only a conditional and limited autonomy in localizing and 
reinterpreting the details of the policies. The situation of multiple social programmes coexisting 
is more a consequence of centralized policy-making. Therefore, if the central government is 
under constraint from a limited budget, how does it design the differentiation of social rights and 
what are its main criteria? 
In the existing studies of China’s society, one important standard that is identified in the 
differing accessibility of resources is political status (Bray, 2005; Lu & Perry, 1997; Q. Zheng, 
2015). The difference of political status mainly results from the Hukou system (Cheng & Selden, 
1994). People in China are born with the political status of being either rural or urban residents 
of their local area and are not supposed to move freely across regions. The rural/urban status, or 
Hukou, is “political” in the sense that it largely determines an individual’s access to initial public 
resources such as education (since schools are mostly localized resources), and local elections at 
the village and district level. Thus it is constructed on residential variation, and when individuals 
get a job, they enter into an occupation-based status: they can join the staff of the government, 
staff of a public institution, staff of an enterprise, or work as a peasant, and so on (M.-k. Lee, 
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2000; Xie, Lai, & Wu, 2009). These status categories determine certain other public resources 
that an individual can access, such as pension plans and health care plans (D. Wang & Chai, 
2009). To give an example, as the economic reform has proceeded, many rural residents have left 
the countryside to search for temporary jobs in cities. However, even though they work in the 
cities, their Hukou is still that of rural residents and they are ineligible for public goods such as 
education, housing and pension benefits in the cities where they live and work (Y. Song, 2014). 
In other words, people with different endowments do not enjoy the same public resources in 
China. Moreover, the unevenness of benefit allocations across different types of public resource 
schemes is distinctive. For instance, Cai and his colleagues (2018) identified the differentiation 
and polarized pension benefit allocation in China, using public transfer data. They showed that 
the public transfer in pension benefit is more concentrated on the top quartile, than it is for 
those in education and health care: those from the top quartile aged 75 receive an annual pension 
of 12,029 RMB on average, and from the second quartile receive around 3,460 RMB per person, 
while the elderly from the bottom quartile receive less than 189 RMB (Yong Cai et al., 2018). 
The variation of welfare benefits in China’s case applies not merely to differentiation in 
one policy, but is systematically designed to provide different social group with different 
programmes in order to maintain a balance of loyalty as well as avoiding the risk of a coalition. 
The formation process of such segregation entails less political conflict, as in the representative 
political system, but shows more sense of “overview” or “seeing the bigger picture” from the 
ruler’s standpoint. It would seem quite in order if certain groups were privileged or sacrificed to 
improve “the general good” or reduce “the general cost”. The question then arise “Who is to be 
sacrificed and who is to be kept safe in the era of transformations, and what tactics will the state 
use if public discontent is stirred up over the inequality? A reasonable assumption is that the 
central government is motivated to treat the core elites generously in its the power-sharing logic 
(Svolik, 2012), while sacrificing marginal social groups in the old power circle when necessary 
(e.g. when budget constraints are apparent). Those in the power circle who were first included 
and then excluded may become very discontented to see such favouritism. An easy way for the 
government to handle this loss of public support is to replenish the pool of social support by 
buying off the politically and economically disadvantaged ones who will cost least. 
How does persuasion help: domesticating your ideas  
Even though the state can sacrifice a certain group of people in order to minimize the 
budget or ease its burden, there is risk of irritating the target population and losing its support. 
In other words, the government needs additional tactics to help promote institutional changes 
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that hurt someone’s existing interests and keep a minimal degree of public consent for its own 
survival. Institutionalism generally supposes that the state has a sophisticated understanding of 
its subordinates (though it is not necessarily 100% correct), and it tries to figure out proper ways 
to manage changes in public compliance. The state, therefore, can decide to manipulate people’s 
emotions through shaping, sculpting and mobilizing the options, expectations, and daily lives of 
individuals. Government and governance not only signal the power relationship, but also issue 
selves and identities to its population (Dean, 2010). The process and the rationale of 
designing/shaping people’s ideas and behaviour can be drawn from the conduct of conduct in 
Foucault’s theory of state power (Foucault et al., 2008). Hence, an analysis of the various tactics 
used by the state to shape public cognition can dig deeper by asking such questions as “What 
does the state want the public to expect and what identities and roles have been established for 
the governed and the governors?” In practice, there are many objects that the authority can 
borrow in its framing or discourse: for instance, ideologies of materialism and rationalism, 
doctrines from traditional culture or religion, experiences from comparable countries, and so on.  
Stefan Svallfors in his book “The political sociology of the welfare state” summarises that one 
aspect of the welfare state is to embody and create norms about what is fair and just, and to 
form citizens’ expectations and demands (Svallfors, 2007). More importantly, his discussion 
stresses that the interaction between the state and its subordinates is dynamic, which pushes the 
governance into a reflective and experimental process. On the one hand, the correspondence 
between institutions, rules and policies provides a stable imagination of the state-individual 
relationship in the delivery of welfare. On the other, however, if the imagination of individuals 
about what to expect and what to demand is deep-rooted, any changes to the value and policies 
promoted by the state may cause a legitimation problem. The state therefore needs to make a 
new effort to try to rebalance the relationship and reproduce the corresponding knowledge.  
The observer, through an examination on official discourse about the desired rules, 
norms, and social values, can capture the changing governmentality of the authority. The 
implications of these theoretical discussions on my exploration of China’s case, therefore, is to 
be aware of the hidden design of the policies that are issued and be sensitive to the changes in 
the discourse. As I further explain in the following empirical section, articles on the official 
newspaper which were designed to promote a certain policy or reform provide me with a good 
opportunity to investigate the process of the state’s “knowledge production”. 
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Who gets what and how: population-based governance 
The allocation of welfare benefits is recognized as a useful tool for showing the 
generosity of the authority and buying loyalty from the public (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; 
Karshenas & Moghadam, 2006; Rimlinger, 1971). If budget constraints occur in a given period, 
one reasonable assumption regarding the allocation of welfare benefits is that the government 
will distribute the limited fiscal capacity to the social group that costs least per unit (that is, per 
person, or per group of people), and can maximize the gains for the state. But how to decide 
which group to favour and which to give up? There are two common assumptions about the 
objectives of the state: to maintain broad social stability, and to maintain active compliance, such 
as support or consent. The former is more basic while the latter is more desirable; but they are in 
general not mutually exclusive. If the priority/objective for the government is “political 
stability”, then the resource will be allocated to those who enjoy the greatest negotiation and 
bargaining power. As regards maintaining compliance objective, the public’s consent is 
fundamental to the state’s legitimacy; it relies heavily on people’s perceptions of social justice, 
equality (at least superficial in the attempts to redistribute) and the belief that the authority will 
meet the public’s expectations. Hence the central authority does its best to meet or pretend to 
meet the public’s needs in order to get loyalty in return when the authority senses pressure/risks 
over legitimation. Under the assumption of consent manufacture and maintaining compliance, 
the state is more likely to redistribute public resources to social groups which are relatively 
disadvantaged. I develop my hypothesis of the government’s choice in welfare allocation on the 
basis of careful consideration regarding these two assumptions, and take into account the nature 
of authoritarian authority—which has an instinct to share power and benefits within its inner 
power circle. A strategic resource differentiation therefore, is a reasonable hypothesis: uphold 
favouritism towards core elites, but wield the weapon of redistributive equality when necessary, 
and only to a certain extent. Meanwhile, the government employs other tactics such as 
persuasion by propaganda, and gradual experiments to keep the general public opinion under 
control. 
In this section, I bring evidence that supports my argument through institutional analysis 
and statistical comparison of China’s pension reforms. The institutional analysis focuses on the 
distinctive pension schemes and addresses variations in a reform’s timing, direction, and content, 
so as to collectively present a whole image of strategic differentiation in welfare benefit 
allocation by the government. To precisely identify the different entitlements to benefit across 
pension schemes, I collected statistical data from the China Labour Statistical Yearbooks, Local 
Fiscal Statistical Yearbooks, National Statistical Bureau Dataset and other datasets (such as G. 
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Zheng, 2016)11, and compared variations including the eligible population, participating 
population, coverage rate, pension benefit (per person per year), incremental rate of pension 
benefit, and so on.  
In the 2010s there are five parallel pension plans12 tailored for 5 groups of people: 
government employees, public institute employees, employees of enterprises, urban non-salaried 
residents and rural residents. The fragmented pension scheme is compatible with the categories 
of political status, which originated from the socialist planning economy that locks the whole 
populace in a registered permanent category of residence (rural or urban) and a work unit (in an 
SOE, government post or elsewhere) (Whyte, 2012). From Table 1, we can identify the 
differences in accessing the public resources between the distinctive social groups. In the present 
pension system, only government employees enjoy the full fiscal funded retirement payment 
(Pozen, 2013). Public institution employees, who used to enjoy a similar political status and 
comparable welfare benefit to those of  government employees, are now confined to a hybrid 
pension system in which individuals share the responsibility for making pension contributions 
after the reform of the scheme in the 2010s. Enterprise employees before the economic reform 
had their workplace unit and the government as accountable welfare providers. Nowadays, 
however, the pension plan for enterprise employees features this responsibility shared between 
government, the enterprise and the individual. The pension plans for urban non-salaried 
residents and rural residents are similar; both are defined contribution pension insurance 
schemes which enjoy a certain (slim) subsidy from the government compared to other types of 
employee (L. Wang, Beland, & Zhang, 2014). Still, before the late 2000s, they had no systematic 
pension plan at all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 A more detailed discussion of the codebook is available in the appendix. 
12 In China’s case, the full state-funded pension is literally called the “retirement allowance”, and a pension that 
requires individual contributions is called a “pension/social insurance”. 
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Table 1. Comparison between Different Pension Schemes in China (in 2015) 
Scheme 
recipients Scheme name Nature Funding source 
Government 
Employees 
Pension plan for 
government employees 
(PGE) 
Government funded 
pension Government 
Public 
Institution 
Employees 
Pension plan for public 
institution employees 
(PPIE) 
Government funded 
pensionèsocial insurance 
Governmentè 
Government and 
Individual shared 
Enterprise 
Employees 
Pension plan for 
enterprise employees 
(PEE) 
Enterprise funded 
pensionèsocial insurance 
Enterprise 
(Government took the 
ultimate accountability) 
è 
Government, 
Enterprise, and 
Individual shared 
Urban Non-
salaried 
Residents 
Pension plan for urban 
non-salaried residents 
(PUR) 
Social insurance Government and Individual shared 
Rural 
Residents 
Pension plan for rural 
residents (PRR) Social insurance 
Government and 
Individual shared 
Source: author.  
 
Changes in policy reform: what does timeline tell us  
As the main embodiment of the authority, government officials with formal contracts 
enjoy the most generous payments after they retire. We can find solid evidence from existing 
studies which demonstrate the welfare privileges of government-related work units compared to 
the enterprise units and urban residents compared to migrant workers and rural residents (K. W. 
Chan & Buckingham, 2008; K. W. Chan & Zhang, 1999; Selden & You, 1997). Right after the 
foundation of the PRC, in 1955, a non-contributory pension scheme was issued for government 
officials. The employees were not required to contribute to the pension pool since the whole 
fund was subsidized by the state budget. The replacement rate for retired government employees 
can reach 90% or 100%, according to the “Tentative Retirement Regulation for Government 
Employees” (State Council, 1956). The “Notice of Salary Reform for Government and Public 
Institution Employees” issued in 1993 specified that the in-service salary for a government 
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worker would consist of four parts: the duty wage, rank wage, basic wage and seniority wage 
(State Council, 1993). A retired government employee can enjoy the full previous basic wage plus 
the seniority wage. The retiree also receives some subsidy from the government in line with the 
duty wage and rank wage based on his/her working years: the longer the employee has worked, 
the higher replacement rate he/she gets after retirement. Starting from 2006, when the “Civil 
Service Law” was issued, the salary system for government employees changed to a 2–layer 
structure: duty wage and rank wage, plus the corresponding allowances. Since the reform, a 
retired government employee can still enjoy a replacement rate above 80 percent of his/her 
previous income.  
Public institution (PI for convenience in the following discussions) employees, such as 
school teachers, doctors in public hospitals, employees of radio or TV stations, and so on, are 
also generally thought to be people who enjoy an “Iron Rice Bowl”. The pension plan for PI 
employees is exactly the same as that for government employees before the 2006 salary reform: 
officially, the PI employees are subsidized by the state budget in full or in part (depending on the 
nature of the work units). The 2006 salary reform specified that the retirees of public institution 
no longer enjoy the allowance and performance wage, though the pension is still much better 
than that of people in other occupations such as enterprise employees. The generous pension 
plan for government and public institution employees has caused great discontent in other social 
groups13 for quite a long time. Under huge pressure from the society, the government claims to 
have changed the dual track of one pension plan for government-public institution employees 
and another for the remaining social groups in early 2008. The reform plan (in the form of policy 
experimentation) launched in 2008 turned out to be a proposal that differentiates the pension 
benefits of PI employees from those of government employees: the old non-contributory 
pension scheme has changed into a defined contributory pension insurance scheme. Started in 
2008 as a pilot policy, it was then implemented across the nation in 2014; all PI employees from 
then on have had to add their contribution to their future retirement fund14. In Figure 4, below, I 
show the chronological changes in the pension scheme reforms for government employees and 
public institution employees.  
 
 
13 People’s Daily Report, 2012, “Unfair Dual track of Old-age care: [dramatically] different treatment for people with 
different status”. (http://finance.ifeng.com/news/macro/20120326/5802741.shtml) [Accessed 2018-11-01] 
14 China News, 2014, “Track convergence of pension scheme: 30 million public institution employees will start 
paying into social insurance from July 1st”. 
(http://district.ce.cn/newarea/roll/201406/30/t20140630_3062399.shtml) [Accessed 2018-11-12] 
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Figure 4. Timeline of Segmented Pension Plan reforms 
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As the main component of the labour force, especially after the economic reform in 
China, enterprise employees are a treasured possession for the ruler, and form what is seen as the  
core engine for economic development, but when they retire they are bad assets—the ruler is 
impatient to shake off this burden of their welfare provision. Before the economic reform in the 
1980s, only state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were allowed to exist in China. SOE employees 
during that time enjoyed high social and economic status, and had an enterprise-funded, 
government-accounted form of social insurance (as had all the enterprises owned by the state) 
that included education, health care, pensions and many other benefits. However, when the 
economic reform started in the 1980s, numbers of SOEs were re-structured and hundreds and 
thousands of employees were laid off (Gu, 1999, 2001). The remaining SOE employees suffered 
from the retrenchment of pension benefits,15 while the new pension scheme was designed to fit 
the economic reform of marketisation, cut fiscal expense and relieve the work units and the 
government of their burden. 
The changes started from the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the dilapidated old 
pension system for enterprise employees was re-designed as a multi-layered pension system. The 
State Council issued the “Decision on a Pension Insurance Reform for Enterprise Employees” 
in 1991, calling for a division of pension responsibility between state, enterprises and individuals. 
The pension system as pictured by this “Decision” is a basic retirement programme managed by 
the state; supplementary retirement programmes funded by the enterprises; and individual 
savings in the form of a retirement account chosen by each employee (Chao & Dickson, 2003). 
But this announcement was more like a proposal and was difficult to set in motion due to the 
lack of funding. People were still expecting the government to admit fiscal accountability and the 
enterprises were unable to fund the pension pool on their own. A more official-looking reform 
started in 1997 when the State Council issued Document no. 26, named “Decision on 
Establishing a Unified System of Basic Pension Insurance for Enterprise Employees” (Council, 
1997). This “Decision”, again, promoted the idea that the responsibility for raising funds for this 
new pension system should be shared between enterprises, employees and government, 
although, de facto, it was still not compulsory. The “Decision” issued in 1997, however, had a 
clear plan for the size of contributions: individual accounts should be kept at 11% of the 
employee’s salary and individuals had to contribute 8% of their salary (starting with 4%). The 
employer should make up the shortfall in individual accounts, namely, 3% of the individual’s 
 
15 This pension plan was later applied to employees of all enterprises, regardless of ownership. 
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salary, whilst separately contributing no more than 17% to the social coordination account (the 
total contribution of an enterprise should not exceed 20% of an individual’s total wages).  
To further clarify the divisions between individual and social pooling accounts, as well as 
to make up for the deficit in individual accounts, the central government issued Document no. 
42 in 2000 (S. Council, 2000) and State Council No. 38 in 2005 to promote the new policy 
experiment of “fully funding individual accounts”16 (Council, 2005). These documents specified 
the clear articulation of constructing a workable three-dimensional hybrid pension reform for 
urban enterprise employees. First, at the individual level, contributions to individual accounts 
were to be borne solely by employees paying at a rate set at 8% of the contributory wage. 
Meanwhile, the contributions from the enterprise should not be partially diverted to individual 
accounts but paid in full into an account under the social coordination plan. This definition of 
the contributory pension scheme clarified the private nature of individual pension accounts and 
implied that individuals should play a larger role in the funding of their pensions. In addition, 
this reform emphasized that the longer the employees contributed, the more they would receive 
when they retired, thus strengthening the connection between an individual’s working history 
and his/her entitlement to the related welfare. The reform also expanded the coverage of the 
pension system to wage earners in other categories, such as employees of small private 
businesses, in addition to the employees of state-owned or collective-owned enterprises. This 
was to pluralize the sources of the funding, as well as the enterprise annuities, encouraged by the 
government as a way of supplementing the basic pension insurance. In the meantime, the reform 
recommended individuals to explore the possibilities of registering with commercial pension 
schemes. Until then, a multi-sourced, defined contributory pension plan has been established for 
all enterprise employees. 
Unlike the above salaried urban citizens, rural residents and urban non-salaried residents 
had no clear pension plan at all until the late 2000s. Although some scattered pilot policies to pay 
pensions to rural residents were implemented at county level in 1992 (also called the “Old Rural 
Pension Plan”), these initiatives were mostly unsuccessful and none of them was turned into a 
national policy. In 2009, the State council issued the “Guidance on Establishing a New Rural 
Pension Scheme (Pilot)”, also called “New Rural Pension Plan”. The nationwide policy started in 
2011 and thereafter rural residents were able to register with a pension plan where they could 
contribute a certain amount of money (the original plan in 2009 included 5 contributory rates: 
100 RMB, 200 RMB, 300 RMB, 400 RMB, 500 RMB; the scales would be adjusted every year 
 
16 More information of this policy experimentation is available in Chapter 4. 
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according to the annual net per capita income of the rural residents) and they would enjoy 
accordingly a subsidy from the government’s fiscal budget. The pension plan for urban non-
salaried residents, which was issued in 2011, is similar to the rural residents’ pension plan. They 
are both defined contributory pension schemes funded jointly by individuals and the state. 
The reforms for different social groups were conducted at various times and went in 
various directions. As shown in Figure 4, the pension policy reform process is a multi-track 
segregation in the fulfilment of social rights. From the content of past pension reforms, it is not 
difficult to figure out the favouritism shown to core elites, government employees who have 
greater political power and help to maintain the function of ruling. They enjoy the most 
generous pension benefit and the government budget takes full responsibility for their lives after 
retirement. Facing the big wave of economic reform and pressure on the fiscal capacity, it was 
the enterprise employees (of state-owned enterprises in particular) that suffered from the large-
scale lay-offs and were encouraged to take charge of their own social risks. Later on, when the 
discontent regarding the dual track heated up, the central authority was happy to shirk its 
responsibilities and shift the blame onto public institution employees in order to appease the 
widespread sense of grievance. A follow-up tactic to replenish the political support pool for the 
government, was to launch the pension plan for rural residents and urban non-salaried residents 
in order to buy off the least costly population. I give more details below of the state’s efforts to 
carry out a “loyalty buyoff” with rural residents in the section on the generosity of the pension 
scheme. 
Generosity and coverage: what the statistical evidence tells us  
Though the timeline of reform shows the timing and brief directions of the welfare 
allocations, it does not show enough detailed benefit differences between schemes. Generosity 
and coverage are commonly used indices for identifying the details of welfare programmes (X. 
Huang, 2014; Ratigan, 2017; Riedmüller, 2008). Thus, to address the different entitlements of 
benefits between one pension scheme and another, I collected statistical data from multiple 
sources of datasets and explained the variations, including the eligible population, participating 
population, coverage rate, pension benefit (per person per year), incremental rate of the pension 
benefit or welfare provision and other statistics showing how they compare.17 
 
17 Due to a highly scattered and incomplete condition of welfare yearbooks, I tried my best to collect all available 
data from various sources. There are certain places where the data do not match very well since the statistical bureau 
stopped publishing many indexes (such as the population and pension benefit for government employees after 
2009) and often changed the grouping methods. Thus, I appended notes to each table to clarify the sources and 
calculations. More information on the codebook is available in the appendix. 
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Pension plan for Government Employees (PGE) and Public Institution 
Employees (PPIE) 
Since the government data are constantly kept confidential and vague, I used two 
approaches in my calculation to show the high replacement rate of the pension plan for 
government employees and public institution employees. As noted above, these two privileged 
groups, the government employees in particular, are the ones who enjoy the most generous 
pension benefits and a higher coverage rate than the enterprise employees and rural residents. 
Both calculation approaches listed below endorse this argument. 
Calculation method 1: according to the pension policy content 
First, we can address the generous pension benefit for government employees and PI 
employees directly from the policy content. The following calculations for pension benefit come 
from the “Civil Service Law” which was issued in 2006. In this reform, the salary structure for 
government employees was split into two levels: duty wage and rank wage, plus the due 
allowance. The replacement rate of pension benefits is quite high. As shown in the calculation, 
pension benefit (b) is related to the pre-retirement salary (sr−1) and working years (n): 
n < 10, b = 0.5sr−1;  
10 <= n < 20, b = 0.7sr−1;  
20 <= n < 30, b = 0.8sr−1;  
30 <= n < 35, b = 0.85sr−1;  
35 <= n, b = 0.9sr−1;  
where sr−1 is calculated differently according to the different stages of the reform of the 
pension plan. Employees who had worked for less than 10 years when they retired enjoyed only 
a replacement rate of 50%. But someone who had worked for more than 20 years would enjoy a 
replacement of above 80% of their previous salary (it could even reach 90% if they had worked 
for 35 years before retirement). The pension plan for public institution employees is quite 
similar.  
Calculation method 2: published statistical data 
We can also check the generosity of the pension benefit for government and public 
institution employees from the published statistical data. Columns 2 to 7 in Table 2 come from 
the China Labour Statistical Yearbook, while the total data on employee numbers and salaries 
come from the Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbook. The other columns are self-calculated statistics 
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(as in column 12, I weight the average salary of all government and PI employees according to 
size). Due to the grouping method in the original data, I can display only a number for all 
government and public institution employees combined here, rather than separate numbers for 
the two groups for the purpose of comparison. Pension benefits are calculated in Yuan per 
person per year.  
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Table 2. Pension Benefit for Government Employees and Public Institution Employees (Combined data) 
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From 1999 to 2015, the rate of retirees compared to the workers in post increased from 
18.6% to 37%. The burden of pension funding largely increased; in other words, the state budget 
investment also increased. Although the data seem less than 100 percent precise, we can still see 
an typical pattern of the high replacement rate of pension benefit for government and public 
institution employees (higher than 80% in the late 1990s and early 2000s), especially when 
compared to the situation for enterprise employees (about 50% in the 2000s, shown in Figure 5). 
The low coverage rate may result from the calculation problem in the original data, since the 
statistical bureau of the government published only the figures for the participants in the pension 
insurance scheme which needed self-contribution, while most government employees did not 
need to contribute anything and had access to full repayment from the public pension budget 
fund. Thus, the coverage rate here more probably calculated by the participants in public 
institution employee schemes dividing the number of public institution employees and 
government employees combined. Either way, we can find that the pension benefit that the 
government and public institution employees enjoy is generous and is largely covered by the 
state budget. 
Pension plan for Enterprise Employees (PEE) 
The pension plan for enterprise employees experienced the most frequent modifications 
during the whole reform period, as shown in the previous section on changing policies. Here I 
present the changes in pension benefit and rate of increase. Table 3 shows the combined 
statistical data of pension benefits for employees of SOEs and other types of employment (such 
as self-employed persons) from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook; and Figure 5 shows the 
enterprise employees’ pension coverage rate, benefit per person per year and replacement rate 
data from the report by Zheng (2016). Compared to government employees and public 
institution employees, enterprise employees enjoyed far lower pension benefits, considered as 
raw benefit per person per year and rate of increase. The benefit per person per year for 
government employees and public institution employees in 2015 was about 44125.5 yuan, while 
for average enterprise employees it was about 27108.2 yuan (or 28236, in Zheng’s calculations) 
even though their on-duty salary was around 56360 yuan before retirement. In other words, 
enterprise employees would have experienced a steeper drop in living standards after retirement. 
Moreover although the coverage rate increased after 1997, the replacement rate went in the 
opposite direction: a drop from 80% to 50% from the late 1990s to the late 2000s, as shown in 
Figure 5. 
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Table 3. Pension Benefit for Enterprise Employees and Others  
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Data source: Zheng, 2016. 
Figure 5. Pension Benefit for Enterprise Employees  
 
Pension plan for Urban Non-salaried Residents (PUR) and Rural Residents 
(PRR) 
The pension plan for urban non-salaried residents and rural residents started quite late 
and with very limited payments. Table 4 shows the pension benefit change for rural residents 
from Zheng’s report in 2016. Tables, 2, 3 and 4 together display the difference in pension 
reforms that supports my argument of “benefit differentiation”. For rural residents, the pension 
scheme has a far lower coverage rate and a low replacement rate. From the data we can identify 
that the pension benefit per person per year for rural residents was about 1000 Yuan, which is 
far less than their urban counterparts received (e.g. enterprise employees got 20270 Yuan in 2012 
on average). In addition to the net number of benefits, the replacement rate in the rural 
residents’ pension scheme was around 13% in 2015, while urban enterprise employees enjoyed a 
replacement rate of 50% (2015) and government/public institution employees enjoyed 67% 
(2010, weighted). To better understand the strategic side of this differentiation, a final 
comparison that I want to show in Table 5 is the difference in population of the different social 
groups in China from 1987 to 200918. Though without solid evidence, a reasonable strategy for a 
 
18 The government stop publishing the employee number and related conditions of government units and public 
institution units from 2009. 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Pension Benefit for Enterprise Employees 
Pension benefit per person per year (Yuan) Pre-year on-post Salary
Coverage rate Replacement rate
  89 
government wanting to reduce its burdens would be to push the largest working population—
enterprise employees—towards the open market. And when a government needs to show 
generosity and appease discontent over inequality, it could give a modicum of “alms” to a large 
but less advantaged population–rural residents–in exchange for more loyalty at least cost. 
 
Table 4. Pension Benefit for Rural Residents 
 
According to my preliminary interviews in summer 2016, many rural residents, especially 
the older ones, were very content with any subsidy from the government. This is mainly because 
they had enjoyed quite a few benefits from the state budget beforehand and most of the old 
people caring for them came from the family or local community. Any cash subsidy from the 
government may have seemed like a bonus to them, especially in view of their relatively low 
income compared to urban employees.  
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Table 5. Raw populations by Types of Pension Scheme Recipient (10000 persons) 
 
 
To conclude, the empirical evidence suggests that the strategy of differentiation in the 
government’s welfare allocation has been to sacrifice the social benefits for employees of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and later on the employees of public institutions to reduce the fiscal 
burden, while providing modest/slender welfare benefits for social groups that could be bought 
off at minimal expense. During the process, government officials as the core elites of governance 
power consistently enjoyed the most generous social benefits. We have evidence that supports 
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this assumption from the various policy shifts of different pension schemes, such as the 
retrenchment policy reform for SOE employees; the expanded coverage for rural residents and 
migrant workers from rural areas; and the contribution ratio reform of the pension scheme or 
public institution employees. To summarize, the segmented resource allocation in China’s social 
welfare reform has favoured the core elites, while it distributed limited fiscal capacity to the 
social groups which cost least per person. 
 
Who deserves benefits and why: constructed truth and knowledge 
What kinds of truth and knowledge about pension benefits are produced and promoted 
by the state when it wants to persuade the public about its multiple and distinctive policy 
experiments and reforms? For instance, from the institutional analysis and statistical comparison 
in the section above, we see that the enterprise employees and public institution employees were 
the ones whose expected pension benefits were reduced; while in the early 1990s and late 2000s, 
pension plans for rural residents were piloted in which the peasants were encouraged to 
participate in the schemes. How did the state manage to push the reform? How did persuasion 
work to help promote the controversial reforms and what kind of knowledge regarding social 
rights was produced by the state? In this part, I investigate the knowledge construction from the 
content of the policy statements and official newspapers by fleshing out the use of discourse, 
differences in sentiment, and the positioning of priorities when the large-scale welfare 
retrenchment was felt by the employees of enterprises and public institutions.  
I use quantitative text analysis (QTA) to show the persuasive efforts of the government 
when it sets out to produce truth and knowledge about pension benefits, social fairness and 
responsibility allocation. To better capture the details in the text (and constrained by the 
availability of data), in the QTA part, I focus mainly on two sets of pension reforms. The first set 
concerns the enterprise employees in the late 1990s and early 2000s. There were several waves of 
pension experiments for enterprise employees, all of them were closely connected with the 
economic reform of the state-owned enterprises and reallocation of state-individual 
responsibility for care in old age. The state had to persuade the enterprise employees that there 
was good reason to take care of themselves, and tell them what they should expect from the 
state. In the following section, I employ text data illustrating that in the process of welfare 
retrenchment for enterprise employees, the government mobilized and worked through 
people’s risk preferences, sense of obligation and lifestyles and constructed the desired 
images of a self-regulated and self-motivated “socialized self”, while denouncing the old 
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“(work) unit-based self”. The second set of pension reforms centres on those for rural 
residents in the early 1990s (as pilot projects in local regions) and late 2000s (as a nationwide 
policy). The pension reform for rural residents in the 1980s and 1990s was mainly used to help 
promote the one-child policy, while the other reform in the late 2000s was part of the process of 
rapid urbanization. For these reforms, the state needed to show the public why rural residents 
deserved the expanded pension benefits. My text analysis of official discourse demonstrates that 
the key instruments that were used included reconstructing the character of social 
redistribution, emphasising the overall situation with Chinese characteristics, and 
packaging the development with social stability. 
The text data include official news data mostly from the People’s Daily dataset19 and 
supplementary data from the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI 
database)20 and Wisenews dataset21. The People’s Daily is the mouthpiece (official newspaper) of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the biggest newspaper group in 
China, with a circulation of 3 million22. It is the weathercock of current political, social, and 
economic trends, delivering information to the public from the central government. It publishes 
not only the main policies, leader’s activities, journalistic reports, but also editorial comments, 
readers’ mail, scholars’ theoretical discussions, and so on. It differs from the rigid contents of the 
policy statements since the media can elaborate more on the policy design, targets and details in 
various styles, whereas the policies themselves are mostly published or issued in a particular 
format. Analysing the text in the People’s Daily is one of the best ways of decoding the policy 
direction and “top-level design” in China. Since the original People’s Daily dataset contains only 
the articles published in the People’s Daily from 1946 to 2003, I supplemented the original 
dataset with news data from the CNKI and Wisenews datasets. The consolidated dataset of 
People’s Daily articles covers the time period from 1946 to 2008. To fit the plan of analysing the 
two sets of pension reforms, I generated the analytical data by searching with the keywords “old-
age insurance” and “pension” while confining the time period to 1978-2008, resulting in 3390 
articles with these keywords in the context (a corpus descriptive statistics is available in the 
appendix). The sample pool for the analysis here, therefore, is all the news articles relates to 
pension reform and old-age care, which is consistent with the main research interest in this 
 
19 People’s Daily Dataset: http://rmrbw.xyz/simple/. 
20 China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database: http://oversea.cnki.net/kns55/default.aspx. 
21 Wise News dataset: http://wisenews.wisers.net/. 
22 It should be noted that, the original text from People’s daily is in Chinese. Hence, all the quotes in the analysis are 
my translation. 
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chapter. More discussions about the potential restrictions on topic analysis posed by the specific 
sample pool can be found in the model validations in the appendix. 
Analysing the text content with computer assistance has been handy for researchers and 
popular among them in the past few years, especially when automated text analysis is used in text 
mining (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Hopkins & King, 2010; Lucas et al., 2015). Unlike traditional 
hand coding and dictionary methods, which are mainly based on the frequencies of selected 
keywords, supervised and unsupervised automated text analysis extracts richer information from 
the content. Moreover, some new methods can provide more choices for the researcher who 
wants to validate the categorization of text and integrate information with meta-data such as 
dates, column types, authors and even the length of documents.  
In order to better understand the content of the news rhetoric, I use a combination of 
inductive and deductive approach in addressing the topics, key classifications, & elements of 
knowledge construction of the documents.  Unsupervised method helps with the identification 
of topics discussed in the articles as well as the relationship within topics without much pre-
assumptions imposed. The descriptive information from the topic identification process reveals 
rich information on the priorities of government’s efforts on policy promotion in various 
periods and circumstances in pension reforms, and latent structure of knowledge been employed 
in the state news. While the usage of supervised methods takes advantage of the current 
literature and my understanding of the text, classify the documents into various key categories. 
Combined with the meta data of the articles, it provides further information on the elements 
been used by the government to construct people’s knowledge about the reforms in specific 
stages. In the analysis part, I integrated the topics with the categories to make further 
investigations about the features of official discourse.  
Unsupervised text mining allows researchers to explore the topics in the whole meta- 
text data without much ex ante classification. The Structural Topic Model (STM) uses mixed-
membership topic models and is able to incorporate contextual covariates (i.e. document-specific 
metadata) in the prior distribution. This is suitable for long texts: each document is assumed to 
present a mixture of topics, each topic is represented by many words, and each word therefore 
has a certain probability of belonging to certain topics. With STM, metadata such as dates and 
sentiments can be included in the topic model through either topical prevalence or topical 
content. The former approach allows us to identify the way the metadata affect the frequency 
with which a topic is discussed, while the latter allows the observed metadata to affect the rate of 
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word use within a given topic—that is, how a particular topic is discussed (M. E. Roberts, 
Stewart, & Tingley, 2014). 
Supervised learning methods, for their part, require researchers to read and code some 
training documents in advance, and then use certain algorithms to accomplish the categorization 
of the remaining documents. This approach is useful for analysing the text more precisely with 
the classifiers designed by the researcher to address particular research interests. In this section, I 
used results from support vector machines classifier, as well as the human coded result of the full 
corpus to make support my analysis. The original training and test set was generated by 
randomly selected a sample of 400 documents. Then the documents were manually categorized 
into the categories of “locus of responsibility”, “praise”, “denounce”, “national conditions”, and 
“international experience”. The “locus of responsibility” included 5 responsibility allocations 
regarding care for the elderly (pension payments, daily caring, and so on): “no clear direction of 
locus”, “state/party”, “individual/family”, “enterprise”, “social coordination” 23. “Praise” and 
“denounce” refer to the tone of the document, while “national conditions” and “international 
experiences” referring to the main highlights in the document (whether the whole document 
emphasised the local situation in China/Chinese characteristics, or experiences from other 
countries). With the hand-coded data, the classifiers followed up and classified the remaining 
documents with specific rules. In addition to the classified results using supervised model, I also 
hand coded the classifications for all the documents in the corpus, which later on is used to 
compare with the predictions from supervised models. A complete comparison of the 
performance metrics of various classifiers is available in the appendix. 
Data cleaning and an exploration on topics24  
To prepare the data, I used SegwordCN in the “tmcn” package (J. Li, 2019) (and 
validate the text pre-processing with “JiebaR” package) to carry out the word segmentation, 
then turned the words into a word corpus after cleaning the punctuation, stop words, and blank 
spaces25. The first step in inspecting the data is to figure out the themes in the metadata using the 
unsupervised text mining method. The topic model presents the probability distribution of terms 
in the corpus, and can assess the similarity of documents; it is therefore suitable for describing a 
text collection. Since all the documents are connected to pension benefits in one way or another, 
 
23 A flowchart of coding rule for category “locus of responsibility” is provided in the appendix.  
24 The original code can be found in the replication files. 
25 The dictionaries that I used to help identify core keywords included “Dictionary of common words in 
government official reports”, “Dictionary of common words in social policy”, “Dictionary of common words in 
socialist theories” etc. downloaded from sogou.com. 
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I used a mixed-membership model in order to include as much information as was in the corpus. 
In this case, the documents were not assumed to belong to single topics, but simultaneously to 
several and the topic distribution varied across documents.  
As with all mixed-membership topic models, the estimation of topics and correlations 
depends on the starting values of the parameters, such as the distribution of words for a 
particular topic. A spectral initialization uses a spectral decomposition (non-negative matrix 
factorization) of the word co-occurrence matrix, which is deterministic and globally consistent 
under reasonable conditions (M. E. Roberts, Stewart, & Tingley, 2016). The method of 
initialization covered in STM package includes Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), Dirichlet 
Multinomial Regression Topic Model (DMR), a random initialization or a previous STM object 
(M. E. Roberts et al., 2014). Below is the graph showing the average for each model and topic 
specific scores (see Figure 6). From the graph, we can see that the spectral initialization performs 
slightly better than the others. I also used the “topicmodel” package (Grün, Hornik, & Grün, 
2018) to validate the generated topic; the main identified topics are similar (as further validated in 
the appendix). These were all results generated by STM package (in which LDA is also the 
default option) in the main analysis. 
 
Figure 6. Performance of different methods of initialization  
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With the help of the STM package, I generated topics setting the topic number K=30 
and 60 respectively (validation of optimal K number can be found in the appendix) and 
estimated with spectral initialization and topical prevalence the parameter “year_month” (time 
when the article was published). Topical prevalence captures how much each topic contributes 
to a document (M. E. Roberts et al., 2014) and this prevalence varies with the metadata. The 
results present the highest probability words, FREX words, lift weighted words and score 
words26. Most of the topics are meaningful and easy to interpret, such as those related to 
economic development, including such core words as development (发展), increase/growth (增
长), income (收入), consumptions (消费), production (生产); the ones related to the reform of 
state-owned enterprise and laid-off workers, including core words such as employment (就业), 
labour (劳动), enterprise employees (职工), work unit (单位), insurance (保险), layoff (下岗) 
etc. There are some junk topics that are meaningless or have no relationship with pension 
reform. These bias is tolerable in my analysis since 1) it would only increase the probability of 
identified topics if there is no junk topics; 2) my analysis are built on the through reading of the 
full corpus of myself, which allow me to identify the meaningful topics as human coders. 
Moreover, I provide a full list of topics from the unsupervised models in the appendix, with 
validations of different word segmentation and pre-processing process and k settings. The 
selection of topics in Table 627 is mainly the most meaningful topics that relates to the pension 
reform and old-age care setting K=30. In labelling them, I focus on the main issues addressed 
from the topic descriptions, and label them use the most intuitive and informative words. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Weighted words are identified by their overall frequency and how exclusive they are to the topic. Lift weighted 
words are generated by dividing the frequency of the words in other topics, thus giving greater weight to words that 
appear less frequently in other topics. Score words come from dividing the log frequency of the word in the topic by 
the log frequency of the word in other topics (Roberts, Stewart, & Tingley, 2014). 
27 Some Chinese words have several meanings or act as several parts of speech (PoS); I include word extensions 
inside brackets. 
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Table 6. Selected topics with keywords 
Topic 4 “SOE Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: enterprise, reform, state-owned, 
market, economy, operation, management 
 FREX: state-owned, amalgamation, shares, 
transfer, bankrupt, enterprise, assets  
 Lift: final fight, bad debt, strategy 
 Score: enterprise, state-owned, reform, market, 
operation, assets, amalgamation 
 Topic 9 “Laid-off Workers” Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: employment, employee, laid off, 
enterprise, labour, insurance, staff  
  FREX: laid off, employment, unemployment, 
Liaoning, assure, positions, difficult 
  Lift: apathetic, bureaus, bring 
  Score: employment, laid off, employee, 
unemployment, state-owned, enterprise, 
insurance (protection)  
Topic 20 “Economic Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: economy, development, reform, 
market, society (social), job, state 
 FREX: macro, control, current, price, rectify 
 Lift: international market demand, victory, soft 
landing, signs, Keqiang, braveness, nothingness 
 Score: economy, macro, reform, currency, finance, 
development, market 
Topic 19 “EE Pension Plan” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: insurance, elder-care (social 
security), social (society), enterprise, protection, 
employees, fees  
 FREX: elder-care (social security), pay, 
insurance, trust, participate, social coordination, 
account  
Lift: rest of the life, transgression, account 
division, current, employed 
 Score: insurance, elder-care (social security), 
pay, employee, society (social), protection, 
enterprise 
Topic 23 “Institution Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: society (social), development, 
protection, institution(system), economy, reform, 
construction 
 FREX: harmony, distribution, public, society 
(social), institution (system), ideology, fairness  
 Lift: missing parts, variables, overstep, should 
 Score: society (social), protection, 
institution(system), reform, economy, ideology, 
market, harmony 
Topic 29 “Retired/Pension fee” Top 
Words: 
 Highest Pro: retire, employee, yuan, fees, salary, 
enterprise  
 FREX: factory director, factory, own, working 
years, surrender insurance, retire  
 Lift: rumors 
 Score: retirement, factory, employee, yuan, 
salary, fee, pension  
Topic 16 “Birth Control” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: reproduction, plan, population, 
giving birth, work, women, development 
 FREX: reproduction, women, plan, female, 
population, couple 
 Lift: still, early marriage, boys, contraception, 
pregnancy, as low as 
 Score: reproduction, population, women, plan, 
contraception, couple, giving birth 
Topic 5 “Old-age Care” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: old, old people, society (social), 
disabled, elderly care, age, service 
 FREX: old people, disabled, old age, care, 
recover 
 Lift: few children 
Score: old people, old age, disabled, age, old, 
home-based, care 
Topic 25 “Rural Migrants” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: peasant, rural area, worker, urban-
rural, agriculture, city 
 FREX: peasant, lose land, urban-rural, land, 
migrant, city 
 Lift: Dujiangyan, deep water, whole scale, Pujiang, 
Xinyang28 
Score: peasant, rural area, urban-rural, lose land, 
agriculture, worker, rural 
Topic 2 “Commercial Insurance” Top 
Words: 
Highest Prob: insurance, company, invest, bank, 
market, China 
 FREX: client, life, annuity, life insurance, 
company, business 
 Lift: be clever, actuary, collusion 
Score: insurance, life insurance, company, life, 
annuity, client, bank 
 
28 These are all names of places. 
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To better understand the relations of these topics, I present the topic correlations (with 
K=30 in order to have a manageable graph) in Figure 729 using a force-directed layout algorithm. 
Positive correlation suggests that both topics are likely to be discussed within a given document. 
The distance (or position in the graph) does not mean a high or low degree of topic connection, 
and nor does the size of the circle. From the correlation graph, we can identify the cluster of 
topics 4 (SOE Reform), 20 (Economic Reform), 23 (Institution Reform) and cluster of topics 9 
(Laid-off Workers), 19 (Enterprise Employee (EE) Pension Plan), 29 (Retired/Pension fee). It is 
easy to identify that topic 4 refers to the reform of state-owned enterprises, topic 20 and 23 cope 
with economic reform, marketization and redistribution; topics 9 and 19 relate respectively to the 
theme of enterprise employees’ layoff and their pension plan, topic 29 mainly addresses pension 
fees. There are some clusters/topics that seem not directly related to the pension reform. For 
instance, topic 30 (Letter/Visits) addresses the theme of appeals, issues and the government. 
Topic 15 (State Budget) discusses fiscal problems, the budget, and expenditure. Topic 7 
(Community Care) covers key words such as people, difficulty, life, disability, warm, street level 
administration and so on.  
 
 
29 Each topic in the figure is labelled with one or two key words for easier identification. It should be noted that 
each topic contains more complicated information than the labels. 
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Figure 7. Correlations of Topics  
 
The isolated topic 2 (Commercial Insurance) refers to the theme of commercial 
insurance, which addresses the promotion of purchased rights to cover social risks. In the 
documents that relate to commercial insurance, the social risks for each individual are treated as 
capital, are calculable and are avoidable once complete preparations have been made. One 
example30 of topic 2 is a selected letter to the newspaper editor from a former worker:  
“Dear editor: Both my partner and I have retained our posts in our original work unit while 
salary payment has been suspended. We have started a small private business since our “iron 
 
30 Based on my understanding of the full corpus (with a full reading of the whole sample text) and the instruction of 
the key topics (with unsupervised models), I select some excerpts that can best describe the feature of certain topics. 
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rice bowl” has disappeared. Therefore, we have quite a strong sense of (potential) risks and 
want to invest in some basic insurance to avoid future problems. I know there are several 
insurance companies and many kinds of insurance. Can you tell me what I should pay 
attention to when choosing insurance?” (“What we should pay attention to when choosing 
personal insurance”, Reader’s letter, 1997-05-28) (present author’s translation, as in all 
subsequent quotations) 
The editor replied with a long discussion of the difference between various types of 
commercial insurance. It can be addressed from the angle that people who make plans for their 
own and care about preparing for risks in life (especially those who have been laid off due to the 
SOE reform) should be warmly encouraged. In another document, “commercial insurance” is 
identified as the stabilizer of society: 
The social attributes of commercial insurance make it capable of adding up to and 
supplementing the government’s social insurance scheme. (Its existence) is good for reducing 
people’s anxieties and it functions as “the stabilizer of the society”. (“Bring out the role of 
commercial insurance as ‘the stabilizer of society’”, Zeng Yujin, 2004-09-18) 
Another special topic I want to highlight here is topic 16 (Birth Control), which is not 
directly related to cluster 4-20-23 or cluster 9-19-29. Topic 16 refers to the “one-child policy” 
and birth control, correlating with topic 8, which covers keywords rural, village, and towns. It 
correlates with topic 5 (Old-age Care), which addresses the social group of elderly people. The 
main keywords are society, elderly, population, life and problems, through topic 7 (Community 
Care). Why do these topics show up here? I give more explanations in the following part which 
discusses how social welfare policies are used as instruments of other contemporary major 
reforms. 
Mind the time: Pension reform as instruments 
Policies and their promotions are never isolated or arbitrary, they are proposed and 
framed in a way that is consistent with their socio-economic conditions. Welfare policy in 
particular is not just concerned with the allocation of social benefits, but also extends to 
employment policy, tax policy, and demographic policy. After sorting out the content and 
correlations of the core topics, it is important to connect the topics and their longitudinal 
variations with the grand socioeconomic reforms initiated by the government. The interaction or 
dialogue between welfare policies and other policies at the same time shows the comprehensive 
and sophisticated design of the governance. We can also find how the details of a welfare 
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policy—such as eligibility standards, subsidy methods—are shaped by their social and economic 
circumstances. As my chief objects in the text analysis, I address two main social groups during 
the period from the 1980s till 2000s: urban enterprise employees (especially SOE employees), 
and rural residents. In this part, I explore further the way that pension reforms interact with the 
other reforms imposed on these two social groups, in particular the way that the official 
discourse works to help address the main problems brought by the socio-economic 
transformations. 
Economic reform and state-owned enterprise reform are generally recognized as the 
main engine of China’s nation-wide reforms from the late 1970s. As shown in Figure 4 (the 
chronological schedule of pension reform), the “Decisions on Economic Reform” was issued in 1984 
and the “Enterprise Bankruptcy Law” was promulgated in 1986. In 1993, the “Decisions on 
Constructing [a] Socialist Market Economy” accelerated the process of economic reform 
following Deng’s visit to southern China. The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a 
core element of China’s social and economic reforms. SOEs formed the backbone of China’s 
economy during the central planning era; their transformation is the most prominent of the 
changes in China’s enterprise system that have been made in tandem with other institutional and 
policy reforms in the course of the transition to a market-based economy (Garnaut, Song, & 
Fang, 2018). The marketization of the SOEs was followed by the laying-off of millions of 
workers. The official total of redundancies increased from 3 million in 1993 to 17.24 million in 
1998 (Yongshun Cai, 2002; Jefferson & Rawski, 1994). The numbers of laid-off workers brought 
challenges to the social stability and pressure on pension reform. According to the OECD’s 
report, the unemployment rate in urban areas increased from 7.6% to 12.7% between 1995 and 
2001 (OECD, 2005). Thus, the government needed to persuade people of the need for the 
reform and tell them what the employees of enterprises (SOEs in particular) should expect from 
the government about their social benefits.  
In addition to the reforms of the state-owned enterprises, the emergence and exponential 
growth of private enterprises (as briefly shown in Error! Reference source not found.) 
following the economic reform also brought challenges to the existing pension system for 
enterprise employees. In 2003, private firms (about 3 million domestic private enterprises and 24 
million sole proprietorships) contributed 59% of the economy (OECD, 2005). Their employees 
were not covered in the traditional socialist pension system, and the central government was 
unlikely to provide “cradle to grave” social protection, as in the old system. Therefore, the 
authority needed to push for the acceptance of a new welfare system for employees of 
enterprises (whatever their ownership) in which individuals shared the responsibility. 
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Figure 8.  Topic proportions by Year: economic reform and pension reform for enterprise employees 
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Figure 8 presents the change of expected topic proportions for the themes of economic 
reform (topic 20), SOE reform (topic 4), pension reform (topic 19) and laid-off workers (topic 
9). I also highlight the critical events during the reform. The green dash lines are critical events 
for the economic reforms: “Decisions on Economic Reform” (1984), “Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law” (1986), and “Decisions on Constructing [a] Socialist Market Economy” (1993). The blue 
dash lines are the critical events for the pension reforms of enterprise employees: “Decision on 
Pension Insurance Reform” (1991), “Basic Pension Insurance Scheme” (1997), issuing the pilot 
programme of fully funded individual accounts for the reform of pensions for enterprise 
employees (2000), and “Improving the Basic Pension System” (2005). The changing trend of 
topics to do with both the SOE reform, marketization and the reform of pensions for enterprise 
employees is increased in the 1980s and reaches a high point around the early 1990s. The topic 
of institutional change has a similar pattern, although the absolute proportion is smaller. The 
issue of laid-off workers is highlighted at a late stage of the marketization and the pension 
reform for enterprise employees from 1994. How does the content of these topics dialogue and 
echo with each other? In the following part, I educe some typical examples of each topic, then 
discuss the governance logic behind the discourse usage. 
The economic reform itself was described as a desired future for everyone in Chinese 
society. Topic 20 (Economic Reform) which refers to the macro of economic growth, 
emphasises the urgency of the “overall situation” in current society in terms of development, 
social stability and long-term vision. For instance, it says: 
Dealing with the relations between reform, development, and stability correctly, and resolving 
the important issues during the process, are crucial for the progress of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, in order to attain the goal of building a society prosperous in every sense, for 
the long-term advancement of all kinds of socio-economic affairs (“Making the effort to 
resolve the crucial questions of the overall situation”, Shi Zhongxin, 2003-09-04)  
As a main component of economic reform, the reform of the SOEs is described as the 
most efficient and effective way of achieving the “prosperous society”. Therefore, from the text 
of Topic 4 (SOE reform and marketization), we can identify the main points of promoting the 
efficiency of the reformed SOEs: it is all tied up with economic performance and statistics. For 
instance, in a passage of the text introducing an example model of SOE reform, the discourse 
reads: 
When we liberate the small SOEs we cannot use a unified mode of “one size fits all”, or 
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just leave them on their own. Here is a summary of the Xinle city’s practices of liberating 
small SOEs. The reform started in the second half of 1992, when the debt asset ratio of 8 
branches of SOEs (including industry, light industry, and retailing, etc.) was close to 100%, 
and the scale of loss was about 63%. The nation’s fiscal capacity was almost exhausted. 
Three years after the liberalization of the small SOEs, the profits and taxes from the SOEs 
had increased dramatically. [This precedes a long statistical justification] (“Using multiple 
strategies, coordinating the government and enterprises, Xinle’s reform for small SOEs is 
alive and stable”, Wang Qingxian, 1996-07-18) 
Along with the SOE reform, one important task of the pension reform has been to help 
the state and enterprises ease the pension burden on employees. When the state started to 
promote pension reform for enterprise employees in the early 1990s, we see that the official 
discourse warmly commended the necessity and importance of this reform: 
The decision from the state council pointed out that the reform of the enterprise employees’ 
pension insurance system was an important move protecting the lives of retirees and 
maintaining social stability. It’s also very important for reducing the burden on the state and 
on enterprises, advancing the reform of the economic system, and guiding domestic 
consumption in a rational way. This work (of reform) is highly policy-centred and will affect 
many aspects of socio-political life. All levels of government need to enforce leadership, follow 
the spirit of this decision, design concrete implementation plans based on the local situation 
and promote the reform in positive and steady ways. (“The state council made the decision to 
reform the pension insurance system for enterprise employees; [we will] gradually construct a 
system which combines basic pension insurance, enterprise-supplemented insurance and 
employees’ personal savings”, 1991-10-10) 
Also, in a summary text about welfare reform, the difference between the desired new 
hybrid welfare system (with shared responsibilities) and the unwanted old system (social 
protection based on the work unit) is stated as an expected change which fits the overall trend of 
the social and economic reforms:  
The old system, unit-based, fully covered, exclusive and inefficient, in which the state takes 
full responsibility, has been replaced with a new multi-layered system of shared responsibility, 
socialized basic protection and inclusive schemes. A new welfare system which fits the 
requirements of a socialist market economy is now built (“The new opportunity for deepening 
the social welfare reform brought about by the advent of WTO membership”, Zhang Yitian, 
2002-03-23) 
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The SOE reform has left many employees facing the risk or experience of being laid off. 
A large number of people unemployed can pose many risks to social stability. The central 
government in response proposed a “social security system with Chinese characteristics” based 
on “three security lines” (2002): first, a basic guaranteed living system for those no longer 
working in an SOE, intended to safeguard basic living standards, pay social insurance 
contributions and encourage re-employment; second, an unemployment insurance system, which 
provides unemployment benefits and actively encourages re-employment; and third, guaranteed 
minimum living standards for all urban residents whose family income per capita is lower than 
the prescribed level (K. W. Chan & Buckingham, 2008). In the official discourse addressed to 
laid-off workers, the government draws attention not only to the importance and correctness of 
the reform, but also to the point that the government would never abandon this group of 
people, but still encourages them to make a new life if they can. 
(In a visit to Liaoning,) Zhu Rongji (the Premier at the time) pointed out that the policies  
of “encouraging amalgamation, regulating bankruptcy, re-directing laid-off workers, cutting 
jobs and boosting efficiency, [and] implementing a re-employment scheme”, and of 
constructing basic protection for the SOEs’ laid-off workers, pension insurance and 
unemployment insurance, secure minimum living standards, and so on, have shown 
themselves to be absolutely correct. These policies play an important part in deepening the 
reform of the SOEs, advancing the adjustment of the institutions and maintaining social 
stability. Hence, they should be carried out comprehensively. The path of pension reform in 
Liaoning is absolutely correct and we should persevere unwaveringly. (“Zhu Rongji 
emphasised during his visit to Liaoning, that [we] need to pursue to the end the path of 
pension reform and use our best efforts to improve the state of employment and re-
employment”, Liu Siyang, Meng Huan, 2002-07-25) 
All these discourses, ether they refer to economic efficiency, the national interest, well-
being for everyone, or simply to the competence of the government, all serve the intention of 
carrying out economic reform while preserving social stability.  
Another good example of social policy as an instrument of reform is the reform of the 
rural pension plan. The rural pension plan was not as well-designed or widely implemented as 
the pension reform for employees of urban enterprises. As shown above in the discussion of 
differentiation, the rural pension plan was in the form of a policy piloted in scattered local 
regions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, initiated and promoted by local governments. The 
central government at this stage acted as cheerleader. The text analysis identified that Topic 16 
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(Birth Control) was related to the rural pension scheme. Why was it? From a typical example of 
the text promoting the rural pension policy but connecting to the one-child policy quoted below, 
we may note that the pension benefits are being offered in exchange for willingness of rural 
residents to practise birth control.  
The priority of controlling birth is in rural areas, which is also one of the most difficult work 
[in one-child policy implementation]. But Zhejiang’s practice tells us that the difficulties can 
be overcome. Recently we investigated 100 households in 50 villages from 10 counties in the 
company of officials from the Zhejiang Birth Control Association. Our experience made us 
feel that their work here has made renewed progress … The way that this progress was made 
benefited from several skills. First of all, they promoted the birth control policy in every 
household. The association members paid many visits to households, bringing educational 
materials specifically designed to combat the difficulties in each of them, combining reasons of 
different kinds and clarifying misunderstandings with detailed information. For instance, the 
chair of the birth control association from Hengdu village, Anji County, visited all the 
villagers and helped them to calculate possible future expenses like this: parents who already 
have a girl must, if they have a second child who is a boy, pay at least 150,000 yuan when 
he marries and at least 200,000 yuan for his education. But if the household participates in 
the pension insurance programme they need to pay less than 30,000 yuan in order to receive 
a pension of 800 yuan when they get old [60 for males, 55 for females]. This calculation 
totally persuaded the villagers. Many couples of childbearing age said that even if their first 
child was a girl, they wouldn’t try to have a second child (“Birth control birth while enjoying 
a pension is a good idea”, Zhao Xiangru, 1988-12-17) 
Another example reads as follows: 
Currently more than 800 counties have started to pilot the pension insurance system, and 
about 7 million are participating. Peasants are thrilled and praise the pension insurance 
scheme, saying “The party and the government have given us a dutiful son”, “[it] is a 
nursing home without fences”. (“Our social welfare is going ahead vigorously”, Chen Hong, 
1992-10-06)  
The one-child policy was introduced in 1979, modified in the mid-1980s to relax 
regulations in rural areas (Scharping, 2013), and finally replaced by a “second child” policy that 
encourages couples to have more children at the end of 2015. In order to promote the policy, 
the government from the 1980s allocated 5 yuan per month to families with only one child (the 
amount is gradually increasing in step with the economic development), and also gave these 
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households a “one-child glory certificate” (with which the parents could enjoy longer maternity 
leave, subsidised social insurance and so on). The one-child limit was most strictly enforced in 
densely populated urban areas, where the government found it easier to grant benefits and 
impose punishments (such as a heavy fine or mandatory contraception) through the citizens’ 
work units. The situation in rural areas is more difficult to manage. For rural residents, one extra 
child means a bigger labour force, and the government has no way of enforcing punishment on 
all who “deserve” it. Thus, rural residents are now allowed to have 2 children, especially those 
whose first child is a girl (so long as they wait for some years after her birth).  Since it is difficult 
to enforce birth control mong rural citizens, the government has to use other means such as 
subsidies and praise. Social policy hereby is wisely used to encourage birth control and gender 
balance. Figure 9 presents the chronological changes in the expected topic proportions for topic 
16 (Birth Control). The topic proportion was high from the early 1980s, dropped in the mid-
1980s and increased again in the early 1990s. The overall trend since the 1990s is, however, 
declining.  
 
Figure 9. Topic proportions by Year: birth control 
 
The interactions between pension reforms and their parallel social and economic policies, 
and the ways in which the pension reforms been used as instruments for other reforms show 
that the authority’s governance in China is dynamic, reflective and experimental. The increased 
proportion of references to pension reform for enterprise employees and the attention to the 
laid-off workers explicitly indicate the government’s anticipation of potential problems from the 
economic reform and the SOE reform. The promotion of birth control, the pension plan 
(although in a scattered pilot form) for rural residents, especially parents who already had a 
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daughter have functioned effectively to buy people’s willingness to comply with the demographic 
control.  
The politics of redistribution: what is fair and just 
One important function of social welfare is to redistribute social benefits, in other words, 
to allow some social groups for some reason to be awarded more social benefits than other 
social groups. The two pension reforms discussed throughout this section—the pension reform 
for enterprise employees and for rural residents—relate to the reallocation of social benefits, 
such as subsidies from the government, or access to certain welfare programmes. In this part I 
ask what we can learn from the official discourse about fairness: “why someone deserves social 
benefits and who should pay for them (or contribute to them)”, and further investigate how 
government in its redistribution of social benefits embodies and creates norms about what is fair 
and just.  
Redistribution among different social groups 
There are several difficult situations related to “inequality” that the government has had 
to address during the whole reform of pensions and social insurance for elderly people. The first 
“inequality” problem in reforming the pension scheme for SOEs’ employees is the different 
performances of the enterprises. The second is the rural-urban difference when the coverage of 
social insurance scheme is expanded. The third relates to the rural migrants who work in cities. 
Due to the dual welfare system opposing urban by rural, rural residents in urban areas cannot 
enjoy urban social benefits. Therefore, when the urbanization process in China involved migrant 
workers from rural areas, their lack of social protection became a crucial issue. In all these 
situations, the government had to address such problems as why the difference existed, why the 
government had to transfer the social benefits (out of the public budget) to a certain social 
group, who needed to be “sacrificed” for this redistribution and why.  
When the pension reform for enterprise employees started in the early 1990s in the 
process of economic reform, the burden of paying for the pensions of the retired SOE 
employees was considerable. Since many enterprises were uneasy about paying for the laid-off 
workers, retired workers, and early retirements31, the solution imposed by the government was to 
redistribute the burden (of paying the benefits) to the SOEs through social coordination. In 
 
31 The policy of early or “internal” retirement was adopted by many SOEs as a means of shedding workers who had 
not actually reached retirement age (normally about 40 to 50 years) and were thus not formally eligible for a pension. 
(“No way out”, 2008, Chinese Labour Bulletin, can be accessed through 
https://clb.org.hk/sites/default/files/archive/en/File/research_reports/no_way_out.pdf) 
  109 
other words, the enterprises that performed better and had fewer retirements were encouraged 
(later on, required) to pay into a social pool, which would be used to relieve the enterprises that 
had got into difficulties. In defending the redistribution of the obligation to pay benefits, the 
government used several types of discourse. One way to address the redistribution was that 
sharing the burden of retirement followed the general design of the country’s economic reform, 
and helped to change the current distributional system into something better and fairer. Here is 
an example: 
The State Council announced the “Decision on reforming the Basic Pension Insurance for 
Enterprise Employees” in 1991. The “Decision” clearly addressed the proposal that 
“following the economic development, [we should] gradually build a system that combines the 
basic old-age insurance, enterprise pension insurance and the individual’s personal savings as 
insurance”… The principle of the basic pension insurance reform is [to combine] “fairness 
and efficiency”, “rights and obligations” and “sharing social benefits brought by the economic 
development”. (“The reform brings benefits for enterprise retirees”, Li Boyong, 1993-04-
29.) 
In addition to the abstract description of “rights and obligations”, more details of how 
the better-performing enterprises could actually benefit from contributing into the social pool 
sounded more attractive to the audience. Shown in numbers and comparisons, these arguments 
seem to have been quite useful in demonstrating the government’s rational and careful design in 
solving the problems. Here is one example elaborating on the reason why the pension fund 
needs to be socially coordinated: 
For a long time, the enterprise employee’s pension in our country was paid by the extra 
revenue of each unit. However, the number of retirees for each enterprise varies dramatically 
different from one to another, making the burden of pension payment, unequal. According to 
census data from the Labour Bureau of Zigong City, Sichuan Province in 1983, the 
pension expenditure for some new enterprises is only about 2% of their total payroll, while in 
some old enterprises, the proportion is as high as 60%. Such differences threaten the progress 
of reform in our distributional system. One of the basic elements of the reform of this system 
is to connect the total payroll directly with the economic revenue of each enterprise. The 
current method of pension payment hinders the evaluation of enterprises’ economic 
performance. For some old enterprises, although they may run well and are properly 
managed, the heavy pension cost leads to less tax revenue than less burdened enterprises must 
pay … In such cases, the taxes and profits cannot reveal the real economic performance of 
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the enterprise, and its connection with the total payroll cannot hit the target of reforming the 
distributional system. 
[The pension payment method] also violates the principle of fair distribution. From the very 
beginning, the new enterprises were able to develop by using the profits of the old enterprises. 
For instance, the total handed-in tax and benefits from Zigong’s salt industry is around 2.3 
billion yuan. This is why the newly emerged enterprises should share the increasing cost of 
paying the retirees from the old enterprises. If the employees of the new enterprises enjoy a 
higher income from exploiting such unfair advantages, it will cause disputes between the two 
sets of employees. Thus, we need to reform the distribution of responsibility for pensions. We 
should make an overall arrangement and collect pension funding from all kinds of enterprises 
according to certain proportions and coordinate the money to the retired employees under a 
central body. In the long term, as the number of retirements increases naturally, the new 
enterprises will not be taken advantage of; by then their retirees will enjoy pension benefits 
from the socially coordinated pool. Most importantly, the overall arrangement of the pension 
fund can direct a smooth reform of the distributional system (“The pension fund should be 
(socially) coordinated”, Tang Liang, 1985-06-09) 
Another way in which the government described the benefits brought by sharing the 
responsibility (as briefly mentioned in the document quoted above) is that it was beneficial for all 
enterprises to prepare for the lagged risks and uncertainties brought by a steadily ageing 
population. Here is a good example of the elaborated “lagged risk” argument: 
Participating in the social coordination of pensions would generally have two results: either 
enterprises that had a lighter burden of retirements would need to contribute or those which 
already had numbers of retirees would seem to benefit from the coordination process. For 
instance, one nitrogen fertilizer factory in Changde, Hunan province, had 829 employees at 
work and only 92 retirees. After the social coordination of pension contributions, the factory 
needed to contribute 40,000 yuan more to the social insurance office, so it counted as a 
contributing unit. Another catering company in the same city had a pension burden of 
498,300 yuan each year to pay for its retirees, who occupied 78% of its payroll. Since the 
company could afford only 56% of the pension total, after social coordination, the social 
insurance office had to refund the company 220,000 yuan every year. This categorised the 
company as a benefiting unit. Does contributing mean losing and does benefiting mean 
gaining? The chief of Changde’s Labour Bureau told us that the employees from the 
fertilizer factory initially thought so: they were upset about “losing” 40,000 yuan to other 
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enterprises. But the officials of the Labour Bureau went on to explain to them that their 
money was just temporarily being used to support other enterprises. When the retirees from 
this factory increase in the future, other enterprises with fewer retirees will come and support 
them. The money they contributed to others will ultimately become their own pension in 
return (“An investigation of pension coordination”, Gong Jinxing, 1991-10-08) 
From the text we can also identify the message that it’s ethical and moral for enterprises 
that are running well to make contributions to the social pool. Such moral argument combined 
with the rational argument (such as forestalling lagged risks in the future) is used to ease the 
anxieties of many enterprises which feel that others are taking advantage of them. For instance, 
another commentator argues:  
The Baoding No. 1 Cotton Mill does not find paying more social insurance fee to be a sign 
of exploitation. This spirit is valuable. It’s valuable in that the workers’ strong sense of 
social responsibility as them care not only about the mill’s own employees, but also about 
social obligations. It’s also valuable in showing that they have a strong “sense of risk”: even 
when their factory is performing quite well and salaries are steadily rising, they choose 
without hesitation to contribute to the pension pool and actively participate in the social 
coordination. Such action shows their boldness regarding reforms and their long-term vision 
of the future. Accelerating social welfare reform is one of the most important tasks for this 
year’s reform. The core element of welfare reform is to achieve the social coordination of 
enterprise employees’ pension contributions, and extend the coverage to different types of 
enterprise. In doing so, we intend to increase the social capacity to confront risks and create a 
better environment for SOE reform. The nature of the pensions’ social coordination is 
actually a redistribution of benefits imposed by the state on enterprises. Thus, enterprises that 
perform better economically and have fewer retirees will support others that are less efficient 
and have more retirees. If we base our conclusions only on temporary contributions and cry 
that “we are being taken advantage of”, we will have a short-sighted view. The reform needs 
to be understood and recognized by its long-term benefits and the changing situations of 
market risks. The economic performance, employees’ age structure and the expected welfare 
burden will never reach their optimum [for individual enterprises], because these change so 
much lot. “I help you today and tomorrow someone else will help me.” In other words, the 
social coordination of pensions is the “shock absorber” [of risk] for enterprises. They should 
open their eyes and make full use of the shock absorber! (“Make full use of the shock 
absorber”, Mo Cun, 1995-04-13)  
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In the case of promoting rural pension reform, the fairness of redistribution is also useful 
in showing why rural residents are eligible to enjoy the expansion of social benefits without 
waiting, and urban areas may have to share the responsibility of paying for it. In the 2000s, when 
the government was planning to establish a new rural pension scheme for rural residents, we 
observed an emphasis in news articles on the “unfair” rural-urban differences, the threat of 
social instability, and the importance of the “common interest”. Here are two well-argued 
documents: 
How huge is the urban-rural inequality? Here are some informative statistics from 2003. 
The disposable income per capita for urban residents was 8,472 yuan, and 2,622 yuan for 
rural residents; the participants in [the urban] basic pension insurance numbered 155.06 
million, while the participants in the rural pension insurance numbered 54.28 million; 
across the country there were 22.35 million urban residents who were covered by the 
Minimum Living Standard Security program while only 4 million rural residents were 
covered. The imbalance of rural-urban growth has created a bottleneck that obstructs all 
social and economic development. Yuyao City in Zhejiang province, where the GDP per 
capita already exceeds 3000 dollars, coordinates the rural-urban development in order to 
share the fruits of development [with everyone] … The repayment to rural residents in 
Yuyao benefits from several innovative principles. First of all, [Yuyao City] persists in 
unifying the contributors and beneficiaries. Rural residents were the main forces in the 
opening up and reform; they are the constructors of our socialist career, they are the creators 
of our social goods … most importantly, the rural residents have the right to enjoy the fruits 
of social progress just like urban residents. Second, [the city government] holds the principle 
of considering “the fundamental interests of the majority”. The traditional social welfare 
system favours the urban enterprise employees. The frequent occasions of illness-led poverty, 
natural disaster-led poverty in rural areas relate, to some extent, to the absence of a social 
welfare system for rural residents. 60% of the population in our country live in rural areas, 
but we cannot let the peasants lose out, we cannot betray the ultimate goal of common 
prosperity. Third, it perseveres in taking people into accounts. As a relatively advanced 
region on the eastern coast, Yuyao has the political and fiscal ability to tear down the fence 
between rural and urban areas. Subsidizing the peasants won’t be in vain; rather, it’s a 
“grand vision” of development, and is beneficial to social stability and long-term growth 
("Sharing the fruits of development with the peasants”, Wang Binlai, 2004-07-25) 
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A common description of sharing the responsibility for rural development with urban 
areas is “promoting agriculture with industries, and powering the rural areas with the efforts 
from urban areas”. By highlighting the fact that the countryside and agriculture have contributed 
to urban and industries development—which is a similar argument to the one concerning the 
contribution of old enterprises—those who have benefited from them should now pay back 
their debt for the sacrifices made. Here is another example which integrates the moral argument 
with the fairness argument to do with rural-urban inequality: 
The special industrialization stage, the complexity of developments in agriculture and rural 
areas determine that we have arrived at the phase of “promoting agriculture with industries, 
and powering the rural areas by the efforts made by urban areas” … Industry repaying 
agriculture sums up the changed urban-rural, industry-agriculture relationship when 
industrialization reaches a certain point …Generally speaking, at the early stages of 
industrialization, agriculture acts as the main strength in the national economy. In order to 
create more material wealth and increase the level of development and living standards, we 
need to rely on the accumulation of agricultural production. When industrialization reaches 
the point when industry becomes the main engine, we need to coordinate the industry-
agriculture relationship by having the state increase its support and protection of agriculture 
in addition to the (existing) market intervention, so we can convert from the model of 
agriculture-feeding-industry to that of  industry-repaying-agriculture. Experience from other 
countries shows that when the process of industrialization and urbanization accelerates, the 
whole economy attains the phase of industry-repaying-agriculture. If we strengthen and repay 
agriculture, the national economy will achieve industrialization and modernization in a 
healthy way. Otherwise, if we still exploit and ignore the agriculture, it will lead to 
agriculture lagging behind, growing inequality and a wider urban-rural gap. Moreover, it 
will sharpen social conflict and lead to social instability and retrogression (“Industry repays 
agriculture and the urban supports the rural: how to support the rural areas and agriculture 
in the new scenario”, Han Jun, 2005-11-18) 
When rural migrants flooded into the cities on a large scale in the urbanization process, 
the question of pensions for them, and more generally, social welfare for them, became a knotty 
problem. Due to the existence of the Hukou system, rural residents had restricted use of schools, 
hospitals and other public facilities in urban areas. In the 1990s and 2000s, when the number of 
migrant workers surged, the absence of a proper welfare scheme for them led to many social 
unrests. However, if the migrant workers had been allowed to enjoy the same welfare system as 
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the urban residents, the competition for resources would have been fierce and cause discontent 
from urban residents. Thus, the government tried to persuade society, mainly the urban 
residents, that there were good reasons for these migrant workers to receive more social benefits 
and fiscal support. Again, we might expect that the most obvious and frequently used reason is 
that the migrant workers contribute to the construction of the cities. For instance: 
Among the manufacturing, construction, mining and service industries (such as domestic 
service, catering and so on), rural migrates constitute more than half of the employees. As one 
important part of the labour force, they deserve fair treatment. This is not only a necessary 
action defending the migrant worker’s legitimate rights, but also directly relates to a defence 
of social justice and fairness … Compared to urban workers, rural migrant workers receive 
low wages (which sometimes can’t even be paid on time and take on dirty and dangerous 
jobs, while enjoying none of the social welfare benefits [of urban workers]. They contribute to 
the growth of cities, yet they enjoy none of the convenience enjoyed by urban employees in their 
daily lives and suffer greatly in such areas as children’s education … Treating them fairly 
requires the government to serve them faithfully, consider their troubles, improve their 
employment situation, and protect their legal rights with efficient rules. Urban employees 
have quite different situations from rural migrants; thus some existing policies may not be 
appropriate for them. The government therefore should be aware of the extreme mobility of 
rural migrant workers and design policies that fit their needs. Luckily, the central 
government is already working on the issue of migrant workers. Early this year the “State 
council’s guidance on solving migrant workers’ issues” was examined and passed by the 
State Council (“Treat rural migrant workers with fairness and justice”, Bai Tianliang, 
2006-03-27) 
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Figure 10. Topic proportions by Year: social justice and rural immigrants 
 
In addition to the text data, we can also identify the changing proportions of the fairness 
and social justice topic, as well as its connection to certain social problems (such as rural 
migrants) from the topic model. As noted above, topic 23 refers to the fair distribution and 
redistribution in the macro issue of institutional reform. If we display the chronological 
proportion of this topic with the topic that refers to the rural migrants (as shown in Figure 10), 
it’ becomes easier to see the resemblance in the trends of these two topics. The emphasis on 
social justice and fairness increases with the increment in the appearance of rural migrants.  
Redistribution between different generations 
Apart from the issue of redistribution between current social groups across various 
enterprise types and regions, the nature of social insurance, especially pension insurance, also 
brings up the problem of redistribution between different generations. For the trust in pensions 
to work, the government needs to raise funding from current employee, in particular now that 
  116 
the state is trying to transform China’s previous pension mode, as a “pay-as-you-go” system, into 
a mixed two-tier system comprising social and individual accounts. The cost of the social 
transition has to be met by someone. What kind of reasons are provided by the government to 
justify the redistribution of social benefits between different generations? The first and most 
convenient tool is highlighting the traditional culture. Filial piety (xiao 孝) is one of the most 
prestigious merits in Chinese traditional culture and conventionally, caring for the elderly is 
undoubtedly the responsibility of their children. Filial piety is a virtue which means not only 
caring for one’s own parents but also showing love, respect and support for all older people. 
Hence in the official discourse, a reconstruction of family and piety culture is generously praised: 
A recent competition for “Star of filial piety” which selects the person who has been most 
filial to parents and dutiful to the elderly, is quite unique and deserves our praise. The “Star 
of filial piety” contest, literally, has the core merit of “filial piety”. For instance, one of the 
winners, Han Shihe, an employee from Hangu Saltworks, is taking care of his 
grandmother, parents-in-law, and aunt with all his heart and all his strength … 
Appreciation of filial piety is definitely the main trend in our society and matches the 
willingness of most of our population. Although there are defiant peoples who refuse to care 
for their parents, they are not the mainstream. More importantly, their attitudes and actions 
are despised by society as a whole. Once their cases are exposed, they are denounced and 
disdained by the whole world. Respecting and caring for the elderly is natural in its essence. 
Just like parents’ obligation to bring up their children, adult children have the responsibility 
of taking care of their elders. The pension welfare system in our country is currently 
incomplete, caring for the elderly still need to be based in families. Thus, filial piety is 
particularly important [for us] (“Complimenting the ‘Star of filial piety’”, Chen Fei, 1997-
11-10) 
 In addition to the cultural factor, older people also deserve respect and benefits from 
society since they have already given their time to it. In addition, the younger generation should 
see its own future from the situation of the generation before theirs. Moreover, rationally 
speaking, the “time difference” will help the social welfare system operate better. Here are some 
examples from an original text: 
Today’s elderly, were hard at work yesterday. They contribute to the development of our 
society in different degrees. Therefore, they deserve to share the material and spiritual benefits 
brought by the country’s development. Today’s youth will tomorrow become the elderly. Today 
when they see the whole society treating old people fairly, they won’t be worrying about their 
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fate [in the future]. They will devote more to their work in the prime of life (“About elderly 
issue”, Hong Tianguo, He Liangliang, and Zhang Da, 1982-06-22) 
Social welfare reform needs to take good advantage of the “time difference”. [It should 
include] more people in the social insurance scheme … because most of these people are still 
young or middle aged and the promise (of a pension) can only materialize 20-30 years 
ahead. By the time they get old, the social insurance trust will have been accumulated to quite 
a size and will certainly be able to afford pension and health insurance for these people32. In 
this case, the new social insurance scheme, the realization of past promises, and the social 
insurance trust will form a strategic triangle and the lapse of time will be valuable. Taking 
full advantage of the time difference, our social welfare system will be on the winning side. 
Because the gap in time will give us enough time to reduce holding shares and realize state-
owned assets33, increase the funding of the national social insurance trust, and boost the 
confidence of the participants in our social insurance scheme (“Building a new platform of 
social insurance”, Gao Shusheng, 2003-04-08) 
The logic in the discourse on redistribution is fairly simple: contributions and rewards, 
rights and obligations. The old enterprises deserve to be funded by the new enterprises 
through the coordinated social pension funding, because they contributed to the start-up of 
industrialisation; the rural areas deserve to have transferred public finance because they 
contributed to the development of urban areas; the rural migrants deserve fair treatment (more 
social benefits) because they contributed to urbanization and the construction of cities; the 
elderly deserve better care because they contributed to the society when they were young. The 
maxim ‘Someone deserves reward because they contributed’, can also be translated as, ‘Someone 
should be rewarded only if they contributed’. Social rights are distributed to anyone who has 
contributed to society. In this way, the rationalized subjectivity of “I am/for everyone” and 
“everyone is/for me” is highlighted in the politics of redistribution. This inclusiveness which is 
conditional on “contributions” is especially obvious when taking the “lagged time” into account. 
We can only imagine our future according to the current redistribution system; therefore, 
everyone is tightly constrained inside the game of “producing and giving”.  
 
32 Ironically, a piece of news reported in 2019-04-12 was that, with the current payment rate, the accumulated 
surplus pension fund would run out by 2035 according to the “Actuarial evaluation of China’s Pension” published 
by the Social Insurance Research Center in the Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(http://www.bjnews.com.cn/finance/2019/04/12/567254.html, [Accessed 2019-04-18]). 
33 To subsidize pension funds, China has also resorted to another means: selling off stock shares and privatising in 
the state-owned enterprises (Frazier, 2010). 
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The state-individual relationship: what should the citizens expect from the state? 
 The pension reform, for whatever social group, has been also a move to reconstruct the 
relationship between the state and the public. This is clearly indicated in the policy content 
below: 
Except for some special programs (such as insurance for occupational injury and childbirth) 
for which individuals do not need to pay fees according to the law or international practice, 
the fundraising responsibility for all other social insurance programs should be shared by the 
state, enterprises and individuals. Enterprises and individuals should pay the insurance fee, 
while the government provides a fiscal subsidy under exceptional circumstances. Raising 
funds from individuals is not only helpful for expanding the funding source of social 
insurance, but also beneficial for increasing labour’s awareness of social insurance (“Speeding 
up and deepening the reform of social insurance system”, 1997-05-20) 
Thus, in this section I investigate the issue of “shaping citizens’ expectations” in the 
official discourse: what is the proper relationship between citizens and state regarding welfare 
responsibility? what should citizens expect to get from the government when faced with social 
risks such as unemployment, illness and ageing? 
The STM package makes it possible to show the way that the metadata affect the 
frequency with which a topic is discussed using topical prevalence. Therefore, I generated the 
classification data by dividing the documents into subcategories of “locus of responsibility”, 
“praise”, “denounce”, “national conditions”, and “international experiences” according to their 
content. The locus of responsibility includes 5 types of responsibility allocation regarding care 
for the elderly in general (such as raising the funds for pension fees, daily caring and so on): “no 
clear direction of locus”, “state/party”, “individual/family”, “enterprise”, and “social 
coordination”. Since many documents contain more than one topic and sometimes refer to 
various kinds of message, my coding of the locus of responsibility is based on the most obvious 
direction of responsibility that can be perceived or identified from the content. Classifying the 
tone of “praise” or “denounce” in a document is useful as these are covariates in addressing the 
issue of “what has been endorsed by the government”. The categories of “national conditions” 
and “international experience” are important in identifying whether the whole document 
emphasises the local situation of China/Chinese characteristics or learns lessons from 
international experience. Table 7 below shows the descriptive data for each category from the 
hand coded classification results. Documents that are categorized as “Praise”, “Denounce”, 
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emphasizing “National conditions” or “International experiences” are coded as 1 in the data, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of document categories (Hand Coded) 
 0 1 
Praise 2996 394 
Denounce34 3343 47 
National conditions 3278 112 
International experiences 3282 108 
 
Unfolding the locus of responsibility: topic-based promotions 
The promoted locus of responsibility regarding elderly care in general (such as 
fundraising to meet pension fees, daily caring and so on) varied according to topic. Figure 11 
presents the expected proportions (X axis) of each topic in different covariate levels of 
responsibility, and the results are quite intuitive. It is clear that for topic 4 (SOE reform and 
marketization), the related documents are likely to be coded as promoting the role of social 
coordination in solving the problem of care for the elderly, while the topic proportion is smaller 
in the class of government/party responsibility. For topic 19 (EE Pension Plan), the pattern is 
quite similar. The topic which refers to the laid-off workers, however, has a much higher 
proportion at the covariate class of government/party responsibility. This is reasonable, since the 
laid-off workers are the ones who were sacrificed for the economic reform and SOE reform, the 
employees needed to be reassured that the government was not giving up on them. Topic 29 
(Retired/Pension fee) differs from topic 19 (EE Pension Plan) in that it mainly refers to the 
fundraising problem in pension reform. Therefore, it is reasonable to see the highest proportion 
resting in the class of enterprise responsibility (and its proportion in the class of social 
coordination follows). Although the main target of the EE pension reform is to ease the burden 
for SOEs and the government, there is not much significance in the signals from the official 
discourse showing that the government is promoting only individual responsibility, or at least 
cannot be directly perceived by the readers. The more commonly used discourse is “shared 
responsibility” between the state, the unit/enterprise, and individuals. As we all know, in the 
 
34 The variation of variable “denounce” is small and not significant, so the result of covariates in the latter parts does 
not include the statistics of denounce related results. They are presented in the appendix. 
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previous system, the accountable source of employees’ pensions was simply the state and the 
work unit. Hence, a proper interpretation of the “shared responsibility” discourse is to increase 
the individual’s responsibility for and contribution to the pension system.  
People may ask why the government doesn’t directly highlight “individual responsibility” 
rather than using the obscure discourse of “shared responsibility” if it truly wants to lighten its 
own burden. The reason for not directly urging a clear reallocation of welfare responsibility is 
complicated. First of all, the government official discourse has its dependency. The socialist 
discourse of “an omnipotent state” has become ingrained in habit and even internalised as 
second nature. Therefore, it is unlikely that the tone will change quickly and to call directly for 
individual responsibility for welfare. Another easily identified reason is public expectations. Even 
if the government wished to change the direction of the official discourse, people who used to 
enjoy considerable benefits from their work unit and government support are less likely to 
accept the reallocated social responsibility. To be more specific, there was a risk of enraging the 
target group—enterprise employees, especially employees of SOEs—at the beginning of the EE 
pension reform if the official discourse had abruptly changed its tone. I give more illustrations in 
Chapter 4’s analysis of official propaganda.  
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Figure 11. Topic by covariate: locus of responsibility 
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For topics that relate to other pension reforms, the covariate class of responsibility also 
fits the design and intention of the policy. The proportions (X axis) for all the covariate class of 
responsibility are quite low for topic 16 (Birth Control) and the highest class is “no obvious 
directivity”. This is reasonable, since this topic directly relates to a demographic policy, not a 
pension policy. Moreover, the pension pilots for rural residents are scattered experiments 
initiated by local authorities. The main reason why the pension policy is mentioned in association 
with this topic is that the government wants to trade the pension benefit for people’s willingness 
to practise birth control. For topic 5 (Old-age Care) which refers to home-based elderly 
care/support, the main responsibility is shared by the individual/family and the government. 
This is because the main content of this caring approach—which does not directly address the 
pension issue—is that elderly people are encouraged to stay in their homes, where the local street 
government will help them to take care of everyday problems as they arise. For the issue of rural 
migrates, we have elaborated that the government want to convince the urban residents that 
rural migrants deserve better social welfare, in view of their contributions to the urbanization; 
while the government also want to appease their anxieties and assure them that the government 
will do the job. The topic of commercial insurance, or the right to purchase insurance against 
social risks, is obviously related to the responsibility of the individual/family. 
In Table 8, I present a summary of the models for several selected topics by covariate 
responsibility, which can display more information about the magnitude of each coefficient. In 
dealing with the issue of “EE Pension Plan reform” (Topic 19), the responsibility of the 
government/party, the individual/family, the enterprise and social coordination are all 
significantly emphasised in the official discourse. However, when we check the magnitude of the 
coefficients, the role of “social coordination” has the highest correlation with this topic. For the 
issue of “Laid-off Workers” (Topic 9), government/party responsibility is positively (and 
significantly) related, while the individual/family is negatively related. For Topic 25, “Rural 
Migrants”, the related welfare responsibility is also focused on the role of the government/party. 
As for “Commercial Insurance” (Topic 2), it is mainly individual/family contributions, while the 
role of government/party is negatively related to this topic. 
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Table 8. Topic proportion by covariate responsibility 
 Topic 19 Topic 9 Topic 25 Topic 2 
Government/Party 0.063*** 
(0.015) 
0.078*** 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.022* 
(0.009) 
Individual/Family 0.146*** 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
0.098*** 
(0.011) 
Enterprise 0.158*** 
(0.025) 
0.029 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.017) 
Social coordination 0.296*** 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
Note: *P < 0.05; * *P < 0.01; * * *P < 0.001. In all the models, the mode of uncertainty is set 
as “Global”.  
 
In addition to the classification of responsibilities, the other coded classifications, such as 
national condition, foreign experience, praising and so on, can reveal more details about the 
discourse employed. For instance, what kind of sentiment is related to each responsibility 
allocation? Which topic (and corresponding policy) is more likely to be promoted using examples 
from other countries? In Table 9, I present the topic proportion estimation by multiple 
covariates. For both topic 19 (EE Pension Plan) and 9 (Laid-off Workers), there is a positive 
correlation between the topic proportion and a document being coded as “praise”. In other 
words, the pension reform for enterprise employees and the government’s efforts in taking care 
of the laid-off workers are more likely to be reported and promoted in a positive tone. However, 
the interaction between an enterprise’s responsibility and praise is negatively significant. It seems 
that in the official promotion of pension reform for enterprise employees, the documents that 
mention the enterprise’s responsibility are less likely to be praising. For using the national 
situation or international experience, topic 9 (Laid-off Workers) and 25 (Rural Migrants) are less 
likely to be related to international experience, while commercial insurance (Topic 2) is negatively 
correlated with the national condition.   
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Table 9. Topic proportion by multiple covariates  
 Topic 19 Topic 9 Topic 25 Topic 2 
Government/Party 0.061** 
(0.021) 
0.097*** 
(0.017) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Individual/Family 0.155*** 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.01) 
0.108*** 
(0.015) 
Enterprise 0.179*** 
(0.028) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.017) 
Social coordination 0.313*** 
(0.034) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
Praise 0.063*** 
(0.015) 
0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.01) 
National condition -0.024 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.03* 
(0.014) 
Foreign experience -0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.032* 
(0.014) 
-0.024* 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
Government/Party*Praise -0.054 
(0.035) 
-0.081** 
(0.025) 
0.01 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
Individual/Family*Praise -0.067 
(0.047) 
-0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.000 
(0.026) 
0.014 
(0.039) 
Enterprise*Praise -0.177** 
(0.066) 
-0.072 
(0.047) 
-0.012 
(0.039) 
0.079 
(0.054) 
Social coordination*Praise -0.109 
(0.084) 
-0.091 
(0.047) 
-0.017 
(0.037) 
0.032 
(0.044) 
Note: *P < 0.05; * *P < 0.01; * * *P < 0.001. In all the models, the mode of uncertainty is set 
as “Global”.  
 
Promoting shared responsibility: the glory of being employed and the common 
interest 
What are the desired attributes of a “good and responsible citizen” when the government 
is promoting the shared responsibility for social welfare? From the text, one attribute that is 
highly praised and promoted is the glory of being employed: a liberal and free labour force. The 
idea is quite similar to those in the reforms of other former communist countries. In Ukraine 
and Russia, despite the widespread suffering caused by the reforms, there is still a belief that the 
liberal recipes of marketization and privatization could work, if they were properly implemented 
(D. Lane, 2007). Even the traditional left wing has accepted the neo-liberal rhetoric and private 
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ownership driven by the reform policies. Mary Gallagher (2011) deciphered some similar 
phenomena in China’s reform era and found that individual merit was highly encouraged while 
“waiting, relying, and demanding” with regard to governmental help was criticized. The official 
propaganda promoted the notion that “the market economy doesn’t pity the weak” and people 
should take responsibility for their fate. 
For instance, some documents from the People’s Daily, below, encourage the laid-off 
workers to change their mind regarding work, especially the idea of “relying on the state/unit”. 
The former employees, indeed the whole society, should change the idea of the “iron rice bowl”, 
and put more effort into their own attempts in the job market. 
Jinan city offered 261 charity positions especially for the “40/50” population. However, 
there are more than 100 positions that have lain idle since mid-August. One laid-off 
employee said, “The job of an urban management officer is just too demanding, [will] entail 
too much outdoor work, and 420 yuan is definitely not worth it” … [This illustrates the 
idea that] “relying on the state in seeking a job, relying on a post for life”. Many people are 
just too comfortable with “waiting, relying, demanding”, and expect the government to find a 
position for them. … 
[The idea that] “the only real employment is when you have an ‘iron rice bowl’” is very 
common in society. Following the trend of socio-economic development, since we are now in a 
market economy, “contractual employment” has been promoted on a large scale. Self-
motivated job searching, career building, and fluid employment have not only set the 
conditions of the job market, but also is an inevitable outcome of social progress. In other 
words, whether for government employees or enterprise employees, the position is no longer the 
so-called “iron rice bowl”. The most reliable “iron rice bowl” should be your skills and 
capacities; [people] should create and develop their own career by their honest work 
(“Talking about ignored vacancies”, Jiang Nanke, 2003-09-01) 
In another exemplary text shown below, a responsible citizen is expected to enjoy the 
opportunities offered by the marketization reform. This text specifically addressed several 
common ideas in society regarding the self-motivated search for a job, such as “only the iron rice 
bowl is counted as re-employment”, or “seeking a job for myself makes [me] lose face”, and “re-employment 
means waiting for job re-assignment”. The main idea is to urge enterprise employees to move on from 
the “old planned economy” and embrace the new efficiency-based, contribution-based market 
economy. Those who can seize the chance through skills of their own will be valued. 
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The deepening reform of the SOEs and the process of “reducing staff and boosting efficiency” 
inevitably lead to some laid-off workers … Laid-off workers should change their attitude of 
reliance to independence and try all ways of expanding their capacity to find a job. The idea 
of “only the iron rice bowls is counted as re-employment” has very deep roots (in this society). 
Indiscriminate egalitarianism and the iron rice bowl were the products of the planned 
economy, and have become less and less [popular] since the start of the economic reform and 
the building up of a socialist market economy. Breaking down indiscriminate egalitarianism 
is the request of all the enterprise employees and will bring benefits to us; [while] discarding 
the iron rice bowl is the inevitable outcome of deeper reform. … 
The idea of “seeking a job for myself makes [me] lose face” need to be changed. This idea 
was born in the old planned economy and in circumstances where all the housing, healthcare, 
and pension provision of SOE employees were covered by the state. Nowadays, following the 
reform of social welfare, the difference between the SOE employees and people who have 
obtained a job by their own efforts is smaller. The old idea should be abandoned along with 
the abolishment of old (economic) system. Meanwhile, we should see that the new socialist 
market economy brings everyone the opportunity of choosing a career and a position that can 
show her/his capacity in line with her/his own willingness, skills, and interests. People 
should treasure such opportunities. As long as they are allowed to reveal their abilities and 
work happily while contributing to the society, the [position that they hold] will be the most 
glorious one [for them]. 
Believing that “re-employment means waiting for job re-assignment” is a “waiting, relying, 
demanding” kind of attitude … It is not possible to wait [for the state] to reassign one’s job. 
Rather than waiting, it may be better to walk into the job market or seize an opportunity of 
creating your own employment. The creation of jobs is the realization of self-value and a 
contribution to the society: the more you create, the more you contribute. (“Expanding the 
employment possibilities in changing our minds”, 2002-05-31)   
Another method of persuasion in official discourse is highlighting the need for common 
goods, encouraging people to work for better benefits, and emphasising the spirit of collectivism. 
For instance, in the following textual example, we find a consolidated discourse which indicates 
that the pension reform for urban and rural areas combines rights and obligations. Therefore, 
everyone should take part in contributing to the well-being of the whole society. Meanwhile, it is 
also necessary to recognize the “unavoidable” differentiation inside the society. Hence, 
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individuals’ personal endowments are given their proper value by the contribution-based 
differentiation in social benefits. 
These following principles and tasks need to be highlighted when building the social welfare 
system that covers both rural and urban residents. First of all, “coordinating the rural-urban 
development while maintaining differentiation”. The progress of the social welfare system in 
urban and rural areas is unbalanced. The rural pension system is lagging behind and the 
health system is incomplete. In urban areas, there are some social groups not yet covered by 
the social welfare system. We need to coordinate the development of both the urban and the 
rural welfare system and hit the target of “covering the risks that need to be covered”. For 
the situation of migrating workers in the urbanization process, we need to design policies that 
connect the anomalous standards across welfare schemes. Meanwhile, we need to keep in 
mind the urban-rural dual structure and the different social and economic levels. Our social 
welfare schemes designed for each area should reflect these differences. Second, as regards 
“enforcing governmental responsibilities while emphasising the obligations of units and 
individuals”, we need to highlight the effect of social welfare on social fairness, while 
considering the efficiency of our system. We need to strengthen the government’s management 
of social welfare and make use of the government’s function of redistributing income, 
defending social justice, and providing equalized public services. We also need to consistently 
match “rights” with “obligations” by making the units and individuals fulfil their social 
responsibility and fundraising obligations. (“Constructing a social welfare system that covers 
urban and rural residents”, Tian Chengping, 2007-09-30) 
[We should] clarify several misunderstandings about the social welfare system. First of all, 
we can’t regard the social welfare system as identical with “robbing the rich to help the poor”, 
nor as a new version of “indiscriminate egalitarianism”. The goal of the social welfare system 
is to defend social fairness and share the fruits of development with all the members of the 
society. … Second, we cannot simply insert the principle of efficiency from the market 
economy into the social welfare system …we need to prevent potentially bad outcomes brought 
by some irrational marketization of the welfare system. Third, we cannot exclude migrant 
workers and rural residents by treating the welfare system as the special possession of urban 
residents. However, we cannot ignore the current stage of our national development and try to 
pursue a universal welfare system too fast. We need to gradually build a unified welfare 
system through diverse, multi-layered institutional arrangements based on the principle of 
fairness and interest-sharing. ("Social welfare construction in the harmonious society”, Zheng 
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Gongcheng, 2005-09-16) 
To summarize, the rationale behind the government’s effort to reallocate welfare 
responsibilities as it drifts away from the state-sponsored system, is to redefine the subjectivity of 
individuals as the “socialized self”. This is not entirely “individualism,” which primarily 
highlights individuality, but posits a “socialized individual” who can take care of him/herself 
while contributing to society and the general good. The individual achieves value through self-
mobilized and self-regulated work, “a pro-active attitude, a self-monitoring conduct of life” 
(Lessenich, 2010, p.315). Moreover, the work needs to be ethically related to the society. The 
specific reasoning, whether “stepping out of one’s comfort zone,” or “realizing one’s value in the 
wave of marketisation,” or “accepting the nature of the multi-layered world,” calls for private 
initiative, personal responsibility and individual autonomy in actively taking social risks. If the 
benefits received do not match expectations, other people should not be blamed, nor the 
institution, nor the system. In some ways, Social Darwinism is deeply in-bred in spite of the loud 
slogans of social fairness. Meanwhile, you should equally contribute to the public good because 
individuals cannot enjoy the opportunities generated unless the society/state goes in the right 
direction for its health. 
Conclusion 
This chapter addresses one crucial segment in answering my overarching question of 
how the modern state maintains compliance from the governed in a period of rapid social and 
economic transformation, and how the logic of its governmentality changes accordingly. In this 
chapter, I investigate the logic of “whom to govern” and “how to govern” through a 
decomposition of the design, implementation, and promotion of the pension reform from the 
1950s to the 2010s in China. I pay special attention to the way that social problems are identified, 
the way distinctions are defined, and the knowledge that is produced to persuade the public.  
The general strategy of differentiation in the government’s welfare benefit allocation was 
systematically based on the existing division on the lines of political status, while also taking 
advantage of the change in bargaining power for different social groups during the social and 
economic reform. Along with the economic reform (that of the SOEs in particular), the social 
benefits for SOE employees were cancelled in the name of “improving efficiency” and 
“encouraging competition”. Later on, the social benefits for employees in public institutions 
were “socialized” in the name of “better social justice,” because “we shouldn’t allow the 
existence of a dual system of pension plans (distinguishing enterprise employees from public 
institution employees)”. Then where else can public support come from? The promotion of new 
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rural pension insurance and the urban residents’ pension insurance reform expanded the social 
insurance coverage to a broader population, and cost less. During the process, government 
officials as the core elites of governance power never ceased to enjoy the most generous social 
benefit. Notwithstanding, it seems at the benefits reallocation still faces the threat of discontent 
from the public. Therefore, I turn to the tactics in official propaganda to examine the way that 
the state frames and justifies its changing policies.    
From the official discourse, the promotion of different key topics in pension reform 
closely dialogues with and serves the contemporary issues in the social and economic reform. 
For instance, the documents that addressed the topics of laid-off workers and their pension 
plans was closely connected to the SOE reform; official discourse in the process of pushing 
demographic control described the pension plan in rural areas as a “son” that could “take care 
of” the elderly; the propaganda imported the discourse of social justice and harmony when 
urbanization and migration were flourishing. The rationale of reconstructing public knowledge 
and expectations of the redistribution of social benefits, and the allocation of welfare 
responsibility between the state and individuals mainly focuses on the reiteration of the 
principles of: “contribution and rewards”, “rights and obligations”, although, technically 
speaking, persuasions that relate to enterprise employees—regardless of the socially coordinated 
solution to pension fundraising, or the individual’s responsibility to contribute to the pension 
scheme—are more likely to use the discourse of profit-oriented “efficiency”. Meanwhile the 
ones related to rural residents and other urban residents—such as birth control, rural migrants, 
home-based elderly care and so on—are more likely to borrow moral arguments from the 
traditional culture.  
Individuals’ personal lives, therefore, are socialized, and initiated in a broader system 
rather than the previous unit-based and localized system. Everyone’s personal interest is 
materialized and combined with the performance of the whole society, the whole state. Only by 
contributing to others can people receive rewards. The subjectivity is reconstructed among 
persons who are directly or indirectly involved in the production process as self-motivated, self-
regulated, and self-sufficient in caring. More interestingly in the official discourse is the frequent 
absence of “action initiators”, the suggestions, appeals, and logical persuasions are commonly 
unidentified but appeal to “us”: “we should”, “we need to”, “our target/job/tasks” and so on. The 
anonymity of initiators in fact, imposes an effective substitution on the readers, and turns them 
into an “activated-self”, and then a “responsible-self”.  
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After identifying the governmentality in the use of programme design, the identification 
of social problems, and knowledge construction in this chapter, a follow-up question for me is 
“To what extent are these tactics effective in changing public opinion?” In the next chapter, I 
use causal inference and unlock the mixed effect of the government’s strategies of combining 
experimentation and propaganda in a specific policy reform, which was conducted through 
several waves of policy experimentation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The data from social 
surveys provide empirical evidence on changing public attitudes (especially that of the target 
social group of this specific policy reform) under the effect of policy experimentation and related 
official propaganda.  
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Chapter 4 Conditional Effectiveness of Governance35: Policy 
experimentation, social construction and political trust 
The late 20th century witnessed widespread institutional transition among the socialist 
and post-socialist countries. With the emergence of market orientation, these countries have 
consistently been confronted by the challenge of conducting proper reforms to their welfare 
systems. Faced with the demands of relieving the government of fiscal responsibility while 
boosting the economic efficiency of their respective nations, the socialist and post-socialist 
countries in the 1980s and the 1990s followed the same tendency as their Western counterparts 
to retrench welfare provision. The old enterprise-based state-financed social welfare systems 
have gradually been reformed to become suit a market economy. The people’s social right to 
income and social security have been more frequently defined as individual rights in the market-
oriented schemes, replacing the collective rights of the previous system. The provision of social 
welfare in particular has emphasized “purchased rights” and “self-contribution,” and individuals, 
families and societal and commercial organizations have since been encouraged to play a greater 
role in bearing the responsibilities formerly borne by the government.  
However, the public has not reached a consensus regarding the relative shares of the 
state and the individual in welfare responsibility, such as pension contributions, and the cost of 
health care. Socialist traditions hold up the state as the main party responsible. Therefore, the 
reform of welfare provision by sharing responsibilities with individuals (for instance by 
privatizing certain health services or increasing individual pension contribution rates) contradicts 
the previous image of the state-individual relationship. The public may disapprove or not easily 
adjust to these rapid changes and the loss of their existential security may cause anxiety and deep 
concern. The situation may be even more critical, given the public’s increasing consciousness of 
the importance of education, health and decent pensions as basic social rights in modern society. 
Government authorities are therefore pressured to adapt the way in which they pursue public 
consent for their reforms.  
How can the government change public preferences while maintaining political support 
during the reformist process of resolving the dilemmas of welfare reform and government 
responsibility? More importantly, is the statecraft used in changing public attitudes efficient or 
not? For example, China’s pension insurance reform in the 1990s and 2000s was designed to 
 
35 This chapter was written in collaboration with Xufeng ZHU (Tsinghua University, China). We shared the work of 
research design, the literature review, data collection, data analysis and writing. I contributed about 60% of the total 
work. An article based on this chapter is currently under review for publication.  
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shift the fundraising commitment regarding the pension for urban enterprise employees from 
unconditional accountability on the regime’s part to a responsibility shared by the state, market 
players and individuals. The Chinese government called it the “socialization of the welfare 
system” (G. O. o. t. S. Council, 2000). Considering the welfare reform in this period, we identify 
the statecraft as the combined strategy of regional experimentation of shared welfare 
responsibility conducted by the central government and local official propaganda, emphasizing 
governmental efforts in welfare provision. On the one hand, the regional pilot scheme is 
deployed to facilitate the public understanding of shared welfare responsibility on the pretext 
that the public has not reached a social consensus. On the other hand, the official propaganda of 
local governments that emphasizes government omnipotence assists in managing public faith in 
regime capacity and governance.   
In this chapter, we take advantage of a quasi-experimental pilot policy in China, referred 
as the “pension insurance pilot scheme in urban areas,” to explore the case of hybrid 
responsibility of welfare provision. This empirical chapter offers a counterfactual analysis of the 
effect of policy intervention and official propaganda on the attitude of welfare responsibility 
allocation and regime support of the general public by taking advantage of the pilot policy 
launched by the central government in selected provinces. With the help of two nationwide 
surveys (“Chinese Attitudes toward Inequality and Distributive Injustice”) conducted in 2004 and 2009, 
we collected over 5,000 randomly pooled cross-sectional data of residents in 8 treatment and 12 
control provinces. 
The empirical results show that the pilot policy launched by the Chinese central 
government significantly affected the citizens’ understanding of shared responsibility and 
privatized social risks in general and that the public has apparently accepted the underlying 
accentuation of the individual’s responsibility for pension contributions. The length of time that 
the policy has been in force amplifies the attitudinal change in individuals’ perception of the 
government’s role. Local official propaganda, which emphasizes the image of an “omnipotent 
government,” has moderated the treatment effect of the pilot scheme on the public’s 
understanding of shared responsibility. In other words, local propaganda has helped the regime 
to maintain the public’s faith in the government’s capacity and responsibility for social welfare 
provision while gradually implementing the experimentation policy.  
Beyond the attitudinal change toward individual welfare responsibility, we also find that 
the influence of policy propaganda interferes with the pilot policy, as shown by the contradictory 
finding about the public’s political trust. Controlling for other factors, short-term exposure to 
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the local propaganda—which praises the government’s efforts to respond to people’s 
expectations and improve people’s living standards—increase the public’s confidence in 
institutions. However, the disjunction of the policy content, which set out to share with 
individuals the responsibility for welfare—and content of the propaganda actually backfired on 
the authorities regarding institutional trust in the long term. Thus, the strategies used by 
governments are influenced by the conditional and practical aspects of policy promotion and the 
local governments’ handling of the perceived role of the government for public. A mismatch 
between the policy content and propaganda details is likely to be caught by the public—
especially by members of the target population (enterprise employees) who are more likely to 
expect a “big government” which can take care of their social risks—and to weaken their 
support for the institution. 
 
From state socialism to shared responsibility for welfare provision: Risks in 
the social welfare transition  
As a special form of society, state socialism adopts distinct structure of institutions and 
rules regarding development, production relations, and welfare provision (Polanyi & MacIver, 
1944). The basic principle of state socialist regimes is that material resources are distributed 
through central planning and a system of political identification. Take the example of China. 
Before the reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, the state organized and governed 
individuals through work units (danwei) in urban areas and people’s communes (renmin gongshe) in 
rural areas. However, the redistributive principle posed serious challenges to governance 
continuity. In particular, collective ownership hindered production efficiency, while the offering 
of incentives for productive improvements and the scarcity of resources cultivated a sense of 
“manipulated equality” among privileged groups (Kornai, 1992; Szelenyi, 1978). The 
unsustainability of such institutionalized settings pressured state socialist countries in the late 
20th century to pursue market reforms (Szelenyi & Szelenyi, 1994). The emergence of market 
power during the reform led to the change in distributional principles, the return rate of capital 
and human capital, social structures and so on (Bian & Logan, 1996; Nee, 1996). At the same 
time, the boundaries of the state, market and society in these state socialist countries were 
redrawn and negotiated across different sectors, especially in Eastern Europe, eastern and south-
eastern Asian countries and the former Soviet Union. Szelenyi and Kostello (1996) argue that 
market competition, as opposed to state mechanisms, began to play a greater role in Eastern 
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Europe in 1980–1989 and in China after 1985. Subsequently, among the East European 
countries after 1989, the privatization of “the public” became a state policy.  
The transitional process has caused profound changes in the social welfare provision in 
China. Market-induced competition has also led the state and urban collective enterprises to 
reduce or renege on pensions, medical costs and housing for employees (Guthrie, 2012; S. Song 
& Chu, 1997). The responsibility for welfare provision has shifted from state institutions to the 
society (including families) and this scheme has been identified by the Chinese central 
government as the “socialization of social welfare” (G. O. o. t. S. Council, 2000). This special 
concept captures the change from state-led welfare provision to a welfare system with multiple 
contributors, in which the state, the market, the sectors of society and families share welfare 
responsibility and the work units no longer take on the welfare function. To match the socialist 
market economy, the government has promoted joint responsibility as the practical method of 
funding, service provision and social welfare regulation (B. Li & Zhong, 2009; Wong & Ngok, 
2006).  
Such a process is similar to the “retrenchment” and “risk privatization” process in 
Western welfare states and the emergence of a hybrid welfare system in which individuals are 
given flexibility but increased responsibility for handling the various social risks related to their 
personal lives, such as “unemployment, death of a spouse, retirement, disability, childbirth, [and] 
poverty” (Hacker, 2002, p. 245). From the mid-1970s onward, welfare states faced rising 
unemployment rates, high levels of inflation and low economic growth, along with demographic 
changes that made the social policy increasingly costly and unsustainable. Extensive problems 
over “low-wage, low-skill labour with low work incentives”, which were severe in the case of 
“welfare without work” burdened the welfare system (K. Anderson & Ebbinghaus, 2011; 
Pierson, 2001). Meanwhile, the “big government” in welfare provision was recognized as over-
committed and underperforming (Mashaw, 2006). In these crises, policymakers decided to 
address the new social and economic situation by adopting a neo-liberal modernization strategy 
(Hall, 2001). The welfare regimes in Western Europe, therefore, opted for the retrenchment of 
welfare provision, which was set to “include policy changes that either cut social expenditure, 
restructure welfare state programs to conform more closely to the residual welfare state model, 
or alter the political environment in ways that enhance the probability of such outcomes in the 
future” (Pierson, 1994, p. 17). In addition to the cutbacks in public spending and other fiscal 
rearrangements, certain countries started to reconsider citizens’ social right to legitimize the 
welfare reforms. For instance, rather than the universal entitlement to social rights for every 
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qualified citizen, welfare support should be provided for the population which truly needs it 
(Béland, 2005; Cox, 2001). 
Models that offer a choice, such as the contracting-out and welfare-mix model, are 
popular in developed countries and have also been used frequently in less developed countries. 
For instance, the private pillar in the pension system was adopted in the 2000s in countries such 
as Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, with varied proportions of public to private (Mares & Carnes, 
2009). In East Asia, countries such as Korea and Malaysia also expect a fast-expanding private 
market in social services (Gough, 2001). Haggard and Kaufman (2008) located their discussion in 
the context of the global economic crisis and identified the attempts among social policies to 
retrench in Latin America and Eastern Europe driven by the economic crisis and liberalization. 
This retrenchment, by reintroducing market and community forces, resulted in extending the 
hybrid welfare system, in which social welfare responsibilities are shared between the state, the 
market and individuals (Benish, Haber, & Eliahou, 2017). Individuals now face a long working 
life and redefined responsibility in a state-led welfare-mix system where they enjoy enhanced 
“flexibility” and increased “responsibility”. 
As the 2010s began, welfare reform in China gradually stopped its pursuit of 
marketization and socialization. The official discourse about social policy now focused on 
expanding “welfare coverage” to rural and non-salaried urban residents. Certain scholars have 
labelled this new trend in the welfare format “state capitalism” or a “state paternalistic 
capitalism” (Gao, Yang, & Li, 2013). In this chapter, we focus on the period of “welfare 
socialization” in the 1990s and 2000s, when the main pension reform for enterprise 
employees was aligned with the marketization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This 
period was an important stage in which the ideas of “a welfare system with hybrid contributors” 
and “shared responsibility for facing social risks” were developed and actively promoted by the 
state. Only after the reconstruction of the public’s understanding of shared responsibility can the 
state be confident in diffusing its attempts to expand welfare coverage without having huge 
burdens similar to those in the state socialist period. 
 Existing studies have carefully examined the details of the pension policy in this period, 
such as the return rate, coverage and return on investment of pension trusts (for instance, J. Li & 
Ge, 2010; Z. Li & Wang, 2009; Lin & Ding, 2007; Yang, Wang, & Zhang, 2010). However, the 
effects of the transitional process on social beliefs, especially the public perceptions of the state-
individual relationship, and the function of institutional dependency in shaping people’s political 
attitudes, have not been fully investigated. The rhetoric of “socialism” itself describes the state or 
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state-managed public bodies acting as sources of social welfare—in schemes similar to a social 
contract—at the expense of low salaries and limited social mobility (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). 
For instance, work units in urban China before 1978 were subsidised by the state so as to 
provide not only jobs to individuals, but also to generate pensions, housing, education and 
healthcare to employees and their dependents (Lu & Perry, 1997). In the rural areas, funds were 
also allocated for the basic education and medical support or healthcare of residents (Wong, 
2005). The socialist institutional setting cultivated a strong image of an omnipotent government, 
in which the state was expected to superintend the social welfare of the public, especially among 
urban enterprise employees who were expected to be cared for “from cradle to grave” (i.e., with 
generous welfare benefits). The legacy of this socialist policy is a population with a strong sense 
of state dependency, attachment to the welfare state and organized stakeholders favouring the 
welfare setup (Cook, 2013).  
However, the cognitional inertia of the public’s assumptions about welfare responsibility 
arising from socialist traditions may pose considerable challenges when neoliberal reforms come 
to be implemented. For instance, Cook (1993) corroborated the finding that workers from the 
former Soviet Union expressed discontent and to a certain extent jeopardized state legitimacy 
when the social contracts that used to guarantee their economic welfare broke down. Denisova 
et al. (2012) analysed data from a survey held in 2006 involving 28,000 individuals from 28 post-
socialist countries and found that transition-related difficulties influenced their support for 
privatization reforms, given the preference for state agency and concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of privatization. Evidence from East Europe suggested that when “literally over a 
single night, all the things that had been taken for granted were no longer valid,” many 
individuals suffered from “serious identity crisis” (Ekman & Linde, 2005, p. 357).  
Apart from cognitional dependency, several other factors weakened the welfare reforms 
which were intended to rebalance state-individual accountability. First, when the market principle 
was introduced in social and economic matters the ruling party in China did not relinquish the 
claim of communist ideology. Perry (2007, 2017) indicated that its resilience in power was 
endorsed by its skilled employment of the communist revolutionary legacy and of symbols from 
traditional culture. Slogans are presented, such as “serve the people”, and “the party represents 
the benefit of the overwhelming majority of the people”. By combining the destiny of the party 
and the welfare of the people, these repeated and solemnly vowed ideological claims in fact aided 
the formation of the “common interest” of the society and became an important element of the 
“inertial thinking” of the public when it had to face external changes. In other words, people in 
former socialist states are more likely to treat the government as the bearer of ultimate liability 
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for all social and economic problems. But at the same time, they are more likely to accept social 
or policy changes “for the sake of the common interest”. Second, the shadow of previous social 
policies also shaped the expectations of the people. For instance, the demographic “One-child” 
policy posed a specific quandary for the care of older people in China. Under the intervention of 
the “One-child” policy, the obligatory compliance of the people in reducing the number of their 
descendants—which is the main form of old-age support in the traditional context of filial 
piety—gave them leverage to make a morally and politically fair request for the government to 
take charge of elderly welfare. Despite this fairness, urban residents suffered more than those in 
rural areas, because the One-child” policy was strictly enforced in urban areas. 
To sum up, China’s welfare reforms during the “socialization process” in the 1990s and 
2000s may have induced a failure of consensus between the state’s conduct and individual 
perceptions regarding the role of government in welfare provision. The difference may also have 
endangered state legitimacy by the public’s sense of betrayal.  
 
Combining social policy experimentation with official propaganda: 
Statecraft and the respective motivations 
To avoid a legitimacy crisis caused by the above consensus gap, the Chinese government 
needed to seriously consider the public’s expectations and anticipate their feedback in its policy-
making process, especially during dramatic transitions in the social welfare provision. Our 
research observed the parallel statecraft of social policy experimentation and official propaganda 
to address the consensus gap and resolve the dilemma of privatized social risks and shared 
responsibility during the pension reform process.  
In China, policy experimentation is a tool of the incremental policy process, a matter of 
“crossing the river by feeling the stones.” Such experimentation is very important for 
maintaining state legitimacy while avoiding radical policy changes at the national level. In other 
words, policy experimentation is the process of conducting moderate and manageable policy 
changes to allow enough space for the central government to learn from “trial and error” 
(Heilmann, 2008b). Policy makers of the central government can determine the types of 
experimentation and decide what aspects of successfully implemented experimentation can be 
adopted at the national level (Heilmann, 2008a; Mei & Liu, 2014; X. Zhu & Zhao, 2018a). 
Provinces, cities, or regions can participate in the selection of pilot sites. Within the process of 
pilot policy making, local governments can benefit from conditional and limited autonomy if the 
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central policies permit. Apart from the unified policy guidelines proposed by the central 
government, local authorities can localize and reinterpret the policy details on the basis of their 
local conditions (H. Huang, 2013). In such a structure, local governments can employ strategies, 
such as the construction of rhetoric, enhancing certain policy elements to popularize the policies 
when they sense potential obstruction from the public.  
We propose that policy experimentations in the field of social welfare can be used as a 
tactic for dialogue with the general public to demonstrate the legitimacy of a reform. The idea of 
experimentation as a dialogue tactic differs from the conventional understanding of policy 
experimentation in the theoretical spectrum. The traditional wisdom on policy experimentation 
has mainly focused on policy makers at the central and local levels, but has paid little attention to 
the recipients social policies—the public. Conventional theories either highlight the autonomy of 
local authorities, in which the argument is that decentralized federations contribute to economic 
leapfrogging (Montinola, Qian, & Weingast, 1995; Weingast, 1995), or accentuate the full control 
of the central government, whose policy experimentation serves to demonstrate policy 
correctness (Heilmann, 2008b), identify errors (X. Zhu & Zhao, 2018a), or delimit competition 
(H. Cai & Treisman, 2006). We emphasize that the government can integrate the public’s 
expectation into the policy-making process into the policy-making process of policy 
experimentation and employ the feed-forward effect (A. Schneider & Sidney, 2009) to minimize 
any undesired impact on the society. If the central government pushes for an across-country 
reform that contradicts its omnipotent stature (which is generally interpreted by the public as 
being a “caring and accountable” government), then the difficulties for the public of identifying 
and accepting the new situation can be considered risky, given the cognitional dependency 
discussed above. By distributing policy changes in selected regions through policy 
experimentation, the government can measure and test the potential feedback and the limits of 
the public in turn, and contain the public’s expectations in the general process of policy making. 
Moreover, policy experimentation provides effective channels for the government to further 
influence public opinion by engaging individuals in dialogue. 
The central government can wield power to conduct policy experimentation and achieve 
its goal of consensus building by facilitating several mechanisms. First, the experimentation is 
operated on account of the fiscal division of central and local governments. In China’s situation, 
the central government controls the fiscal resources and allocates transfer payments to local 
governments, whereas the local governments are motivated to accomplish or improve pilot 
programmes to gain financial resources and cope with welfare expenditure (X. Zhu & Zhao, 
2018b). This interactive loop helps the central government find the most appropriate policy 
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instrument that is a much broader version of the reforms in the experimental policies; moreover, 
the central government can establish its legitimacy by modestly implementing the reform process 
(X. Zhu & Zhao, 2018b). Second, the general public may change its perceptions, mainly through 
an experiential process, in the context of external experimental interventions. Gradual reforms 
based on policy experimentation instil in the public the belief that a new policy may be cancelled 
if it does not work. In the regions chosen to pilot the new welfare policy, the public may have 
derived benefits and observed deficiencies—but with less anxiety. Therefore, the central 
government can promote new policies without the need to obtain large-scale prior approval 
from the general public as a whole; rather, it can persuade people by informing them of the pros 
and cons of the policies as the experimentation proceeds. An incremental pilot scheme facilitates 
the building of public attitudes, in which the preferred outcome corresponds to the policy 
design, especially when a controversial policy is involved. During the buffer period of policy 
experimentation, the public may either accept the permanence of the controversial policy or 
signal their discontent in ways that are not too radical for the government. To summarize, 
experimentation can be a useful tool in letting the central government initiate dialogues with the 
public. 
It should be noted here that the risks of policy failure and legitimacy crisis in the piloting 
of welfare reforms are unevenly distributed between the central and the local governments. In 
China, local governments are more likely than the central government to be blamed by the public 
for deficiencies in social policies, whereas the central government can more easily than the local 
governments obtain rewards from warmly-accepted policies (T. Shi, 2014). Central government 
generally possesses a higher degree of political trust than local governments do, which is referred 
as “hieratical political trust” (Lü, 2014; T. Shi, 2014). This is partly because local governments are 
the ones that implement the rules and provide the services and such proximity leads the public 
to focus on their deficiencies and misbehaviours. Cultural factors also matter because Chinese 
people tend to look up to a “just and upright lord” and believe that most of the local problems 
are the results of distortion by local officials. Additionally, social instability caused by public 
discontent may threaten the political career of local officials. As a precaution, local governments 
may either actively initiate localized innovations when the experimentation scheme allows it or 
promote central government-instructed policies with carefully designed messages (X. Zhu & 
Zhao, 2018b). I give further details in the following discussion of local government’s choices in 
its propaganda efforts and use empirical evidence in the section on the substantive context to 
further elaborate on its motivation. 
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In design process of public policy, official discourse is commonly recognized as effective 
statecraft enabling a government to convince their subordinates regarding new policies and 
eliminate the possibility of a legitimacy crisis (Beetham, 1991). For instance, in electoral politics, 
the core principle of making politics work is to mobilize the “majority” of the population. 
Schneider and Ingram use the theory of “social construction of target groups” to describe the 
process in developed countries whereby the election elites use certain portrayals to maximize 
voters’ support and minimize electoral costs by identifying the target population of the policy 
they want to promote (Boushey, 2016; A. Schneider & Ingram, 1993; A. L. Schneider et al., 
2014). The electoral elites sacrifice a small group of people whilst promoting a reallocation of 
welfare resources through the rhetorical construction of certain weak and marginalized target 
populations—those who lack effective political power to engage and change the policy process. 
This is effective, so long as the policy is constructed to be legitimate for the majority (Goode & 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994; A. Schneider & Ingram, 1993). These constructions are formed from social 
values, emotions, or stereotypes of the target population. As an example, when policy makers 
intend to impose a new welfare burden or retrench welfare benefits for a certain group of 
people, the target population may be constructed as “undeserving” and “selfish”. Therefore, they 
are denied certain social assistance (Hynes & Hayes, 2011; Maynard-Moody, Musheno, & 
Musheno, 2003). By so doing, the government can legitimize the proposed policy and alter the 
expectations, perceptions and even behaviours of the citizens (Donovan, 2001; Lawrence, 
Stoker, & Wolman, 2013; A. Schneider & Sidney, 2009). 
In developing and non-democratic regimes, the logic of social construction in public and 
social policy changes is slightly different, due to the institutional difference from their democratic 
counterparts. In these regimes, the government is perceived to be likely to directly issue a policy 
with or without majority consent and has less motivation to construct portrayals that would do 
enough to meet the citizens’ expectations. However, in practice, we still find numerous cases 
wherein the policy promotion delivers rhetorical messages not directly related to the policy itself 
or contains specific information that is highly sensitive and salient to certain social groups. In 
this project, we find a strategy which is similar to the situation in electoral politics, but more 
specific and tailored to the constraints in developing countries—to interpret the motivation and 
effect of policy making. For policy making in developing countries where there are no mature 
democratic elections, policies targeting a certain population do not need a voting approval from 
the whole population. The pressure on policy makers mainly comes from possible discontent 
from the target population because any instability caused by collective resistance from the target 
population can lead to a legitimacy crisis for non-democratic authorities (Lipset, 1959). Thus, 
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welfare retrenchment that is designed to reallocate the responsibility between the state, the 
market and the target population requires the policy makers to try hard to ensure that the image 
and logic of a policy are congruent. In this case, policy makers can strategically construct the 
policy content to gain the acceptance of the target population and avoid the risk of legitimacy 
crisis from the incongruence of the welfare policies. The ideal achievement of such 
constructional efforts by government might be a cognitional change in the target population 
following the design of the policy, together with greater general trust from the entire population, 
if possible. 
In practice, for the authorities to attain the goal of social construction—persuading the 
public of the advantages of policies and the credibility of governments—they must use the 
acknowledged tool of propaganda through the public media (Easton, 1975; Shirk, 2011). The 
incumbent authority can effectively defend or promote its policies and guide or mobilize public 
opinion by using its own media (Di Tella, Galiani, & Schargrodsky, 2012; Keefer & Khemani, 
2011). Many specific components of constructive propaganda are used by governments to help 
promote policy changes. For instance, propaganda can be designed to magnify the necessity and 
urgency of policy changes, particularly by connecting these to short-term social problems (Cox, 
2001). Propaganda can also emphasize the part of the message in which a government’s duty and 
credibility are enhanced while neglecting other parts where the government has begun to 
withdraw from its former role. Some propaganda models glorify and exaggerate to the public the 
benefits of new policies, especially to the target groups of certain policies (A. L. Schneider & 
Ingram, 2019). Regarding the efficiency of official propaganda, Huang’s paper (2015, 2018) on a 
government’s indirect provision of information, identified “subtle and sleek propaganda” as 
something likely to have a highly persuasive effect, whereas “hard propaganda” may backfire and 
alienate citizens from the policy. 
In the case of China’s social welfare areas where the socialist legacy persists amid the 
transition in socioeconomic conditions, the effort of local governments to promote welfare 
reform requires a careful social construction tailored to the target population of the reform. In 
the case of a pension pilot for enterprise employees led by the central government, we observe 
that the local governments’ promotion of the reform described the piloted policy as something 
closely associate with the generosity of the state. It may be asked why, if the government as a 
whole intended to share the responsibility with individuals (society) and enterprises in this 
reform, its propaganda didn’t use relevant discourses, such as connecting the pilot reform 
directly with individual responsibility. The reason why the government’s official propaganda 
about the pilot reform still connected the policy with the state’s generosity is partly because of 
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the citizens’ dependence on the socialist media pattern of official discourse. Drawn from the pre-
reform period, China’s official propaganda, similar to that of its communist counterparts, is 
famed for its “formalistic, ritualistic and ideological” content (H. Huang, 2015). The state-owned 
media usually exaggerate the omnipotent role of the state, avoid negative messages/information 
and signal the capacity of state power (see, for example, McQuail, 1987; Siebert, Siebert, 
Peterson, Peterson, & Schramm, 1956). Some scholars who specialise in the welfare state also 
addressed the point that the authority in non-democratic regimes tends to take a “paternalist 
role” in public welfare provision (Beck, 1997; Leung & Nann, 1995). Thus, it is unlikely to 
change its habits completely in its official discourse. Another, more important reason in this 
case, is that the local government was also trying to avoid the risks that the reform might bring. 
The promotional content of the propaganda emphasized the role of the government in 
appeasing public anxiety, especially since the social welfare reform involved incremental changes 
to a more individually-based type of responsibility. I further analyse local government’s 
motivation to use selective discourse in the following section. 
To summarize, policy experimentation can help downplay controversial reforms by 
slowing down policy implementation and minimizing the confusion and reaction of the public. 
In cases where the authority wishes to take on the potential trade-off between opportunities and 
challenges of conducting social and economic reforms (social change), policy experimentation is 
useful to buffer the associated risks. Meanwhile, it is vital for the authority to promote its 
intentions, construct knowledge and shape a population’s ideology by propaganda. Hence, a 
combination of incremental piloting of policy and relevant constructed propaganda helps the 
government to manage any chance of public discontent and build a consensus for the reform. 
 
Substantive context: The Chinese pilot scheme for urban pension insurance 
In this chapter, we select the case of the reform of China’s urban pension insurance in 
the 2000s to demonstrate the strategy used by the Chinese government of combining social 
policy experimentation with official propaganda. The policy process of this reform involved 
typical policy experimentation in which the central government led the promotion of a new 
pension scheme for a certain population in some selected provinces. The experimentation was 
conducted in three waves, which was ideal for investigating the exposure effects of the policy 
treatment on the public. Another reason for choosing this case was that this reform acted as an 
important segment of the reconstruction of welfare responsibility in the process of moving away 
from the state socialist welfare model and “socializing the social welfare” (Ringen & Ngok, 2017; 
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S. J. Shi & Mok, 2012). As for the propaganda, we chose local official propaganda (published by 
the local Provincial Party Committee) rather than that of the central government (such as the 
People’s Daily). The reason is that, on the one hand, local official propaganda follows the basic 
tone of central government in promoting certain policies. On the other, local governments can 
vary their propaganda efforts (in volume, coverage, emphasis, and so on) according to their 
understanding of the reform direction, policy details and local conditions. Especially with regard 
to policy experimentation, local governments are allowed under the general direction of central 
government to make localized changes. Therefore, local governments’ varied efforts in 
promoting the government’s image and the policy reform provide a good case model for 
analysing the effects of constructive propaganda.  
Before the economic reform in 1978, China was in a period when the “creation of a 
socialist egalitarian society [promised] a relatively stable livelihood at the expense of economic 
development” (Leung & Xu, 2015). Work units acted as administrative social integration sections 
in urban areas, as well as public goods providers (Lu & Perry, 1997). Urban work units provided 
not only jobs for life but also pensions, housing, education and health care to employees and 
their dependants. More than 80% of the urban labour force was covered by the Danwei system 
(Leung & Wong, 1999). The state’s patriarchal role brought a collective welfare mechanism that 
collectively secured citizens’ social rights at the stage of state socialism (Xie, 2016). 
Corresponding to the economic reform, the state promoted social reforms that helped to cut the 
state’s welfare burden and boost efficiency. The ongoing reform in welfare provision would 
focus on life-time employment, pensions, health and the housing system in urban areas (B. Li & 
Zhong, 2009; Wong & Ngok, 2006). Numbers of employees of state-owned enterprises were laid 
off in process of liberation and marketization. Furthermore, the newly established basic health 
insurance scheme also required contributions from individuals and employers. The functioning 
of hospitals started to employ market-competition principles. The total welfare contribution 
from individual workers accounted for quite a large proportion of their salaries (Ringen & Ngok, 
2017). Certain areas of welfare provision would be transferred to local government, society or 
even back to the family. In the areas of funding sources, subjects of the provision and regulation, 
joint responsibility would become to various degrees as a practical tenet. 
Among these welfare reforms, China’s pension plan for urban enterprise employees has 
changed dramatically since the retraction of the “iron rice bowl” and the reformation of SOEs in 
the 1980s. Beginning from the 1990s, what used to be a pay-as-you-go system of pension 
insurance has gradually changed to a mixed two-tier system comprising social and individual 
accounts. The reformation officially started in 1997 when the State Council issued Document 
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No. 26 entitled “Decision on Establishing a Unified System of Basic Pension Insurance 
for Enterprise Employees” (Council, 1997). According to this, the responsibility for raising 
funds for the new pension system should be shared by enterprises, employees and the 
government (Gao, 2006), although the action is not de facto compulsory. The document 
proposed that each individual account be maintained at 11% of an employee’s salary, to which 
individuals need to contribute up to 8% of their salary (i.e., starting at 4%). To this, employers 
are expected to cover the shortfall in individuals’ accounts (i.e., the remaining 3% of an 
individual’s salary) while separately contributing at most 17% of the payment (i.e., the 
enterprise’s total contribution should not exceed 20% of an individual’s total wages) for the 
social account. 
However, individual accounts were often “empty” due to insufficient fund allocation and 
the diversion of funds to the social accounts which were originally designed to cover the needs 
of retirees. This situation also caused a “common pool” problem, in which current pension 
contributors always expected the social account to cover everyone’s pensions, although their 
individual accounts might have been used up by now. To further clarify the division between the 
pooling of individual and social accounts, and to cover the deficit in individual accounts, the 
central government issued Document No. 42 in December 2000 to promote a new reform of 
“Fully funding the individual accounts” (S. Council, 2000). The pilot policy reform, which 
was first implemented in Liaoning Province in 2001, has specified that contributions to 
individual accounts must be handled solely by employees and the 8% rate must be set from the 
contributory wage. In 2003, the pilot policy was extended to Heilongjiang Province and Jilin 
Province. These two provinces adopted similar policy schemes that differed only slightly in terms 
the regulations regarding the contribution rate. The three provinces in North-eastern China 
comprised the first wave of pension insurance reform for urban enterprise employees. In 2005, 
the central government issued “Decision on Improving the Basic Pension System for 
Enterprise Employees” (Council, 2005) and added eight provinces that would form the second 
pilot wave: Tianjin, Shanxi, Shanghai, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan and Xinjiang, beginning 
on January 1, 2006. Jiangsu and Zhejiang Province joined as the third wave in 2008. Overall, 13 
provinces took part in the reform’s pilot scheme36. 
As explained above, in the process of policy experimentation, local governments can 
promote a reform through official propaganda. In particular, the local official propaganda 
emphasises the omnipotent role of the state not only due to the tradition from the communist 
 
36 As a result, the ten-year pilot scheme gradually faded away as the 2010s began, the reason being cited as the 
unsolved problem of “empty individual accounts” (Zheng 2016). 
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period, but also as a precaution taken to avoid the risks that a controversial social reform might 
entail. As I have argued, trust in the political system of China is hierarchical, that is, local 
governments are more likely to be blamed than a central government for any deficiency in a 
social policy, whilst, unlike the former, the latter can easily be rewarded for any good policies it 
may deploy. Social welfare provision is generally considered a local affair, which reflects the 
situation in fiscal profits during the 1980s. Previously, local governments could retain up to 
84.5% of their fiscal revenue and most of the funds were diverted to reinvestment and 
development instead of the provision of social welfare for local residents. Following the 1994 
fiscal reform, the central-local relationship was redefined as a tax-share between them because 
the balance leaned towards the central government. Under the new system, the central 
government took 75% of the Value-Added Tax, one of the most important fiscal resources for 
government revenue. However, the expenditure on social welfare remained a local matter, 
especially at the prefectural and county levels, when fiscal revenue had already gone through the 
process of recentralization (Y. Fan, 2015). The situation was worse if we consider that the social 
welfare index was not even included in the promotion criteria for local authorities until the late 
2010s. In other words, local governments are expected to provide social welfare but do not have 
enough capacity or motivation to provide it; nevertheless, they are more likely to be blamed for a 
policy that is unwelcome from the public’s viewpoint. Therefore, local governments are 
motivated to take precautions against the possible negative effects of implementing policies 
when the central government attempts to promote a hybrid type of welfare reform. 
In local official newspapers, we find that articles reporting that the pilot policy is 
associated with the omnipotent role of the state. The articles were full of the following messages: 
the government’s generosity, efficiency and conscientiousness ensure social justice; the framing 
of “good government,” and the government’s taking “people’s livelihood into account”—all 
these messages are consistent with the socialist rhetoric. As an example, one of the local official 
newspapers described the pilot policy as follows37: 
This policy aims to support the basic pension and social old-age insurance systems by 
reforming the methods of calculating the basic pension and allowance. We are ensuring the 
punctual granting of pensions for retired enterprise employees whilst expanding the coverage 
of the old-age insurance system for everyone included in the scheme. This requires the 
government to renew its efforts to collect insurance funding and tighten the supervision and 
management of it. Moreover, we should also improve and integrate a pluralistic approach of 
 
37 Originally in Chinese, translated by the present author. 
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fund raising in order to fully fund individual accounts (Shanxi Daily, 2006) 
Another widely employed approach in local official newspapers is to magnify the 
necessity and urgency of the reform by connecting it to general social benefits, where it is 
consistent with the central government’s repertoire of methods of knowledge construction that I 
addressed in Chapter 3. For instance, one report addressing the 2005 State Council No. 38 as 
follows: 
This decision (Decision on Perfecting Basic System of Pension Insurance for Enterprise 
Employees) is a significant one made by the central authority on the basis of overall socio-
economic development of our country. The decision is vital for the healthy and sustainable 
development of the economy as well as for the long-term safety of our nation. It is also 
essential for protecting the well-being of our prefecture’s citizens (Tianjin Daily, 2006) 
 
Testable hypotheses, data and identification strategy 
Hypotheses 
To examine the causal relationship between the trajectory of welfare reform from state 
socialism to shared responsibility and changes in individuals’ perceptions, we propose a set of 
testable hypotheses on the basis of the policy effect of this quasi-natural experiment created by 
the pilot scheme for pensions for enterprise employees in the 2000s. The main research interest 
is the effectiveness of statecraft regarding changes in individuals’ attitudes to the locus of 
responsibility (LoR) of certain welfare provisions and regarding the trust given to political 
institutions across regions and periods. Individual perceptions of welfare responsibility are 
sensitive to changes in social policies (Im & Meng, 2015; Lü, 2014) and are of great importance 
in understanding political support in general. As a market-oriented policy that resonates with the 
privatization of the SOEs in the late 1990s, the pension insurance reform has as one of its goals 
the sharing with individuals, the market and the society of the responsibility for social pension 
insurance contributions. For the central government, the ideal micro-level outcome of the 
reform is the target population’s recognition of its responsibility as individuals for pension 
contributions, thereby achieving a sustainable system of pension contributions for future retirees. 
Thus, we argue that the pilot policy discussed in this chapter implies an increase of individual 
responsibility that can lead to changes in public cognizance. We propose our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: The implemented pilot experimentation of the basic pension insurance 
reform increases the popular acceptance of individual responsibility for elderly care. The longer 
the public experiences the pilot experimentation, the more intensely they become affected by the 
reform. 
The emphasis on incorporating individual responsibility in welfare provision differs from 
the practice observed during the egalitarian-socialist period, which accentuates the duty of the 
state to provide elderly care in the form of either pensions or social insurance. Therefore, local 
governments are strongly motivated to take precautions to offset the potential negative effects of 
the policies—the anxiety of the public (especially the target population) over losing the state’s 
support/benefit. Meanwhile, the local governments do not want to be blamed for the reform, as 
they would be if the public distributed blame/trust in its usual hierarchical fashion, given the 
special central-local relationship in China. One of the stratagems was for the local governments 
to use official propaganda to send messages in the course of the basic pension insurance reform 
emphasizing the omnipotent role of the state. We found qualitative evidence of the propaganda 
efforts of local official newspapers focusing on the public’s faith in the government’s devotion to 
duty and responsibility. Drawing on these arguments, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Policy propaganda emphasizing the omnipotent role of the government 
offsets the pilot policy’s effect on public perception and shifts the people’s perception to 
governmental responsibility. 
We recognize the short-term effectiveness of official propaganda in maintaining the 
public’s faith. However, in the long term, individuals will be likely to distinguish the real target of 
the policy and even resist its implementation (X. Chen & Shi, 2001; H. Huang, 2018; Kennedy, 
2009). In the case of the pension insurance policy reform, although its description in the official 
media highlighted the government’s efforts to improve the public pension system, individuals 
reportedly have had to increase their individual contributions to their pension and in retirement 
have encountered difficulties in claiming benefits. People who conscientiously planned their 
monthly income and expenditures were deeply influenced by the implications of governmental 
retrenchment as part of the policy design. Thus, in the event, the reform dramatically changed 
the individuals’ disposition of their salary and their expectations of risks as they aged, social 
welfare and the state-individual relationship. This contradiction between policy propaganda and 
policy experimentation may over time undermine the public’s confidence and trust on 
government institutions. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis regarding the concurrent 
effect of the propaganda and pilot policy on the public’s political trust: 
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Hypothesis 3: In the short term, local official propaganda regarding the pilot policy has 
increased the public’s support for the regime. However, in the long term, local official 
propaganda regarding the pilot policy can reduce the public’s support.  
 
Data and variables 
Our measurement of dependent variables (DVs) has benefited from two rounds of 
household surveys called “Chinese Attitudes toward Inequality and Distributive Injustice,” which 
were conducted by teams led by Marty Whyte and Mingming Shen in 2004 and 200938. The two 
surveys used randomized sampling under the global positioning system. The sample pool of the 
national adult population involved respondents aged 18–65. The total of observations from the 
two surveys is 6,119, as shown in Table 10. Since the three provinces in north-eastern China 
started the pilot policy before 2004, we dropped the samples of these three provinces from the 
dataset, thus constraining the analytical samples within the window of the two surveys (2004 and 
2009). This modification has resulted in 5,280 observations from 20 provinces.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Martin Whyte served as the principal investigator for the project, which also involved Albert Park (Oxford 
University), Wang Feng (University of California-Irvine), Jieming Chen (Texas A&M University-Kingsville), Pierre 
Landry (Yale University) and Shen Mingming (Peking University), with Jie Yan, Tianguang Meng and Chunping 
Han as research assistants. The initial project was held in 2004. 
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Table 10. Descriptive data of two rounds social survey 
Province 
Survey Year Total 
Samples Pilot Year Pilot Wave 2004 2009 
Beijing 121 136 257  0 
Hebei 58 44 102  0 
Shanxi 112 104 216 2006 2 
Liaoning 205 183 388 2001 1 
Heilongjiang 239 212 451 2003 1 
Shanghai 233 87 320 2006 2 
Jiangsu 88 107 195 2008 3 
Zhejiang 90 111 201 2008 3 
Anhui 177 184 361  0 
Fujian 87 71 158  0 
Jiangxi 42 84 126  0 
Shandong 486 453 939 2006 2 
Henan 122 110 232 2006 2 
Hubei 251 291 542 2006 2 
Hunan 54 68 122 2006 2 
Guangdong 164 181 345  0 
Guangxi 242 206 448  0 
Hainan 58 54 112  0 
Yunnan 137 63 200  0 
Xizang 94 108 202  0 
Shaanxi 67 73 140  0 
Ningxia 25 37 62  0 
Samples (Total) 3152 2967 6119   
 
The two core questions in the survey that were used to construct the DVs for hypothesis 
testing are as follows: 
(DV in hypothesis set 1): Between the government and the individuals, who should take 
greater responsibility for elderly pension provision? 
(DV in hypothesis set 2): Do you trust the central/provincial/local governments? (asked 
as separate questions) 
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Figure 12. Provincial variations of the dependent variable: LoR perception 
 
In Figure 12, we present the provincial variation of the dependent variable—the locus of 
(welfare) responsibility from two rounds of survey data. In addition to the dependent variables, 
the two-round survey also provides demographic information about the respondents, which are 
then used as control variables in our models. The variables comprise age, gender, educational 
attainment, marital status, party membership, household income level and residential registration 
(hukou) status, among others.  
The main independent variable in our study is the different waves of pilot policy. The full 
pilot policy started in 2001–2003 and expanded in 2006 and 2008, respectively involving three, 
eight and two pilot provinces. Figure 13 shows the provinces in the three waves. The 
construction of treatment variables is explained in the model identification section. 
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Figure 13. Visualization of three waves pilot policy 
 
To measure the independent variable of local official propaganda, we collected 
newspaper articles from the “China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database,”39 which covers 
data beginning in 2000. The official newspapers published by the local Provincial Party 
Committee were selected, but not all the available newspapers in a certain province because it is 
the provincial party newspapers that generally highlight propaganda information from the 
provincial government. Moreover, the propaganda rhetoric of provincial party newspapers can 
help to construct public opinion in the provinces. Officials’ attitudes to the current welfare 
policy that are revealed in provincial newspapers can be spread and appear in other media 
platforms across a province. People who do not read or subscribe to official provincial 
newspapers are also informed about such attitudes. The collection of data involves keyword 
searching and manual selection. To capture the intensity of propaganda regarding the pension 
insurance reform, we collected articles containing the exact name of the pilot policy (i.e., “fully 
funding the individual accounts”) to construct the variable “policy propaganda” and use the ratio 
 
39 “China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database” (http://oversea.cnki.net/), accessed July 2016. The dataset 
does not include the official newspaper data of Shandong Province and thus is complemented by another 
newspaper database, that of “Wise News” (http://wisenews.wisers.net/), accessed July 2016. 
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of the variables rather than absolute numbers. In Figure 14, we present the provincial variation 
of local official propaganda efforts (as the article rate) on the pilot policy. Moreover, we 
calculated the accumulated ratio in 3 or 5 years (!"#$% = ∑()*+,-./	12	3,.1+	31.,-4)6∑(71+8.	9/:;	)*+,-./;)6 , where t equals 
3 or 5 years before the two survey years of 2004 and 2009, respectively) to capture the long-term 
effects of the propaganda. 
 
 
Figure 14. Provincial variation of local official propaganda efforts 
 
To compare the provincial-level covariates between treatment provinces and the rest of 
the country, we collected provincial level statistical data on social and economic variables—
which can influence the possibility that certain provinces will be selected as pilot provinces and 
the public’s perception of pension insurance—from the National Bureau of Statistics for the 
period covering 2000 to 201040. The selected social and economic variables included regional 
economic performance, demographic characteristics, fiscal revenue and expenditure distribution, 
the implementation and participation rate of pension insurance, and so on.  
Identification of policy effect 
The nature of the two rounds of survey data permits us to adopt the difference-in-
differences (DID) model for estimating the average policy effect on individuals through 
counterfactual inference. In the DID model, we define the treatment group as all the samples in 
the provinces that participated in the pilot policy, whereas others are used for the control group. 
 
40 “National Bureau of Statistics” (http://www.stats.gov.cn/), accessed July 2016. 
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Our baseline model is to estimate the difference between the treatment area and the control area 
before and after the policy experimentation.  <!,+ = = + ?@A$B%#, + ?CA%D#+ + ?EA$B%#,A%D#+ +F?GH,+ + A, + I,+,				(1) 
where <!it denotes the individuals’ attitudes regarding the LoR of pension insurance; A%D#t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for year 2009 and 0 for year 2004; A$B%#L is the treatment 
variable that equals 1 for samples in the piloted provinces and 0 otherwise; the ?E of the 
interaction term between A$B%#L and A%D#t is the average treatment effect on individuals; and Hit 
is the vector of control variables that is employed to capture minor imbalances in demographic 
factors that can interfere with the outcome of interest. Given that the pilot sites were selected at 
the provincial level, we included a dummy variable A, for provinces to ensure that the selections 
did not lead to an overestimation of the treatment effects. By taking advantage of the condition 
that the policy was targeted at urban enterprise employees, we further analysed the occupational 
and residential differences by using different subsamples. 
In addition to the dualistic treatment-or-control variable, we also coded a continuous 
variable denoted by Duration to capture the gradual feature of the policy implementation by 
substituting the variable Pilot. This variable on Duration corresponds to the length of time that 
each treatment province had experienced by 2009, the time that the post-treatment survey was 
conducted in and the value was set at 0, 1, or 3. Duration also captures the slight policy 
differences between two different waves41. The model with “duration” as the explanatory 
variable is similar to Model (1). <!,+ = = + ?@MNO"#$%P, + ?CA%D#+ + ?EMNO"#$%P,A%D#+ +F?GH,+ + A, + I,+,				(2) 
where MNO"#$%Pi is the length of time for which each sample experienced the pilot 
policy. 
In investigating the mixed effect of the pilot policy and the local official propaganda, we 
further constructed the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD, or triple difference) model 
as follows:  
 
41 The pilot policy was conducted in three waves. The full scale of funding the individual accounts by local 
governments and the financial subsidies from the central government varied somewhat across these three waves. 
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<!,L+ = = + ?@A$B%#, + ?CA%D#+ + ?EAO%R"S"PT"L + ?GA$B%#,A%D#++ ?UA$B%#,AO%R"S"PT"L	 + ?VA%D#+AO%R"S"PT"L	+ ?WA$B%#,A%D#+AO%R"S"PT"L	 +F?XH,L+	 + A, + I,L+,					(3) 
where “AO%R"S"PT"L” represents the individuals’ direct exposure to the pilot policy. 
The coefficient ?W of the interaction of pilot effect (Pilot*Post) and propaganda thus caught the 
concurrent effect on the outcome variable. We contained the same control variables in vector Hit 
and province dummy A,. 
To test the short-term and long-term effects of the local policy propaganda on the 
public’s political trust, we employed the question in the 2009 survey by measuring the level of 
Chinese citizens’ trust in the central government, provincial government and local government 
(county or district).42 Short-term and long-term propaganda were identified with the accumulated 
ratio of articles that contained the exact name of this pilot policy in the previous year, 3 years 
and 5 years. We constructed the following model by using the interaction between pilot policy 
and local propaganda to capture the marginal effect of official propaganda on the public’s 
political trust in the treatment provinces: [OND#,L = = + ?@A$B%#, + ?CAO%R"S"PT"L + ?EA$B%#,AO%R"S"PT"L +F?GH,L + A,+ I,L,				(4) 
where the marginal effect of local official propaganda on political trust was calculated as ]([OND#,L)](AO%R"S"PT"L) = ?C + ?EA$B%#,.			(5) 
Thus, the coefficient ?C+?E × 1 indicates the estimated marginal propaganda effect on 
the public’s political trust in the pilot provinces. Here, the dichotomous variable A$B%#Lcan be 
replaced as the continuous variable MNO"#$%Pi (to be discussed in the empirical section), which 
then turns the measurement into the marginal effect of propaganda on political trust for one 
additional year. Using MNO"#$%Pi helps us identify the long-term and short-term effects of 
propaganda in spite of the stepwise pilot policy. 
 
42 There were no questions related to political trust in the 2004 survey. Therefore, we can use only the 2009 survey 
for data on political trust. 
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Selection of pilots 
Individual balance 
The legitimation of a counterfactual DID design relies on the parallel trend assumption, 
which assumes that the counterfactual “natural” change in the outcome for the units in the 
treatment group between time 0 and 1 would have been the same as the change in the outcome 
for the units in the control group between periods 0 and 1. In this study, people’s attitudes to the 
allocation of welfare responsibility or political attitude in the treatment provinces would have 
been the same as the ones in the control provinces if not for the policy experiment, or as shown 
in formula `[bc(1) − bc(0)|M = 1] = `[bc(1) − bc(0)|M = 0], which was drawn from the 
derivation of the average treatment effect on the treated estimation under the DID design. 
Given that the parallel trend assumption is not directly testable, especially for two periods of 
data, we approached this assumption in several ways. First, we ran a simple t-test of our main 
outcome variable (LoR, a large value of the variable indicating considerable agreement on 
individual responsibility) of the 2004 survey samples (i.e. at period 0) by the treatment and 
control groups. `[b(0)|M = 1] and `[b(0)|M = 0] indicate no significant difference (p = 
0.51). 
Second, being treated during the policy pilot programme is arguably exogenous to 
individual preferences and political attitudes. That is, Δbc	 should be independent from the 
assignment of M. Most sites of policy experimentation in China are not randomly selected and 
potential bias with certain confounding factors may affect each province’s likelihood of being 
selected as a pilot. Nevertheless, an in-depth case study on the development of the Chinese 
pension system implies that the urban pension insurance pilot scheme was designed by the 
central government, which carefully considered the issue of representativeness in selecting sites 
(Zhu and Zhao 2018). We conducted the following data description and balance check of key 
determinants in the selection of pilot regions to empirically address the identification challenge 
of DID. Third, we ran the baseline models depicted above with various control variables to 
minimize the bias brought by potential confounders. Finally, we leveraged the time effect 
conditional upon different groups (such as different propaganda intensities) with triple difference 
models. 
Time trend 
Although we cannot display the long-range development of individual perceptions due to 
data constraints, we can present the variance of provincial-level covariates that may affect the 
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outcome variables. We used the panel provincial data from 2000 to 2010 and compared the 
aggregated long-term trends of the treatment and control provinces on economic development, 
demographic features and social conditions. As shown in Figure 15, the trends of the two groups 
were nearly parallel to one another on most of the indices. 
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Figure 15. Time trend of provincial index 
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Regional Balance  
Scholars typically find it difficult to identify the selection of the pilot provinces. Several 
latent factors can cause potential self-selection bias in the process. For instance, provinces 
affected by the ageing problem in terms of demographic structure are more likely to be chosen 
as a pilot, but provinces with good fiscal and economic performance will probably be better at 
deploying the reform. Selection based on unobservable information, such as the motivations of 
provincial leaders, which vary across provinces, is also possible and the motivations may have 
changed as the stages of the leaders’ tenure changed. Although we were constrained by the 
availability of insider stories, we could still rule out the endogenous problems through statistical 
analysis by using observable data (Gentzkow, 2006). 
Bearing in mind the nature of the selection of pilot provinces, we first constructed a 
provincial sample pool through sampling without replacement to address the potential selection 
bias. For each wave, denoted by year t, we used the social and economic data in year t–1 and 
then coded the province selected for the pilot pool as 1 and other provinces as 0. In the selection 
of the next wave of pilot provinces, the previously selected provinces were dropped from the 
selection pool. In other words, a province that had started to implement the pilot policy was not 
compared in the next round of pilot selection. 
We then conducted an event history analysis (EHA) of the significant variables while 
satisfying the requirement of the variance inflation factor test to measure the imbalance between 
the selected and unselected provinces. The results are shown in Table 11. Both the time discrete 
result and the time series result indicated that the difference between selected and unselected 
provinces was insignificant in terms of economic performance, fiscal condition, demographic 
situation and the existing pension insurance system (column “All samples”). The three provinces 
in north-eastern China possess some specific features not found in the other provinces: a larger 
proportion of SOEs, a longer history of industrialization, more severe problem of outflow 
emigration and so on. Fortunately, these provinces were part of the first pilot wave and thus 
were not covered by the individual-level data in our study. Thus, we conducted an EHA test 
dropping on three provinces (columns “2004-2009 samples”). As shown by the result, the 
difference between the selected and unselected provinces in the second and third waves was 
greatly reduced. Thus, even if the provinces that participated in the pilot were not de facto in the 
random selection, they were still statistically representative. 
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Table 11. Balance check: Event History Analysis (EHA) of the provincial index  
Probit Regression Treated 
 All samples 
2004–2009 samples 
(excluding first wave of 
pilots before 2004) 
 
Time- 
discrete 
Time-
series 
Time- 
discrete 
Time-
series 
Population growth rate 
-0.094 -0.043 -0.049 0.050 
(0.090) (0.112) (0.108) (0.134) 
Old-age dependency ratio (census data) 
-0.225* -0.199 -0.134 -0.067 
(0.127) (0.126) (0.138) (0.138) 
Urban retired employees participation in 
Pension insurance 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban retired employees participation in 
Pension insurance 
0.009 0.010 0.009 0.008 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log GDP per capita 
0.609 0.900** 0.343 0.814* 
(0.440) (0.400) (0.477) (0.452) 
Log Fiscal specific purpose revenue 
0.479 0.780 0.151 0.562 
(0.465) (0.536) (0.505) (0.590) 
Log Fiscal general budgetary revenue 
-1.212 -1.508* -0.489 -1.035 
(1.117) (0.891) (1.133) (0.876) 
Log Basic Pension Insurance Funds 
expenditure 
0.636 0.729 0.216 0.649 
(1.156) (1.118) (1.183) (1.300) 
Year Dummy  YES  YES 
Observations 190 190 132 132 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Policy effects on locus of government responsibility 
We present the DID regression results of the public’s attitude to the LoR on pensions by 
using !"#$%, &'(% and the interaction between &'(% and !"#$% (Pilot effect) along with other 
control variables in Table 12. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level are reported in 
parentheses. The coefficient of the pilot effect (&'(%*	!"#$%) shows a significant positive effect 
(0.126), which indicates that the policy in the treatment provinces after the pilot increased the 
public acknowledgement of individual responsibility on pension insurance. After controlling for 
province, year and individual demographic variables, the effect remains positive (0.091) but 
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insignificant. This mixed effect is partly addressed in the following section by discussing the 
propaganda effect.  
As shown by the results in Table 12, the interaction between *+"$%,'- and &'(% 
(Duration effect) has a significant and positive effect (0.073) on people’s LoR attitude after 
controlling for the demographic factors, provinces and year dummies. This result indicates that 
the people in the provinces who experienced longer pilot policy experimentation had higher 
levels of acceptance of individual responsibility on pension insurance. Thus, our Hypothesis 1 is 
supported. 
 
Table 12. Policy effects on locus of government responsibility 
 
 Treatment vs 
Control 
 
 
Policy 
Duration 
 
Pilot effect (DID) 
0.126** 0.123* 0.091    
(0.060) (0.068) (0.068)    
Duration effect (DID) 
   0.085*** 0.083*** 0.073*** 
   (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) 
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Provincial Dummies   Yes   Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,921 3,790 3,790 4,921 3,790 3,790 
R-squared 0.025 0.069 0.148 0.027 0.071 0.150 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table presents ordinary least square (OLS) results. Clustered standard 
errors at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. The estimates of treat, post, duration, demographic 
controls—which include age, age squared, gender, educational attainment, marital status, party membership, 
household income level and hukou status—are not reported. The estimates of constants, provincial dummies and 
year dummies are not reported either. 
 
Mixed effects of policy experimentation and policy propaganda 
As shown in Table 13, after controlling for the demographic features and province 
dummies, policy propaganda was shown to have a contrary effect on the public’s LoR 
conditioning in pilot situations. In other words, people affected by the pilot policy were likely to 
have a higher impression of governmental responsibility when exposed to stronger local official 
propaganda. The result from the decomposed subsample indicated that the “pulling back” 
function of the policy propaganda was significant for the target population, namely, the 
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enterprise employees (–0.161) and the public sector employees (–0.552) in urban areas. 
Meanwhile, the rural residents who had largely been alienated from the policy were weakly 
influenced by the propaganda, as shown by the slight increase in their confidence (0.018) on the 
omnipotent role of the government. Our Hypothesis 2 is thus supported. Along with the pilot 
policy, local governments’ official propaganda in defending the governmental image in welfare 
provision as well as the justification of joint responsibility to a certain extent attenuated people’s 
faith—especially that of the target population of enterprise employees—in the “glorious 
government”. In other words, official propaganda acted as a moderator for the treatment effect 
of the pilot scheme and kept the government from “losing face” (faith). 
 
Table 13. Effect of pilot policy and policy propaganda on locus of government 
responsibility 
 
All 
samples 
Urban 
samples 
Rural 
samples 
Enterprise 
employees 
(Target 
Population) 
Public sector 
employees 
(urban) 
Pilot effect (DID) 
0.500*** 0.557*** 0.379** 0.523 2.245*** 
(0.117) (0.168) (0.176) (0.339) (0.722) 
Pilot effect × Policy propaganda 
(DDD) 
-0.105*** -0.184*** 0.018 -0.161** -0.552*** 
(0.029) (0.041) (0.043) (0.080) (0.197) 
Policy propaganda 
0.017*** 0.045*** -0.021** 0.038*** 0.029 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) 
Policy propaganda × Pilot 
-0.026* -0.066*** 0.012 -0.082 0.142 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.052) (0.140) 
Policy propaganda × Post 
0.079*** 0.139*** -0.009 0.123** 0.261** 
(0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.061) (0.120) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,790 1,947 1,846 729 207 
R-squared 0.156 0.164 0.149 0.191 0.260 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Concurrent effects on political trust 
Short-term and long-term effects of combined statecraft 
Despite the image construction of a “caring and accountable” government that may have 
effectively swayed public opinion in the short term, our presented case showed that the 
divergence between the propaganda images and the benefits derived by individuals from the 
pilot policy would probably result in political distrust in the long term. The results of the 
marginal effect of propaganda on the public’s political trust in the pilot provinces are shown in 
Table 14. The coefficient of the interaction between treatment and policy propaganda indicates 
that local official propaganda in pilot areas significantly increased the public’s trust in local 
governments by 0.286 (=0.497–0.211) and in provincial governments by 0.132 (=0.298–0.166) in 
the short term (1 year), according to Equation (5). The effect on the public’s trust in the central 
government (0.012) is not as significant as the effects on trust in the local and provincial 
governments. Meanwhile, in the long term (3 years), official propaganda significantly but 
negatively affected public’s trust in the local and provincial governments (–0.279 and –0.129, 
respectively). The effect on the public’s trust in the central government (–0.012) was 
insignificant. The coefficients of accumulated policy propaganda for 5 years indicate a similar 
pattern: policy propaganda affected the public’s trust in local and provincial governments (–
0.131 and –0.060, respectively) in a significant and negative way, while the trust in the central 
government was very weak (–0.006). The effect on the central government was clearly not 
statistically evident, which is reasonable, considering that the statistically measured propaganda 
and the above discussion on pilot policy took place only at the provincial level. Therefore, our 
Hypothesis 3 was supported. 
In this result, we also distinguished a confounding variable to capture the self-interest 
factor under the policy effect: number of older family members who needed to be taken care of 
(as shown in Table 14). The coefficients of this variable in the various models suggest that the 
direct self-interest factor has limited influence on the public’s political trust. 
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Table 14. Effect of pilot policy and policy propaganda on political trust 
 Local Gov Province Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Pilot -0.956*** -0.620*** -0.309** 0.721 0.125 -0.269 -0.037 -0.308 -0.397 
(0.222) (0.185) (0.124) (0.627) (0.514) (0.409) (0.482) (0.401) (0.299) 
Policy propaganda (1 yr) 
-0.211** -0.166** -0.088*       
(0.088) (0.075) (0.053)       
Pilot × Policy propaganda (1 
yr) 
0.497*** 0.298** 0.101       
(0.150) (0.124) (0.096)       
Policy propaganda (3 yrs) 
   -0.053** -0.042** -0.022*    
   (0.022) (0.019) (0.013)    
Pilot × Policy propaganda (3 
yrs) 
   -0.226* -0.087 0.010    
   (0.119) (0.096) (0.077)    
Policy propaganda (5 yrs) 
      -0.069** -0.054** -0.029* 
      (0.029) (0.024) (0.017) 
Pilot × Policy propaganda (5 
yrs) 
      -0.062 -0.006 0.023 
      (0.062) (0.051) (0.040) 
Enterprise employee 
0.051 -0.050 -0.112** 0.051 -0.050 -0.112** 0.051 -0.050 -0.112** 
(0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) 
Public sector employee 
0.038 -0.021 -0.086 0.038 -0.021 -0.086 0.038 -0.021 -0.086 
(0.085) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.079) (0.075) 
#Old age people in the 
family 
0.015 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.015 0.001 
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,549 1,529 1,555 1,549 1,529 1,555 1,549 1,529 1,555 
R-squared 0.076 0.099 0.106 0.076 0.099 0.106 0.076 0.099 0.106 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 15. Effect of policy duration and policy propaganda on political trust 
 Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Pilot Duration -0.319*** -0.207*** -0.103** 0.240 0.042 -0.090 -0.012 -0.103 -0.132 
(0.074) (0.062) (0.041) (0.209) (0.171) (0.136) (0.161) (0.134) (0.100) 
Policy propaganda (1 yr) 
-0.211** -0.166** -0.088*       
(0.088) (0.075) (0.053)       
Duration × Policy propaganda (1 
yr) 
0.166*** 0.099** 0.034       
(0.050) (0.041) (0.032)       
Policy propaganda (3 yrs) 
   -0.053** -0.042** -0.022*    
   (0.022) (0.019) (0.013)    
Duration × Policy propaganda (3 
yrs) 
   -0.075* -0.029 0.003    
   (0.040) (0.032) (0.026)    
Policy propaganda (5 yrs) 
      -0.069** -0.054** -0.029* 
      (0.029) (0.024) (0.017) 
Duration × Policy propaganda (5 
yrs) 
      -0.021 -0.002 0.008 
      (0.021) (0.017) (0.013) 
Enterprise employee 0.056 -0.048 -0.112** 0.056 -0.048 -0.112** 0.056 -0.048 -0.112** 
(0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) 
Public sector employee 0.044 -0.018 -0.085 0.044 -0.018 -0.085 0.044 -0.018 -0.085 
(0.085) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.079) (0.075) 
#Old age people in the family 0.019 0.017 0.001 0.019 0.017 0.001 0.019 0.017 0.001 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,549 1,529 1,555 1,549 1,529 1,555 1,549 1,529 1,555 
R-squared 0.076 0.099 0.106 0.076 0.099 0.106 0.076 0.099 0.106 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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A logical concern over the difference between the short-term and long-term effects of 
propaganda on political trust may arise if we consider the different waves of policy 
implementation in the treatment provinces. Therefore, we added another test to show how the 
effects of propaganda varied in the different waves (as shown in Table 15). We replaced Pilot 
with Duration in Equation (4). The marginal effect of propaganda on the individuals exposed to 
the pilot policy for different years is calculated with !" + !$%&'()*+,- . 
The results, which are consistent with those in Table 14, further validate our hypothesis 
on the effect of incremental experimentation. For individuals in the treatment provinces that 
started their pilot policy in 2008, the duration of experience of the reform is 1 year. Therefore, 
the estimation of the effect of the 1-year propaganda on the public’s trust in the 2008 wave of 
pilot provinces is –0.045 (=–0.211+0.166×1). Individuals in these provinces in the 2006 wave of 
policy experimentation with a 3-year pilot exposure show significant and positive change in their 
trust on the local government by 0.287 (=–0.211+0.166×3), different from the weak negative 
effect on the ones under the intensity of 1-year official propaganda. For provincial governments, 
the pattern is similar: short-term official propaganda shows a weak and negative effect (–0.067) 
for individuals who reside in provinces with a short exposure to the policy, whereas the effect is 
positive (0.131) for individuals who reside in provinces with a long exposure of the policy. If we 
accumulate the propaganda effect for the longer terms (e.g., 3 and 5 years), then the negative 
effect on local and provincial governments becomes extremely high as the exposure to the pilot 
policy lengthens. As shown in Table 14 and Table 15, which both use 2009 survey data, the long-
term decline of the public’s political trust is a result of propaganda and of the disjunction of 
policy from propaganda, rather than the policy itself. Therefore, we can exclude the alternative 
explanation that the possibility of policy failure caused the long-term distrust we observed.  
The idea of official propaganda, no matter whether it is called “social construction”, 
“frames” or “discourse”, does have a risk of failure. In many cases, unsuccessful alterations of 
either the image of the target population or the discourse of the policy agenda may lead to a 
failure of to promote the policy. In our case of a pension pilot for enterprise employees in the 
early 2000s, the key problem, as I reiterate many times above, is the “mismatch” between the 
promoted pilot policy content and the local government’s official discourse. Such mismatching 
partially results from the discourse dependency of the communist state-owned media; it also 
comes from local governments’ efforts to maintain the general face (faith) of the “state” before 
its population. The “mismatch” can be captured by the public in a longer period, such as three or 
five years and it diminishes their political trust. 
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Short-term and long-term propaganda effects on the directly targeted group 
In addition to the main results, we also exploited the design of the pilot policy to explore 
the marginal effect of propaganda on the policy’s target population. We conducted regression 
modelling of the official propaganda on political trust with the urban samples (see Table 16) and 
we focused on the targeted group of the policy reform, namely, the enterprise employees in the 
piloted provinces. Columns 1 to 3 show the short-term effect of the propaganda on urban 
residents and its marginal effect on enterprise employees, while columns 4 to 6 present the 
comparable effect of propaganda over the long term. The outcome for the policy’s target 
population was identical to our hypothesis, in which local official propaganda has incremental 
effects on political trust in the short term and has reductive effects on the public’s confidence in 
the long term. In particular, short-term propaganda significantly increases the target population’s 
trust in local governments by 0.365 (=0.368–0.003) and on provincial governments by 0.267 
(=0.272–0.005). The effect on the target population’s trust in the central government 
(0.015=0.017–0.002) was positive but insignificant. Long-term propaganda, measured as either 
accumulated over 3 years or 5 years, led to a significant loss of public trust in local and provincial 
governments among the target population. In particular, the 3 to 5 years of official propaganda 
exposure diminished the enterprise employees’ trust in the local government (from 0.293 to 
0.562) and the provincial government (from 0.216 to 0.399). The results show that, with long 
periods of local official propaganda, the target population’s political trust in local and provincial 
governments regarding the pension pilot policy consistently declined, reversing from positive to 
negative. In general, we may conclude that the negative effect of long-term local official 
propaganda on local regime support does not vary among different social groups. 
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Table 16. Short-term and long-term propaganda effects on directly targeted group in piloted provinces 
 Local 
Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov Local Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov Local Gov 
Province 
Gov 
Central 
Gov 
Enterprise employee 
0.056 -0.008 -0.070 0.044 -0.092 -0.134 0.100 -0.076 -0.107 
(0.097) (0.092) (0.095) (0.121) (0.124) (0.130) (0.142) (0.144) (0.151) 
Policy propaganda (1 yr) 
0.368*** 0.272** 0.017       
(0.122) (0.112) (0.107)       
Enterprise employee × Policy 
propaganda (1 yr) 
-0.003 -0.005 -0.002       
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)       
Policy propaganda (3 yrs)    -0.292*** -0.211** -0.009    
   (0.097) (0.088) (0.085)    
Enterprise employee × Policy 
propaganda (3 yrs) 
   -0.001 0.005 0.005    
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    
Policy propaganda (5 yrs)       -0.556*** -0.403** -0.020       (0.185) (0.168) (0.161) 
Enterprise employee × Policy 
propaganda (5 yrs) 
      -0.006 0.004 0.002 
      (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
#Old age people in the family 
0.068*** 0.077*** 0.037* 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.037* 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.037* 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 729 711 733 729 711 733 729 711 733 
R-squared 0.088 0.111 0.099 0.088 0.111 0.100 0.088 0.111 0.099 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Robustness test 
Considering that all the models in the previous discussions are OLS regression 
estimations, we reran the empirical models with the ordered logit model for robustness testing. 
Table 17 below shows that the above results for the pilot policy effect were robust.  
Table 17. Robustness test with Order logit model 
Locus of Responsibility (Ordered Logit) 
Pilot effect (DID) 
0.202  0.943*** 
(0.126)  (0.218) 
Duration effect (DID) 
 0.146***  
 (0.042)  
Policy propaganda 
  0.034*** 
  (0.011) 
Policy propaganda ×Pilot 
  -0.059** 
  (0.026) 
Policy propaganda ×Post 
  0.156*** 
  (0.044) 
Pilot effect × Policy 
propaganda (DDD) 
  -0.195*** 
  (0.054) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,790 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In addition, we conducted tests by using multilevel models that allowed cross-province 
random intercepts, with results that were consistent with our main models. The model was 
constructed as follows: !"#$% = '(#$% + *+,-./0#% + *12340$% + *5,-./0#%2340$% +6*78#$% 					(6), 
where  '(#$% = '( + >($% + ?#$% . 
The multilevel model results are shown in Table 18: the direction and significance of 
main coefficients (such as the DID effect and DDD effect) did not change from those of  our 
main models in Table 12 and Table 13. 
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Table 18. Robustness test with multilevel model (Random intercept at Provincial level) 
Locus of Responsibility (Multilevel Logit) 
Pilot effect (DID) 
0.089  0.466*** 
(0.069)  (0.116) 
Duration effect 
(DID) 
 0.072***  
 (0.024)  
Policy propaganda 
  0.010** 
  (0.005) 
Policy propaganda 
×Pilot 
  -0.018 
  (0.013) 
Policy propaganda 
×Post 
  0.056*** 
  (0.020) 
Pilot effect × Policy 
propaganda (DDD) 
  -0.084*** 
  (0.026) 
Demographic 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,790 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
We also conducted a test to identify intergenerational difference by adding retirement as 
a third dimension along with the cross-time and cross-province difference by using our data on 
the urban samples. As shown by the robustness test results in Table 19, individuals who were 
retired at the time of the survey would have preferred the government to have taken more 
responsibility, but they did not show significantly different attitudinal change in terms of 
experiencing the pilot policy.   
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Table 19. Robustness test with intergenerational difference 
Locus of Responsibility 
 OLS Ologit OLS Ologit 
Retired -0.672*** -1.304*** -0.726*** -1.425*** 
(0.129) (0.281) (0.127) (0.277) 
Pilot effect (DID) -0.071 -0.119   
(0.117) (0.243)   
Retired×Post 0.401** 0.764* 0.625*** 1.215*** 
(0.197) (0.424) (0.194) (0.418) 
Retired×Treat 0.432*** 0.797**   
(0.154) (0.337)   
Retired×Pilot effect (DDD) 0.060 0.142   
(0.236) (0.501)   
Retired×Duration 
  0.183*** 0.348*** 
  (0.051) (0.113) 
Duration effect 
  0.077** 0.162** 
  (0.039) (0.081) 
Retired×Duration effect (DDD) 
  -0.106 -0.204 
  (0.078) (0.166) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,560 
R-squared 0.163  0.165  
Pseudo R2  0.0636   0.0643 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Finally, we tested the baseline models by adding other confounding variables, such as the 
expectation of upward mobility and whether the respondents were or were not receiving their 
pension insurance at the time of the survey. It may be argued that individuals with higher 
expectation of upward mobility are more aware of individual responsibility. However, after 
controlling or these variables in the models, the effect of the pilot policy and policy propaganda 
that we proposed and examined in the empirical section did not change, as shown in the 
following table, Table 20. 
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Table 20. Robustness test with other confounding variables 
Locus of Responsibility 
Pilot effect (DID) 
0.049  0.413*** 0.101  0.504*** 
(0.069)  (0.120) (0.067)  (0.117) 
Duration effect (DID) 
 0.064***   0.079***  
 (0.023)   (0.023)  
Policy propaganda 
  0.017***   0.017*** 
  (0.006)   (0.006) 
Policy propaganda ×Pilot 
  -0.027*   -0.026* 
  (0.015)   (0.014) 
Policy propaganda ×Pilot 
  0.077***   0.079*** 
  (0.024)   (0.023) 
Pilot effect × Policy 
propaganda (DDD) 
  -0.098***   -0.105*** 
  (0.030)   (0.029) 
Expectation of upward 
mobility 
0.095*** 0.096*** 0.094***    
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)    
W/O pension insurance 
   -0.250*** -0.254*** -0.248*** 
   (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,580 3,580 3,580 3,790 3,790 3,790 
R-squared 0.157 0.158 0.163 0.156 0.158 0.163 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Conclusion 
A government always needs to make the greatest possible effort to promote a potentially 
controversial policy, especially during a time of socio-economic transition. After the 
“socialization” period, the welfare reform in China entering the 2010s exhibited substantial 
diversity in policy design under the increasing pressure from the people over the social justice of 
redistribution and the sustainability of the welfare system. The government has been proposing 
reforms such as postponing the retirement age, integrating the rural and urban pension schemes 
and allowing the social security fund to be listed. However, the steady progress of these follow-
up adjustments relies on a consensus over the sharing of welfare responsibility between the state 
and individuals. Our study takes advantage of a crucial period of transition from a state socialist 
welfare model and examines the strategies used by the Chinese government to promote the 
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shared welfare responsibility and convince the public that the reform was in the country’s 
interest. The responsibility reallocation process or the “socialization of social welfare” in China is 
similar to the hybrid welfare reform in Western Europe, in which the traditional welfare state 
model has transformed into the residual welfare state model. China’s welfare reform also 
resembles the privatization trend in other transitional socialist countries, in which the previous 
socialist welfare model was replaced by a mixed welfare model that integrates more freedom and 
more responsibilities for individuals. The common risk during all these transitions is the problem 
of public consensus that may not accord with the politicians’ reform design. Therefore, strategies 
such as social construction are adopted by the governments to promote new policies.  
Our findings show that China’s pension reform for urban enterprise employees is a 
combined tactic of policy experimentation and official propaganda. However, although the 
socialization of welfare provision can relieve the government of its responsibility, the transition 
may also reduce the public’s confidence on government capacity and accountability. Therefore, 
the central government has designed the policy experimentation for the pension reform, which 
served as a dialogue mechanism between the state and the public for reaching social consensus 
on a welfare system with hybrid contributors. Accordingly, local governments have employed 
official propaganda to socially construct and persuade the public with an omnipotent image of 
the government as a way of maintaining the public’s faith on regime capacity. 
The empirical results based on two rounds of survey data and local propaganda data 
show that the pilot policy decreases the public’s perception of governmental responsibility on 
elderly welfare in general. Moreover, the longer the individuals have experienced the pilot policy, 
the greater they present attitudinal change. Along with the pilot policy, official propaganda has 
been employed by local governments to maintain the government’s image amid welfare 
provision, but the justification of shared responsibility has reduced the public’s faith on the 
omnipotent role of the government to a certain extent. Moreover, the disjunction of policy 
propaganda and policy experimentation seems to have been recognized by the public and this 
phenomenon has led to the decrease in the perceived credibility of the governments in the long 
term.  
The analysis presented in this chapter aligns with those in many studies focusing on the 
transitional role of governments in providing social welfare and the effect of welfare-related 
policies on the public. The government’s approach for promoting social policy changes and 
constructing public consensus may include a series of tactics. For instance, China’s policy 
experimentation and propaganda have both been useful at the onset. However, the political 
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attitude of the public in general have later been influenced by the mixed information arising from 
the various approaches and their support to the regime may change—or even reverse—
unexpectedly in the long term. As I shown with the analytical model, the state tends to rely on 
tolerant statecraft to reduce the information asymmetry through knowledge construction and 
consensus building. Facing state’s well-designed statecraft, individual’s options are limited but 
not null. People are capable of identifying the potential inconsistency in policy details and the 
propaganda and the state (in a broad sense) “go back on one’s word” might lead to loss of public 
confidence. Therefore, in the following chapter, Chapter 5, I further unpack the state-individual 
power interaction from the perspective of individuals and address the possibilities of individuals’ 
counter-conduct. 
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Chapter 5 Truth or Dare: Falsification in Manufactured 
Compliance 
This chapter is an empirical chapter which, from the perspective of the people addresses 
the overarching design in my dissertation—to explore the governmentality of authoritarian 
regimes in managing social order and legitimacy. In this chapter, I investigate the potential 
cognitional counter-conduct of the population in an authoritarian regime and ask what the 
possibility/existence of falsified compliance implies about the future of the regime. Although 
China is experiencing tremendous social and economic changes, the Chinese government as an 
authority reports considerable public endorsement from all kinds of survey results, which all 
suggest people’s praise of the current authority together with a strong sense of belonging and 
solidarity. In earlier chapters, I have shown that the government uses many tactics to 
manufacture public consent and minimize the possibility of challenge from the governed. 
However, people can reflect on the idea of the “state”, “politics” and the “state-individual 
relationship” in their interactions with governmental power. In other words, despite the well-
designed statecraft of the government, the risks for the authorities of falsified 
compliance/consent from the people are present. These individual level reflections and 
(untold) second thoughts—or ideological rebellions—play an important role in shaping the long-
term expectations and superficial compliance of the general people. Many studies have 
highlighted the constant collective actions from the bottom of the society in China which 
obviously contradict the orderly scene on the surface. My empirical work in Chapter 4 also 
showed that in the short term people may express contentment with a controversial policy, but 
in the long term there is a decline in political support as the real impact of the policy on their 
everyday lives fails to match the official propaganda. This situation makes China an interesting 
field for studying the possibilities of falsified compliance and its implications for state 
governmentality.  
Falsification43 in public compliance or consent usually describes the situation when 
people hide their true attitudes/preference. The population’s falsified compliance could reshape 
and even distort the social order and public knowledge. The falsification of political attitudes can 
be fundamentally dangerous for the authority because it may lead to an unexpected “cascade” 
(Kuran, 1991, 1997). My study in this chapter asks the following specific questions: is the 
 
43 The concept “falsification” here is used as a convenient word to describe the situation of people constructing 
their public images/attitudes/preferences, which may not be exactly the same as their private 
images/attitudes/preferences. 
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reported general and specific compliance of the public regarding political 
institutions/representations in China true or just falsification? What is the lowest bar of people’s 
tolerance regarding governmental actions/reforms? If intentional construction of their public 
political attitudes exists in the population, what mechanism propels it? And finally, what are the 
implications of falsified political attitudes for individuals’ actions and, more importantly, for the 
legitimacy of the state in the long run?  
Due to the complexity of the research question, I combine observation, in-depth 
interviews to investigate the black box of the subjectively constructed public political attitudes of 
the people in an authoritarian regime. Face-to-face interviews capture the emotions and the 
choosing of a pause and time to react so as to uncover the unnatural situations of the 
interviewees. Interviews are also helpful in unpacking the complex and usually self-contradictory 
logics of individual choices. Survey experimental employs indirect and disguised questions to 
infer the potential falsification and mechanisms such as rewards, coercion, pluralist ignorance or 
something else. In the analysis, I construct arguments with empirical evidence from various 
sources of data, including past observational data that were collected informally. Moreover, this 
chapter will explore the power relationship between state and individual by highlighting ordinary 
people’s subjectivity and its involution affected by the governmentality of the current authority.  
Research rationale, conceptualization and context 
Chapter 5 develops from the previous chapters (such as Chapters 3 and 4, which analyse 
statecraft and its effectiveness) and digs into the seemingly paradoxical situation that, on the one 
hand, the Chinese report high public consent regarding the authority, while on the other there is 
empirical evidence of discontent in private, and a lack of confidence in the claims of the official 
publicity, numerous collective activities and people “voting with their feet”. Why and how do 
citizens disentangle the reported consent from private attitudes/choices? How do different 
mechanisms work for different social groups? I first define the concept and outline the context 
of falsified political attitudes in authoritarian countries such as China with evidence from existing 
studies. 
What is a falsified attitude, socially and politically? 
The idea of attitude falsification captures the situation when people are unwilling or 
unable to truthfully reveal their actual preferences (or attitudes) and intentionally (or 
unintentionally) construct preferences that can be publicly reported. The notion of “constructed 
attitudes” has its roots in social psychology studies and is sometimes used by the critics of social 
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surveys. It is also an idea frequently used when describing public political attitudes in 
authoritarian regimes, as either “falsified compliance” or “preference falsification”. Social science 
scholars have devoted considerable effort to identifying examples and mechanisms whereby 
people falsify their ideas. In everyday social interaction, people tend to convey specific 
information about themselves (which may not be true in private) to others, in order to influence 
the audience’s perceptions and judgments (Goffman, 1978). The motivation of self-performance 
or impression management is to either to match one’s own self-image or match audience 
expectations and preferences. In these practices, individuals can achieve high social value (which 
is also called “face”) or satisfaction with themselves. Social interaction therefore occurs when a 
person “… can be relied upon to maintain himself as an interactant, poised for communication 
and to act so that others do not endanger themselves by presenting themselves as interactants to 
him” (Goffman, 2017, p. 155). The capacity to present oneself in the way one wishes is in 
practice distributed very unequally across the population. It may be determined by their 
resources, experiences, personalities and so on. People’s intentions and actions in constructing 
social images not only change the way that they express themselves, but also exert a certain social 
pressure on others and change their behaviours (Bursztyn & Jensen, 2017). In spite of the fact 
that self-presentation itself is investigated by many scholars, the prevalence of impression 
management causes inevitable problems in social science studies and opinion polls before 
elections/referendums. Since empirical social science research relies heavily on interviews and 
surveys, individuals’ self-presentation can distort the results of empirical evidence. Researchers 
have identified many conditions involving the “social desirability bias”, such as the “interviewer 
effect” in interviews and the “pressure of social expectation” in social surveys (Edwards, 1957; 
Nederhof, 1985). 
Research about the falsification of political preference peaked when the social scientist 
Tim Kuran proposed his theory explaining the unexpected revolutions in East European 
countries in the late 20th century. He defined falsification as the difference between people’s 
public preferences and private preferences; “preference falsification” occurs when an individual’s 
public preference diverges from the one that he holds in private (Kuran, 1991). Building on 
impression management, Kuran describes a situation when individuals have several public 
preferences on a given issue, each tailored for a particular audience. He presented a vivid 
example of a Soviet citizen admitting to “six faces” under communist repression: “one for my 
wife; one, less candid, for my children, just in case they blurted out things heard at home; one for 
close friends; one for acquaintances; one for colleagues at work; and one for public display.” 
(Kuran, 1997). These “faces” differ from each other in that the faces for his family could be very 
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private and sincere, while the ones worn for colleagues and the public could be disguised. There 
are some extreme examples (such as during the Maoist period in China) when everyone must 
perform in a politically correct way even in private, because close family members could turn 
people in for some casual word or action. 
Performance, as opposed to spontaneity, and impression management are fairly common 
in societies of all kinds, where people are connected with others and receive 
rewards/punishment from “others”. These “others” may be other individuals, social groups, or 
certain institutions. For instance, people with unorthodox views may fear to reveal themselves in 
public due to the social pressure in their community; some candidates running for an election 
may buy off anyone who does not support them in the first place; the state apparatus can force 
dissenters to show compliance notwithstanding their strong discontent in private. What is 
fascinating for the social scientist is to investigate the interaction of powers beneath the norm-
enhancement, support and compliance. Among the institutions and arenas that may generate 
falsification, the authoritarian states, which are generally recognized as intolerant, attract much 
attention. 
Falsification in political attitudes: why it is important in authoritarian regimes and 
how 
Public opinion or public support is one of the most important topics in the social 
sciences because it is crucial for political stability and even for the survival of the authority. 
Scholars are especially curious about changes of public opinion in authoritarian states, including 
the distribution of public opinion, directions of any changes and factors that shape the changes 
in these regimes. More importantly, observers are keen to see how far the state is perceived to be 
legitimate by the citizens. Even more intriguing are the events that scholars and the outside 
world find striking or unexpected, such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the communist 
authorities in East Europe—there was no clear sign of a revolution before the event (Kuran, 
1991). Falsification of public opinion may be one of the main factors to blame. People “knew 
that to criticize their governments openly could derail their careers or land them in jail ... even in 
the absence of formal sanctions, there is the universal human desire for approval, which often 
prevents people from voicing minority opinions” (Frank, 1996, p. 115). In this way, the 
discontent of the public is disguised beneath the fake flourish of praise. When the time comes, 
private non-compliance may turn into collective public non-compliance.  
The situation of political trust is similar in studies about falsification in China, although 
the fall of the state has not occurred. It is commonly agreed that the political trust reported from 
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survey data is very high. Tang’s work (2016), along with many others, attributes the high political 
support to China’s economic growth, the effective promotion of nationalism, the individual’s 
external efficacy based on the government’s responsiveness to public demand and the cultural 
tradition of conformity. However, it is also widely admitted in China studies that people in 
Chinese society do hesitate to report their discontent, especially when it concerns the political 
authority. Scholars who do not think that the political trust is reported truly believe that, as a 
typical communist and Asian regime, the high political support derives from people’s fear of the 
authority, or from the patriarchal and hierarchical culture of the society and its politics (Fuchs, 
2007; Rose, 2007; Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006). 
Although the idea of constructing public attitudes and falsifying compliance has been 
broadly discussed and recognized by plenty of theoretical arguments—especially after Kuran’s 
explication with models and cases—empirical studies that provide evidence of the “preference 
falsification” in authoritarian regimes are scarce. Currently, several published or working papers 
have been published. Jiang and Yang’s paper in 2016 took advantage of the fall of one high-
profile official in Shanghai, China and constructed a semi-natural experiment to examine which 
people would lie about their attitude to corruption and the government. Their result shows that 
the falsification was most intense among the groups that had access to alternative information 
but were vulnerable to political sanctions (Jiang & Yang, 2016). Frye and his colleagues used a 
list experiment to test Putin’s political support among his people and found counter-intuitive 
evidence: the high approval of Putin in Russia was genuine (Frye, Gehlbach, Marquardt, & 
Reuter, 2017). Tang’s work (Tang, 2016) used a similar design and found similar “true support” 
in China’s case. Other empirical work includes Tannenberg’s working paper manipulating the 
affiliation of the survey—government, or academic institute, or NGOs—to see whether or not 
people would falsify their answers (Tannenberg, 2017); and Shen and Truex’s working paper 
considers existing social surveys and compares the abnormal “no answer” replies to sensitive 
questions and to non-sensitive questions (Shen & Truex, 2018). 
Theoretical discussion about possible mechanisms 
Many factors that could exacerbate the falsification of ideas in general social interactions 
and in the context of authoritarian regimes. Falsification in public attitudes may stem from inner 
utility, external temptations or pressure. For instance, people may find it rewarding to falsify 
their opinion so as to follow the crowd; or find it frightening to reveal their true feelings in 
public. In some cases, people simply feel content or happy to present themselves with a certain 
  180 
public image. Generally speaking, there are several recognized sources of falsification in public 
political attitudes. 
The most obvious ones are the “reward” (or patronage resources, in many studies) and 
“punishment” associated with one’s reported preference (Magaloni, 2006; Wedeen, 2015). 
Reward is seen as a common tactic for the authority to exchange for loyalty and votes from the 
public (C. Lane, 1984; Lust-Okar, 2006; Pepinsky, 2007; Zhao, 2001). People who have fewer 
endowments and little bargaining power may be bought off more easily and then controlled by 
the authority (Blaydes, 2006). Sharing benefits can also silence people who may not be pleased 
with those in power. So long as they display compliance, they may still be entitled to the benefits 
of a member of the club. Punishment is another common factor that causes political attitudes to 
be falsified. People who voice their discontent and disloyalty may be punished by violence or 
must have their voices censored. Authoritarian governments find it easier to mobilize resources 
to buy loyalty and carry out punishment; people are thus more likely to disguise their true 
feelings/preferences lest they seem unacceptable or undesired by the authority. 
Some indirect sources are also identified in explaining the falsification in public opinion. 
For instance, individuals may overestimate or underestimate the conditions of public opinion, 
which is sometimes termed “pluralistic ignorance”. For example, some members of the public 
could reject certain norms in private, but mistakenly assume that most others accepted them (J. 
O'Gorman, 1986; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). A lab experiment in social psychology (Asch & 
Guetzkow, 1951) shows that individuals tend to obey a false consensual judgment rather than 
risk being isolated as deviants. Centola and his colleagues (Centola, Willer, & Macy, 2005), using 
a computational simulation, carefully discussed the equilibrium in pluralistic ignorance, whereby 
few people would actually enforce a norm, but no one realizes this. They found that if agents’ 
horizons are limited to their immediate neighbours, highly unpopular norms can be enforced by 
both true believers and non-believers. Another explanation for possible (ignorant) falsification in 
public attitudes is the effect of socialization and education. For example, students in high school 
may present a politically correct opinion for questions about politics, simply because they know 
the “right” answer and have not reflected on it. These two indirect sources are more or less 
unconscious falsifications compare to the falsification brought by rewards and punishments. 
However, they may still be useful for the authority and manipulated by state power through 
information segregation and educational cultivation. 
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Involution of political attitudes in the Chinese population 
When the state acts as a central source of power, both “totalizing” and “individualizing” 
power (Foucault, 2009), a phenomenon in Chinese political attitudes in line with the effective 
governmentality can be identified: the involution of people’s political attitude. The concept of 
“involution” was originally used by Clifford Geertz to describe the process in Java where 
agriculture appeared to intensify rather than change under the external economic pressure from 
the Dutch rulers and the internal population (Geertz, 1963). Later on, the concept was borrowed 
by Philip Huang to describe the rice economy of the Yangzi Delta, which he argued was locked 
in a pattern of “involutionary growth” with little or no improvement in per capita output and 
living standards and a pattern of declining labour productivity (Philip C Huang, 1990). Another 
school stretched the concept “involution” to apply to state theory, for example, Prasenjit Duara 
(1987), who took China’s example in the early 20th century and introduced “state involution” as 
an imperfect state-making process wherein the formal structures of the state grow 
simultaneously with the informal structures.  
Entering the 1990s, the concept of involution was widely used in social science writing 
on China to describe the phenomena of the social economy or cultural system getting into a state 
of “increase inertia”. Both external restrictions and internal factors are possible reasons for such 
involution. For instance, in explaining the operational logic of the state-owned enterprises, Li 
and Zhang argued in their work (1999) that the SOEs followed two contradicting objectives: 
optimizing the efficiency of the enterprise while maximizing the welfare of the employees. The 
two objectives dragged the SOEs in the direction of functional involution and staffing 
intensification and led to the standstill of enterprises. Some other works have addressed the 
involution of dictatorship, the involution of “Guanxi” (social connections) and, the involution of 
social class in Chinese society. Generally speaking, it can be used to refer to all kinds of 
communities or situations where transformation fails and the inner complexities proliferate 
without new inputs.  
I introduce the notion of “involution” here to capture the increasingly obvious trend in 
Chinese political attitudes. In a situation where the state as a central source of power, the state 
can construct the knowledge (political or social) in whatever form is most suited to maintaining 
its power. Individuals who have limited access to alternative explanations of social facts are less 
likely to interpret the environment in a different way. In the long term, even when citizens are 
provided with a new possibility, they are not capable of accepting a different version of the story, 
or reaching out on their own initiative (as shown in Y. Chen & Yang, 2019). To be sure, social 
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knowledge is still increasing in the society; thanks to the diversity of the population, the historical 
trend that keeps moving forward. However, it increases without questioning past or current 
stories, and therefore is leading to an involution of the population’s “hard knowledge” (Kuran, 
1997). In the following section, I demonstrate with more substantive evidence the “involution” 
process as regards social knowledge and public opinions. 
Is there any chance of breaking the cycle? As noted in the literature review, a 
Foucauldian understanding of counter-conduct can be found in all kinds of power relation: 
struggles against exploitation, domination and subjection. Among them, the struggle against 
subjection has these days become more and more important. Individuals need to make an effort 
to break out of the subjectification imposed by the state through the process of self-formation 
and self-understanding. In this research, my exploration of the individual’s subjectivity rebellion 
against the involution of political attitude in authoritarian regimes begins with two different but 
overlapping approaches: either through falsified compliance (intentionally or non-intentionally) 
or through active reflection on subjectivity, power and the current state-individual relationship. 
Of these two approaches, reflection is more difficult to achieve, but more meaningful in 
breaking the “involution” of public/private knowledge.  
Research design and testable hypotheses 
Rationale of the research design 
In this research, I take falsified compliance in authoritarian regimes as the hidden 
discontent with and disdain for the authorities in people’s voiced consent. Compliance includes 
political trust of the government and the incumbent leader, acceptance regards political 
uncertainties during the reform, approval of the official propaganda and so on. It is not easy to 
find people’s real attitudes, especially in answers to questions that may be quite sensitive. 
Therefore, I planned to use a combination of observation, interviewing and a survey experiment 
to address this problem.  
Observational data are valuable for painting a preliminary picture of the population. 
Combining with the relevant literature, they are also important for researchers constructing basic 
assumptions and hypotheses. After living in China for more than 20 years, I had the good 
opportunity of four years of post-graduate life in London to ruminate on everyday observations 
of Chinese political attitudes from my past life and to reflect on the subjectivity of ordinary 
people. In addition, I actively participated in the social life of Beijing during my fieldwork from 
September to December 2018. I keep track of changes in public opinion through the Chinese 
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social media and make notes on important texts accordingly as evidence to reflect on. 
Observational evidence provided a solid foundation for my follow-up research design and data 
collection; it also worked as a useful source of cross-validating references in my final analysis.  
Face-to-face interviewing is a useful tool that allows researchers to observe the 
interviewees’ reactions and add tailored follow-up questions (Seidman, 2006). The emotions, the 
choice and length of pauses and reactions during an interview are good pointers to the unnatural 
situation of an interviewee. Moreover, qualitative evidence combined with existing theories helps 
me narrow down the hypotheses that can be further tested by a survey. Therefore, before 
devising the explicit content of the survey questionnaire, I conducted 10 face-to-face in-depth 
interviews with 4 male and 6 female interviewees from various backgrounds. Their ages ranged 
from the early 20s to the late 60s, and their occupations covered government officials, retired 
enterprise employees, public institutional employees, private sector employees, unemployed 
young people, students at school, and so on. 5 of the interviewees were recruited through my 
own social network (such as a friend of my parents, a remote relative, the parent of a college 
friend, who might have willingness to reveal their true attitudes to me), while the other 5 were 
recruited through a local community in collaboration with the Tianjin Social Science Research 
Institute. Each interview lasted at least one hour, rising sometimes to 5 hours, depending on the 
situation. To help them relax and feel secure in talking about politics, all the interviewees were 
informed in advance that the whole conversation would not be recorded and notes would not be 
taken during the interviews44 (with permissions to use the content of our dialogue in the 
dissertation).  
The pre-survey interviews focused on the interviewees’ experiences, ideological changes 
and the politics in their daily lives. We discussed such topics as how they perceived the current 
political situation, the past 40 years of transformation (reform) and the future possibilities of the 
society; their view of a desirable state-individual relationship; whether they believed the rhetoric 
and discourses promoted by the authority; what they thought about the potential challenges of 
the state. In some conversations, I asked directly about falsified public attitudes in general and 
their opinion of falsification. In addition to these in-depth interviews, during the fieldwork 
period I discussed the above topics with more than 15 social scientists from various academic 
institutions in China in private talks, workshop panel discussions and so on. These materials 
provided me with primary evidence of the falsification in public political attitudes. Combining 
 
44 Thus, the quotations from the interviews that are analysed are not exactly what the interviewees said, but my 
memories of it, noted after the interviews and translated for inclusion here. 
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them with the existing theories and the research questions underlying my whole dissertation, I 
narrowed down some hypotheses, which were designed to be tested with a survey experiment.  
The survey experiment was a convenient complement for answering my research 
questions, because face-to-face interviews can never be anonymous. They may put interviewees 
under pressure and cause an interviewer expectation effect that distorts the evidence. It is 
difficult, too, with snowball-sampled interviews to identify an average treatment effect of 
sensitive items in general. Therefore, I designed a small-scale online survey and used indirect 
questions to figure out the sort of falsification in political attitudes that might be shown. I 
describe the survey design (and the respective modification in data collection) more fully in the 
section on the data generation process. 
Testable hypotheses and structured research questions 
Heterogeneity of falsified consent 
Constructed on the basis of the pre-survey interviews and relevant studies, the first set of 
hypotheses relates to the existence and different types of falsification of political consent. It has 
been constantly argued in both theoretical and empirical works that general (or diffuse) political 
support is substantially different from specific political support since Easton’s work on the 
multi-dimensions of this concept (Easton, 1965, 1975). People may show different levels of 
compliance regarding different branches of the current political institutions, may have specific 
complaints regarding certain polities and may even have special expectations of certain 
politicians. Thus, my investigation of the heterogeneity of falsification in people’s political 
support starts from the varied features related to politics.  
The political support for the state’s institutions already has considerable variations inside. 
In the interviews, many of my interviewees had a sense of “the state is good and sincere (to its people), 
(it’s) just local authorities twisting the policies and instructions.” The state here is more than central 
government; it’s also an abstract idea of the grand governors who rank above local officers. The 
idea of the “state” for ordinary Chinese people is a vague concept that mixes the notion of 
country, nation, government and sometimes even the Communist Party. Chinese people in 
general never seem to fear the expansion of the state—as long as they can get benefit and 
convenience from the expansion (Xiang, 2010). In this sense, the state-individual relationship 
reveals some duplicity: on the one side, the “state” as an abstract image is moralized and is given 
legitimacy by its nature in good faith; on the other side, the public is highly suspicious about the 
specific actions of state institutions: the interaction between individuals and the branches of 
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government/officials heavily relies on the exchange of benefits. With such duplicity in mind, it is 
easy to explain the hierarchical political trust (T. Shi, 2001), as well as the rule consciousness in  
China’s contentious politics (L. Li, 2010): people trust the central government more than the 
local government and would blame the local government for “not following directions from the 
centre”; and when people perceive “injustice” from local government, they tend to appeal for 
“just and right” supervision from a higher authority. Examples of treating local 
officials/government as scapegoats when a policy fails, but respectfully addressing the top leader 
as “Chairman Xi”, are not uncommon in my interviews, either.  
To better understand the complexity of political support revealed in my interviews and 
the theoretical arguments, I first hypothesise about the potential differentiation of falsified 
compliance directed at the various types of state representative: the local authority, the central 
government, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the incumbent president Xi Jinping as top 
leader. The public’s criticism of these state representatives differs in the freedom of discourse: 
the lower in the hierarchy, the less controlled the speech is. Thus, the deficiencies of local 
government furnish the least sensitive context. My first hypothesis is about the heterogeneity of 
falsification of political support: people falsify their compliance regarding the central 
government, the party and the top leader; but will reveal their true discontent regarding local 
authorities. The objects that I use to test the varieties of compliance include a multilevel 
measurement. The first—attitudinal— level covers questions about whether the respondents 
would agree with various statements (which might not be 100% true) about social conditions 
under the promotion (endorsement) of different state representatives.; for example, “under the 
lead of CCP, education brings a higher possibility of social mobility”, or “under the lead of the 
central government, the dual track social pension system45 has been largely reduced”. The 
second—cost—level refers to the individual level of the cost people are willing to bear at the 
request of different state representatives. Here I distinguish two kinds of cost: the cost of 
common goods (taxes imposed on individual goods to protect the environment) and the cost of 
national requests (income/consumption degradation to help China win in the trade war with the 
US). The underlying rationale here is that people are more willing to express their true feelings in 
response to questions that are less sensitive to them.  
As indicated in the duality theory of the state, Chinese people are quite capable of 
disentangling the policies from the policy makers. For them, a policy is acceptable as long as it 
does not hurt their own interests too much. In many cases, people take their chance in the policy 
 
45 The different return rates of pensions for government employees and enterprise employees. I elaborate this 
situation in detail in Chapter 3, above.  
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reform and bargain with the government (without fundamentally questioning the legitimacy of 
the policy makers) to gain more benefits. There are many cases of controversial policies which 
the interviewees criticised in our conversations, but very few of them would directly blame the 
incumbent central authority. When it came to specific policies, such as the property tax, 
education reform and health care policies, some interviewees would open with, “I am not saying 
there is anything wrong with it, just some things I think the policy could improve in a little bit” or “The state may 
have an overarching design and I believe it’s a good policy, but there may be some local officials who distort it when 
they put it into action”. For instance, with regard to the education policy of “lifting the student’s 
burden”, young parents complained that this leads to the problem of shifting the burden of 
educating children from the schools to the parents. Since the primary schools are reducing the 
school hours and the size of the curriculum, parents have to register their children in private 
education institutions after school. When I probed their complaints, however some of them 
identified the discontinuity and arbitrariness of the policy to a certain extent. Therefore, we may 
suppose that the degree of falsification is not significant for specific policies even when the 
policy is controversial. 
The logic of people’s attitudes to the official propaganda is not one-way, either. On the 
one hand, they are easily guided by the propaganda content, as I show in Chapters 3 and 4. On 
the other, I also discovered that people could identify the disjunction between official 
propaganda and the policy content and this disjunction sooner or later led to a loss of political 
trust. Existing studies suggest that the Chinese public is aware of pro-regime bias from official 
mouthpieces, but still trust these outlets more than other sources (Truex, 2016). It is possible 
that the public prefers the official reports to commercial/foreign news sources, while also be 
able to admit that their preferences are swayed by the propaganda. In other words, people may 
recognize that the official propaganda only says “good words” about the government and never 
says “bad words”, but still believe that these words are “real” and “trustworthy”. This is 
consistent with the model shown in Kamenica & Gentzkow’s work: that the degree to which 
citizens are persuaded by a positive media report is negatively related to the degree of media bias 
(Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011). To further explore the “cognitional duality” regarding official 
propaganda, I extended my exploration falsified compliance to a third subsection: people’s 
attitudes to the legitimacy of official news. To be more specific, I wanted to know whether 
people could identify the element of indoctrination in official propaganda and why they liked 
biased official news better than other news. The related hypothesis is that, people do not falsify 
their acknowledgement of the social constructive nature of official propaganda. Moreover, 
people may be aware of the potential discontinuity in public discourse. 
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Identifying potential mechanisms46 
Apart from the existence of falsification, I also interested in the mechanisms that could 
induce falsification in reported public attitudes. As I explained in the theoretical discussion, 
people may choose to falsify their true political attitudes because they are aware of the potential 
rewards of displaying loyalty in public, or because they are afraid of potential punishment of 
showing discontent, or they mistakenly perceive the general public hold a certain “common” 
viewpoint. In line with the model of statecraft that been used to generate compliance in chapter 
1, the state would prefer to manufacture true consent and avoid false falsification bring by the 
fear. For individuals, I hypothesis the following relationship between the effect of punishment 
and rewards on displayed compliance: punishment, rather than reward indicates a higher degree 
of falsification.  
During the interviews, one factor that is not highlighted in the existing explanations is 
the low political efficacy people have when talking about the reason for not telling the truth or 
fighting for their own rights. “There won’t be anything changed even if I speak up”; “It’s just not my turn to 
discuss about (these political issues)”. This maybe because of the citizens are not confident with the 
responsiveness of the government, or they are not confident in their own ability of making a 
difference, or both. To identify the role of political efficacy, one hypothesis I propose to test in 
the survey regarding the mechanism behind the falsification is: low political efficacy might relate 
to a high degree of falsification.  
Heterogeneity among social groups  
In addition to the general scenario of falsification and the average effect of stimulation 
(such as the rewards of showing loyalty, or the punishments for non-compliance) on the 
population as a whole, people with distinctive endowments may have different degrees of 
falsification and various degrees of elasticity regarding the spectrum of stimulation. I show in 
Chapter 3 that the government is prepared to differentiate the benefit allocation and construct 
specific knowledge for people of high or low political status. Political status and age group 
determine “what pension benefits people get”, as well as “what policies/propaganda/education 
they receive (experience)”. Consequently the cost of expressing oneself truthfully varies and the 
motivation to construct a public face varies a great deal. Exploring the heterogeneity of 
falsification among different social groups was valuable for unpacking the varied degrees of 
falsification in people’s political attitudes.  
 
46 An inference design based on survey experiment is not feasible with qualitative data; therefore, in this research I 
focused only on the details of possible reasons, rather than making causal inferences as shown in the hypotheses.  
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Jiang and Yang’s work (Jiang & Yang, 2016) also touched upon unequally distributed 
falsification of the attitude to corruption in different social groups. Falsification was most intense 
among the groups that had access to alternative information but were vulnerable to political 
sanctions. Shen and Truex (2018) in their working paper also showed that, when they measured 
the falsification with an unusual inflation of “Don’t know” and “No Answer” responses to 
sensitive questions in cross-sectional surveys, self-censorship was more prevalent among older 
cohorts (who voiced extremely high levels of support for the regime), women, ethnic minorities, 
non-Party members and members of the working class. The evidence of these writers, for its 
part, suggests that people who are marginalized in the society are more likely to falsify their 
political attitudes with “Don’t know” and “No Answer” response.  
I highlighted the first category of heterogeneity among social groups by saying that 
People who are closer to the power system react more strongly (with a higher degree of 
falsification) to the possibility of punishment than people who are further from it. The logic is 
that people who are closer to the power system may enjoy more benefits and privilege, but they 
are also sensitive to the potential loss that they might suffer if they revealed their discontent and 
moved away from the “guided road”. For instance, taking the most prestigious group, would an 
officer from the public sector be more prone to falsify his/her loyalty to the authority than a 
farmer? I asked one interviewee from the government sector why he didn’t try to use his 
position inside the government machine to offer a suggestion to the decision makers when he 
found aspects of policy that were not feasible at the local level. He replied “… we are not like 
ordinary people who have nothing to lose by arguing with the government. We (government 
officials) all have to be very careful about picking out errors for the leaders. It’s like skating on 
thin ice—one careless move could ruin everything” (No. 22).  
Another characteristic that may determine people’s ability to distinguish the problem in 
official propaganda and deliberately construct their public preferences is their educational level. 
People who are more educated are more likely to receive diverse sources of information 
(“alternative information”, as Jiang & Yang (2016) call it) and are more likely to be critical about 
the current political, social and economic situation. Meanwhile, the education level may highly 
correlate to people’s closeness with the power system, which makes them more likely to hide 
their discontent (if it exists). I propose the next hypothesis; people who are more educated are 
more likely to falsify compliance regarding nationalist requests from the authority. In addition to 
the feature of “distance from the power system” and “educational capacity” discussed above, 
some other heterogeneities may be decisive for people’s reported compliance regarding authority 
and the state apparatus. For example, would a respondent who had been exposed to a socialist 
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education be less likely to falsify loyalty to the party? Would respondents who belong to a ethnic 
minority be more sensitive than other people to possible political sanctions? I investigate these 
questions in greater depth when I analyse the data. The final differentiation of social groups is 
age, or generational difference. People who have experienced more in the society are in general 
more likely to conceal their true discontent. Hence, the last hypothesis is, people who are 
younger are more less likely to falsify their discontent. 
Data generation process 
 My original plan of collecting data includes a survey experiment. However it could not 
be distributed at the time due to a lack of funding and a sudden tightening up of policy regarding 
overseas surveys in China (affected by both the temporary international and the domestic 
situation) at the very late stage of my research. Therefore, I propose to answer the research 
question in this chapter solely with interview data (from the fieldwork period and supplementary 
remote interviews in June 2019) and observational data (mainly from the fieldwork period). The 
survey part (as described in detail in the appendix) will it is hoped, be distributed in the post-
doctoral period. My back-up plan of additional semi-structured electronic interviews was 
conducted in a framework developed from the survey design. In this section, I briefly present the 
original design of the survey experiment and then introduce the data generation using 
supplementary interviews with close reference to the observational data and the experimental 
design of the survey. Since the experimental survey, which essentially relied on randomization, 
was different from the in-depth interviews that depended on careful probing, I paid special 
attention to the methodological challenges in remodelling the process of data generation and the 
associated changes I made in the analytical part. 
Supplementary interviews and methodological modifications 
Working as a backup plan for the unexpected interruption of research process, the 15 
supplementary interviews were conducted in late May and June through the online social 
platform Wechat47 (for interviewees who were located in China) and face-to-face interviews (for 
the few interviewees who were in London). In order to capture the heterogeneity of the 
population, I invited interviewees through snowball sampling from a diverse range of ages, 
genders, occupations, education levels, ethnicity and locations in China48. Each interview lasted 
 
47 A Whatsapp-like App. 
48 A detailed table of interviewees’ attributes is shown in the appendix. 
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1.5 to 2 hours. As in the pre-research interviews, the interviewees were informed in advance that 
the interview would not be recorded and would be anonymous. 
The methodological difference between survey experiment and interview forces me to 
examine the proposed hypotheses in a different way. Rather than following the questionnaire’s 
design of three blocks—“falsification, mechanism and potential actions”, the interview questions 
were tailored for the interviewees according to their personal situations and instant reactions to 
specific questions. The questions were also continually modified according to the stream of 
interactions between them and me. Another methodological challenge was that imposing 
random treatment in interviews is impossible. Therefore, to better obtain true responses from 
the interviewees, I tried my best to build mutual trust with them, such as highlighting the 
personal connection, being honest about my background, and reassuring them of the research’s 
ethical guarantee of anonymity.  
My strategy of interviewing for falsified compliance and disguised discontent also took 
advantage of the changing political and social environment in the presidency of Xi Jinping’s. The 
period of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s administration was widely recognized as open in political 
power sharing and decentralized. During their administration from 2003 to 2013, much progress 
was made in social welfare reforms and social events often drove the institutional reform (e.g. 
(Kelly, 2006; Liu & Sun, 2016; K. Ngok, 2013). The abolition of the “temporary residence 
permit” regulation is an outstanding instance. It originated from the death of one migrant 
worker, but it later gathered widespread attention from the whole society and hastened the 
change of policy on migrants (Qiu & Wen, 2007). It was also the period when online social 
media platforms (such as Weibo, launched in 2009) and some non-official papers (such as the 
Southern Weekly) came to the forefront of the forces monitoring political power through 
publicity and reports (Stockmann, 2013; Tong & Lei, 2010).  
Xi’s administration, however, started with a vehement anti-corruption campaign, a 
recentralization of political power and a gradual tightening up of the societal space. Censorship 
on online content accelerated around late 2017 and 2018. Moreover, in early 2018, the 13th 
National People's Congress approved the abolition of the limited presidential term in the 
Constitution proposed by the CPC49. Beginning in 2018 and intensifying in 2019, the US-China 
trade war is posing new challenges in domestic socio-economic situation. This “new normality” 
affects everyone’s daily life, directly or indirectly. Many people have experienced or heard of the 
 
49 Xinhua Net, “CPC proposes change on Chinese president's term in Constitution”, See  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/25/c_136998770.htm, [Accessed 2019-06-22]. 
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“disappearance” or “explosion” of some personal social media accounts. Some government 
officials or civil servants are required to use a state-issued App called “STUDY (XI) STRONG 
COUNTRY” every day. All the changes can be seen by people from every background and will 
be assessed and compared with conditions in previous periods. Therefore, it is fascinating to 
make use of the theme of transition in objective scenarios and to, investigate the subjective 
perceptions of ordinary people.  
In my interviews, I normally started with some casual talk about the worsening trade-war 
and invited the interviewees to evaluate its impact on their everyday lives. I asked how much 
they would feel like paying as a patriotic sacrifice if the state requested them to give something 
up in order to win the trade war. Further questions could then turn to the general social-
economic situations in China in past year or two years and how it differed from previous years, 
with varied questions regarding controversial social policies (such as the education inequality 
brought by the Hukou system, or the patriotic slogans all over the streets), social issues (such as 
the perceived loss of space for public speech, or the accusations of teachers from students for 
their “inappropriate speech” in class), and institutional reforms (such as the lifting of term-limits 
for the top leader, or anti-corruption moves and the foundation of National Supervisory 
Commission). In addition to interviewees’ personal reactions, I also paid attention to public 
opinion and public knowledge as they perceived them. 
The potential problem is that the collected interviews data are not distinctively “public” 
or “private” in the attitudes they represent. They are clearly not “public” since the interviews are 
all one-to-one conversations, so the interviewees can feel the intimacy of the dialogue and it’s 
possible for them to trust me as a friend. But nor are they purely “private,” in the sense that I as 
the interviewer was still counted as a semi-stranger, not in the inner circle for most of the 
interviewees. However, from a different perspective, this may have been useful for my analysis. 
By combining the interview data with observational data, I could actually construct a relatively 
smooth scale, which covered the observational data proper to a public space (online and offline), 
the interview data of the middle-distance interviewees and the observational data of very close 
friends/relatives.  
It should also be highlighted that, due to the accessibility problem, the interview evidence 
mainly came from the group of people who are more educated and lived or living in major cities. 
Even though I tried my best to reach samples with distinctive attributes and backgrounds, the 
analysis in the following sections has NO intention to offer any general inferences about the 
whole population. The discussion all focused on interpreting the accessible data from the 
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interviews and observations, deciphering the rationale of certain choices at individual level and 
revealing the heterogeneity of political compliance across different social groups within the range 
of available data. To better present the structure in the analysis part that was changed by the 
methodological modification and data features, I drew up Figure 16 below to clarify:  
 
Figure 16. Qualitative data collection on falsified compliance 
 
Different faces of compliance: the words in shadow 
In this section, I present the varied political compliance for different representatives of 
the state, deciphering the differentiated “distinctive faces” that people constructed and the words 
in shadow. 
Local or central government: differentiated compliance 
The differentiated niches of the different levels of government resulted in several 
observable phenomena of people’s political compliance. The first and most obvious one was that 
people tended to blame the local government for controversial policies while not questioning the 
ability and good faith of higher-ranking/central government. In other words, people generally do 
not avoid complaining or discussing controversial policies in public, but would be cautious over 
attribution. For instance, from late 2018 to early 2019, a new policy of “clearing and unifying the 
billboard format” was promoted in big cities and caused large-scale debates about the 
appropriateness of doing so. Many people argue that there is no need to keep the same format 
(e.g. font, size and background colour) for all the billboards in the street; it is unaesthetic and the 
government is too controlling. A propos of this controversial urban policy in an interview, one 
interviewee who works in Beijing said,  
“Sometimes I feel like it is the local government that tries to do something excessive to take 
credit and seek rewards from the upper government or the central government … The 
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‘unifying the billboard’ campaign was getting heated last winter. Our office building … used 
to be able to control the light outside the building… last year, the local government informed 
us that we need to remove the original lights and install a new set of lights and follow the 
unified rule for on and off. We used to show the shape of a Christmas tree in the Christmas 
period, but now we can only follow the general instructions.” (No. 11) 
Although intolerable for some, the policies relating to minor aspects of urban planning 
such as lighting and billboards seem no big deal to others. They can certainly tolerate the 
seemingly nonsensical regulations. Many people find it acceptable so long as the government can 
give explanations, even when a plan may affect local residents’ lives, such as the construction of 
a chemical plant, or changing the purchase constraints on the real estate market,  
“The government has its own difficulties; we (the people in general) should try to give 
sympathetic consideration to the mountainous problems the government has to solve. If the 
government gives us reasons (for policies that seem controversial), we should understand and 
give full support and not trouble them” (No. 16) 
Regarding the reason why a higher-ranking government, especially the central 
government, should be trusted more than the local government, some people reason by 
comparing the abilities of the officials.  
“The appearance of weird/strange policies is mostly like… the central government puts 
forward a certain project and the executive department and the local government are 
responsible for implementing it. However, the policies are very likely to be distorted or twisted 
in the process. The governance capacity of county level governments is very worrying; the local 
governmental officials do not possess enough knowledge and ability to capture the whole 
picture. But I think the cadres and leaders in upper government have higher education and 
merit, they can deal with the governance problems appropriately” (No. 9) 
Although the topics of government, governance and the state are not absolutely taboo in 
people’s daily conversation, the sensitivity of various representations of the government is 
varied. As discussed in the section on hypotheses, the sensitivity of political issues relating to the 
government, party, top leader gets more significance in moving to the right side of the scale. 
People are less likely (either from will or ability) to publicly discuss issues relating to the top 
leader, especially after the accession of Xi. For instance, the official accounts of state newspapers 
would close the comment area (which is in grey and no one can leave a comment under the post) 
when they posted a weibo (a twitter-like social platform) concerning the top leader. For topics 
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related to the party or central government, the official account will show only certain select 
comments with a positive content.  
The regulation of the party has become stricter since the large-scale anti-corruption 
campaign in late 2012. One former member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, two 
vice-chairmen of the military commission, one alleged successor in the 20th Party Congress and 
more than 200 provincial level officials are all in jail now due to this unexpectedly intense and 
protracted campaign. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the party regulations became 
more and more strict and now directly affect party members in many ways. One of my 
interviewees who works in a local government office talked about her personal experience and 
attitude: 
“I read the news quite often, but mainly focus on the items which are closely related to my 
work and life. In everyday work, we basically have quite limited autonomy with regard to 
policies… we just follow the guidance from the upper government. In recent years, especially 
after Xi’s reign, the workload has got substantially larger, working overtime is just as 
common as your meals every day. …I knew many cases of death by overwork [among] local 
government officials ... Everyone faces the heavy pressure of performance evaluation (by the 
upper government and the inspection group from central government) and strict regulation (of 
your behaviour). The inspection group from the central are just like the feudal prefectural 
governor (刺史, CI SHI) in the old days50 …I am aware that this is because of the start of 
the anti-corruption campaign and  ideological education is very necessary inside the party. 
We currently have many ‘red education’ modules, such as party history, new theory, new 
thoughts (proposed by Xi) and local governments organize a visit for us to the ‘red-base’51 
occasionally. I mean, in the current international and domestic situation, it’s necessary to 
have ideological unity (inside the party).” (No. 2) 
Party members who do not work in a government department can also identify changes 
in party regulations and have their own understanding of these topics. For instance, as one of the 
interviewees commented, 
“Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (when Xi was elected 
as the Party leader), the party regulation became a core issue, which is much stricter than in 
 
50 The “CI SHI” system, or “feudal prefectural governor” system was originally established in the Qin and Han 
dynasty (around 202 BC) and continued to be used (with brief interruptions) until the Republic of China period in 
the early 1900s.  
51 Such as Yan’an, Jing Gangshan, etc., where the CCP originated, or where some historical event has taken place.  
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previous periods. It starts from the cadres, with the campaign against the “four styles” 
(formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance). Then party members are encouraged 
to join the ‘two studies, one action’ (study the party regulations, study the leader’s speech, be 
a qualified party member). There is also the ‘STUDY (XI) STRONG COUNTRY’ 
app, so all party members are strongly encouraged to use it every day. In other words, the 
party regulations have been normalized …There are also campaigns for a youth league, 
called ‘one study, one action’ (study Xi’s thoughts, be a qualified youth league member). 
And we all know the interaction between the party and the youth league is very close. We 
can see that ideological education has moved to the forefront in our society. This is better—
the ruler can listen to the public and help to solve the problems at the grassroot. [I think] for 
a party that wants to rule such a big country with so many people, that it’s necessary and 
correct to unify its own members and regulate their behaviour” (No. 4) 
Another interviewee, who is a member of an ethnic minority and works in a university 
that gives professional training has similar observations to make in and outside the party: 
“My own experience, from school to work, is that the emphasis on ideology is stronger now. 
There used to be regulations for party members, but these were not strictly followed and no 
one would come along and accuse you directly. Now it’s getting formal … … In universities, 
we would also organize teachers to learn the new thoughts, or new regulations. The ideology 
is not just about communist or red ideology as you might think, it also includes our 
traditional concepts such as ‘kindness and love’, ‘respect’, ‘equality’ and so on. We also try 
to include patriotic ideas in our professional courses; [the attempt] is encouraged and 
promoted by our city government. For instance, we would introduce the idea of ‘glorious 
China’ in our textile courses and encourage students to include more traditional beauty in 
their work …The existence of such things must have its proper reasons” (No. 3) 
Although many people may genuinely find the Party regulations necessary and important, 
other voices mention the conspiracy feature of the anti-corruption campaign and the Party’s 
stringent inspection of its cadres. For instance, in informal conversations, people pass on gossip 
and hearsay, like “the anti-corruption campaign started with good intentions, but seems to have been used as a 
weapon that certain people used to pull their opponents out of the party.” The issues related to the party are, 
however, generally not very controversial and people find it easy to accept the changes as new 
governance tactics which will contribute to social well-being. After all, the party regulations 
reduce corruption and bring better regulated and better behaved cadres.  
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The top leader’s golden shield and defections regarding nationalist requests 
When we move from the party to the top leader (of the party and the state), the related 
issues are less likely to be discussed openly and discontents are less likely to be disclosed. One 
significant move of the top leader in recent years has been the removal of limits to the term a 
state president can serve. Following the previous constitutional regulations, the president could 
not serve more than two consecutive terms; this rule was obeyed from 1982 onwards. But in the 
2018 National People’s Congress conference this constitutional limit was lifted, with only 2 
delegates voting against and 3 abstaining out of 2964 votes52. This news attracted considerable 
attention overseas, because the move technically allowed a person to remain president for life. 
There were some domestic objections from a few intellectuals, though without anything being 
changed. What did ordinary people think? In the interviews, I asked, directly or indirectly, 
“Would you think that if a leader has enough merits, he/she shouldn’t be limited by term 
regulations”. In some interviews, when the conversation went well, I directly asked their feelings 
about Xi’s case and what their friends’ reactions had been back in 2018. Their reactions 
expressed similar passive sentiments. Although they did not agree with the political move of 
lifting the term limits, they were already trying to accept it and find excuses for it. 
“If you ask me, I would say we really need term limits for top leaders. Our society and 
history are all very different from the Western system. It’s difficult to change a ‘guanxi’ 
society and our reliance on the assumption of upright rulers. In such circumstances, if a 
leader stays in power for a long time, we might expect some flaws or wrong doings. Therefore, 
we need to make sure that when the time comes someone else will be there to fill the position 
... But currently, (regarding Xi’s move) we have no power to change the situation, although 
we can complain in private with our friends” (No. 3) 
Some interviewees resort to the reasoning that it is “pointless to reject”, or “doesn’t 
affect normal life” or “people are already finding life enough of a struggle” when they dislike 
strong reaction to political change. Some simply respond to such events with “we are not trained 
to express our opinions”, or “we should trust the central government”. Here are several 
examples of interviewees’ replies regarding the term limit change: 
“I feel like the change of term limit is just a political game. To be fair, whether it changes or 
not does not make much difference. We are a one-party state, the power and the rule of the 
 
52 BBC News, 2018-03-11, “China’s Xi allowed to remain ‘president for life’ as term limits removed”, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-43361276 [Accessed 2019-06-07] 
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party chairman is not under the control of any other authority … and for people in general, 
well, we don’t really do anything about it, right? If you can’t fight why don’t just accept it? I 
can see it (the party) is moving forward, progressing…” (No. 9) 
“I was really worried when I heard about the (term limit) change. However, when I 
mentioned it to my colleagues, they were, like, not anxious at all. They fell like it had 
nothing to do with their lives, whoever was in that position didn’t matter at all. If it’s 
something directly related to their own interests, they might complain, very probably without 
doing anything about it. Maybe it’s because we were educated to avoid showing our own 
views when we were young. We can’t parade or strike like capitalist countries; we can’t 
unleash our anger” (No. 11) 
“The term-limit thing, to be fair, is something you can’t change now. People are already 
thinking how to adjust themselves to it. We don’t really have much choice. If we did, we 
might not be like this; but we don’t. Most people feel like the change has no direct impact on 
our income and living conditions … currently the cake is large enough for almost everyone 
[to share], so the resentment is not strong. Even if the state censored most of the political 
news, people might still feel like events had no impact on their own career. Honestly, I would 
say that people are very tolerant about issues related to politics.” (No. 5) 
“It’s useless [to try to change it]. I would say, maybe it [the changed term limit] is for the 
better development of the country. We [ordinary people] should do whatever we can and not 
make troubles to the state and society … the term limit change was probably a group 
decision [by all the central leaders] and we should fully understand and trust them. If anyone 
has other [different] views, it would be pointless [to voice them] and might obstruct public 
order” (No. 4) 
It seems as though the top leader has a golden shield, which excludes any criticism from 
the public. Even in private, most of the interviewees choose without much complaint to swallow 
their worries and discontents over the changed term limit. Below, in later sections, I discuss 
further their defence of the political apathy in themselves and their circle in response to their 
weak political efficacy and nationalist ideology.  
But, if the public are tolerant of undesired political moves by the leader and still willing 
to find excuses for it, would things change if they were asked to bear some personal cost in order 
to promote the state’s interests? In addition to people’s direct attitudes to the government, I 
asked questions about interest exchange by taking advantage of the ongoing trade war between 
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the US and China53 to see if they were willing to accept an individual burden in order to win the 
trade war. Most of the interviewees said they did not personally feel any direct influence of the 
trade war (such as domestic inflation, unemployment, or difficulties in international 
communication). But some mentioned that they had friends working in a factory where the trade 
war had reduced the number of overseas orders. One interviewee who works for the press said 
that the reason why many people are not aware of the effect and the danger of the trade war is 
the information control: 
“Now we are having the trade war and the whole economy is slowing down, everyone is 
stressed out. Like Huawei, directly hit by the conflict. But the central state doesn’t allow 
much news reporting on the trade war issue—well, maybe some nationalist articles are 
allowed. I personally feel that the issue is actually quite serious, many companies are laying 
off employees, just it’s not reported publicly. Any issue, whether it’s a social, political or 
simply economic issue, if it has a chance of sparking wide public discussion is not allowed to 
be reported nowadays” (No. 13)  
Whether directly perceived or not, if the central government encouraged individuals to 
bear more costs (in the form of more taxes, inflation, and so on, converting into income 
reduction), would they agree to accept or not, and why? Some would find it acceptable to bear 
some burdens if it was for the general good: 
“(The trade war) doesn’t have much effect at the personal level. Although, emotionally, you 
will feel like it’s being at war and we should stand together and stay strong. In reality you 
can’t really measure any influence, like, our school still have its normal exchange programme 
with US schools. The price of daily goods may go up slightly, but it’s really small and you 
can’t perceive it, to be honest. If one day the state calls everyone to bear the cost (of the trade 
war), I would probably accept a maximum reduction of 5%~10% income. Anything more 
would affect my personal life. Although, if we really had to bear more costs more than that, I 
think maybe I would have to accept it. I mean, well, for most people, we just let our 
complaints loose when we’re at home and in practice you have to bear the cost anyway. Most 
people don’t really have a choice, or don’t have the capital to make choices” (No. 3) 
Some interviewees do not find the costs problematic at the individual level, since very 
few rational discussions are heard: 
 
53 Swanson, Ana, 2018-07-05. “Trump’s Trade War With China Is Officially Underway”. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html, [Accessed 2019-06-07] 
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“Is the trade war really because China is doing better than the US now? I only have some 
ideas about the trade war because our company invited a lawyer to show us the changed 
regulations and further sections that we needed to pay attention to. Our colleagues were kind 
of patriotic for a bit, but just complained a little bit and didn’t discuss it too much ... We 
[work for] a Japanese company, so can’t really do much or say much about the stand. Our 
colleagues do not really consciously care about it. But if you asked them to bear some costs, 
they might have no objection.” (No. 11) 
Other interviewees would refuse to make a patriotic sacrifice proposed by the state: 
“Our friends may discuss the trade war a bit about when we get together for dinner or 
something. But they mostly focus on the things that directly relate to everyday life …generally 
speaking, it [the trade war] is not a good thing… About the request to bear an individual 
level cost, I would refuse. Why should I? I really don’t like this grand storytelling. It [the 
trade war] is not a war about justice or injustice—it’s just a Party action. I just don’t like 
the big idea of letting state or country influence my personal life … I mean, I would be 
willing to devote myself or make a sacrifice, but I just don’t want to do this for any big, 
macro concept. I hope we can make judgements from an objective and fair angle, not just 
some emotional and ideological perspective (calling for sacrifice) …Other people in the 
society, I would say, people in a different social stratum or age group may have different 
degrees of acceptance of nationalist requests, or ideological requests. Maybe older people may 
be easily motivated, but I don’t think the younger generation will…” (No. 10) 
Another example of a refusal to take on an individual burden for the trade war insists 
that no one should bear the cost because the trade war is merely a typical political game: 
“[I think] no one is willing to bear the cost. I personally wouldn’t ... Why would anyone do 
so? It [the trade war] is caused by certain politicians. There shouldn’t be any sacrifice or cost 
at the individual level” (No. 8) 
Comparing people’s attitudes and reasoning regarding the top leader’s controversial 
actions and a nationalist request that might directly damage someone’s personal interests, it can 
be identified that people are cautious about complaining over political issues that relate to core 
politics, especially when the issues do not directly affect their benefits. However, a nationalist 
request that might bring about changes in personal living is more likely to be rejected, even 
though the topic itself is still not publicly debatable.   
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Face on/off: a smooth transformation 
Throughout this research, I identify the falsification of compliance as a distinguishable 
difference between people’s public support and private support. The change from public face to 
private face, however, does not seem from the interview evidence very distinctive. There are 
complaints that people are not allowed to publicly discuss or spread certain opinions. But the 
degrees of falsification differ according to whether the issue directly relates to the speaker’s life, 
whether the issue is sensitive or not and which level of authority the issue refers to. As common 
sense would suggest, people do not hesitate to reveal their true discontent regarding local 
authorities. People may be cautious when discussing in public issues relating to the central 
government, the Party and the top leader, while in private they would be honest. From the 
evidence above it is clear that people’s public faces are not the same as their private faces. But   
there is no clear line between these faces and people themselves may not necessarily be aware of 
the difference.  
One interviewee reflected on whether or not to publicly present discontent: 
“About discontent, normally people are not willing to discuss it in public. Mostly because, if 
you don’t have a better solution, or a constructive suggestion, I would rather not talk about it 
with total strangers. … Don’t make a fuss. If you simply want to unleash your emotions, 
it’s pointless and will not help to solve the problem. Moreover, it might deepen the social 
conflicts, or social divisions. And make it difficult for the government to work” (No. 17) 
Some close friends expressed their views of people’s discontent and the boundary 
between expressing it publicly and not: 
“In my opinion, in today’s China, you can discuss your discontent in public, regarding 
politics, the government, the party or any other authority. But don’t touch historical issues 
such as June 4th, or issues relating to the state’s fate, like classified topics. If you do, it might 
be identified as treason; people might treat you as a traitor to the country.” (No. 19) 
Another obvious feature when people talk about politics, in many public discussions and 
even in private conversations, is that people are very keen to see things from the position of the 
governor and tend to explain/consider issues from his standpoint. For instance, one friend’s 
view of ideological education runs:  
“I would say, everyone should take care of themselves, live their own life. Don’t make 
trouble for the state or the government … When the international and domestic situation 
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gets tough and tense, like the trade war, it’s totally necessary to emphasise the ideological 
education from the state’s point of view. Or you might say we need special policies in special 
times” (No. 21) 
The smooth transformation of people’s public and private attitudes made it difficult to 
capture the moment when people begin to hide their true discontent intentionally. However, this 
observation enriches the theoretical discussion of falsified compliance and constructed political 
attitudes by highlighting the elusiveness of varied compliance and the way in which the 
cautiousness of political sensitivity is embedded in daily life. In later sections, I investigate 
further how people manage the discontinuity (and continuity) between different faces. 
The dual track of political knowledge 
In addition to the varied attitudes to different state representatives, another field in 
which people may have perceptions in private which are unlike their public discourse is political 
knowledge. People’s social knowledge is shaped by various agents. School, family, public 
education and past experiences are all effective in establishing or changing the way people 
perceive, describe and understand their situation. How, then, do people think about the shaping 
agents of their knowledge? Moreover, is there any possible difference between their public 
knowledge and private knowledge?  
Being led by the nose? Sure, I know  
The public media have been recognized as main sources in shaping people’s knowledge, 
preferences and desires. As noted in the literature review, authoritarian and communist countries 
rely heavily on ideological legitimation, through tactics such as knowledge construction and 
media censorship. Chapters 3 and 4 also elaborated on the content of knowledge construction in 
official propaganda and the effect of the media on individuals’ welfare preferences. The question 
then arises, are people themselves aware of the power of the official media in shaping their 
political attitudes? And do they find information censorship tolerable or not? 
The interview data along with observational data show that people do not falsify their 
acknowledgement of the socially constructive nature of official propaganda. They acknowledge 
the shaping power of official propaganda and are also aware of the possibility of the state to use 
biased discourse. However, they would argue that discourse construction is a necessary to 
maintain the rule of the authority.  
“The state is very cautious about changes in public opinion. You can’t mention certain issues 
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in public, for sure …The whole propaganda system, or the official voice is a bit harsh now, I 
admit, kind of leaning to the left. But I would also say that 80% of the opinions that were 
censored or deleted had inappropriate content, or twisted the facts. From the viewpoint of the 
government, our government is led by the party, no question, so when it feels like its interest 
is harmed, it will surely take action, like using propaganda, or just censoring wrong opinions 
... As individuals, we all only so much energy every day, so we would definitely be influenced 
by the official discourse” (No. 4) 
“I think most people are quite obedient in public and do not publicly criticize the authorities, 
no matter which social stratum you come from, upper level or lower level … I think we all 
have similar perception of the nature of politics. It’s all about governance and rule. So, it’s 
natural that the official media will only say good things about the country. I totally 
understand that sometimes the [official] media will avoid tackling social or political issues 
head on” (No. 1) 
One press editor who had worked for several commercial presses in China for 10 years 
also admitted that the educative nature of the public press has never changed: 
“We all know that the press in China is nothing but propaganda. Even the commercial 
press is just some platform that puts forward official decisions or policies. Well … several 
years ago, there was still some space, but now we can feel it getting tighter and tighter. But no 
matter whether it was years ago or yesterday, the nature of the press in our socio-political 
scenario has never changed. It’s beyond question a tool for the state to manage its 
governance” (No. 13) 
Some attribute the necessity of news control to the weakness of the Chinese population, 
arguing that the state needs to lead the trend and public opinion in order to keep society moving 
forward. 
“There are some things the government prefers us not to know. I think it might be because 
Chinese people are not intelligent enough to digest some information properly. There are 
many social conflicts in our society, so people are quite easily led by inappropriate opinions 
… About the official propaganda, I think the starting point must be good and the 
intentions are good. I believe the leaders still want to serve the people and the think tanks 
are not dumb, they definitely know how to govern the country. In many cases we may see the 
emotions being set above the rationale. But we all understand that we are a huge country 
with 1.4 billion people, that is very difficult to govern. We have a very complex population 
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structure so every move of the government needs to be very cautious … I know there are 
historical cases that the party does not want to mention or explain, but they have no effect on 
our domestic development …When we get strong, all our actions and choices will be 
understood [by the world].” (No. 15) 
It’s quite common for people to be aware of the problem of information control while 
also have very limited optimism about other approaches of obtaining information due to the 
limited freedom of expression. One interviewee who had experienced the pre-reform period 
compared the current information control with former times: 
“Currently the control on free speech is quite tight. But the sky won’t fall if you let people 
say something. Now I know there are some local platforms, if you say ‘too much’, your post 
will be censored. The situation is somehow similar to that in Mao’s time. Only good and 
positive things can be publicly discussed, only things that are beneficial to the state and the 
party …other approaches exist (if you want to solve problems other than resorting to the 
press), for instance, you can write to a government office or something of the kind, but it 
won’t help much” (No. 12) 
From the interview evidence and observational evidence on the social media, people are 
aware of the shaping power of official propaganda and the constructed official discourse when 
they describe the situation. However, many accept that they are thus influenced and seem not 
too worried about the extensive role of the state. How is this discontinuity sustainable for them? 
Below, I discuss further people’s passive and seemingly contradictory attitudes in the section on 
the mechanism. 
Socialist? or Capitalist? And why is a market necessary? 
Even though China has experienced so many reforms in the short period since 1978, 
whether politically, socially or economically, the official discourse has been quite consistent 
regarding the institutional nature of the state. The public description of the political system is still 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” and the economic system remains a socialist market 
economy. However, as many scholars have identified, the economic system in China is more like 
state capitalism (Philip CC Huang, 2012; Naughton & Tsai, 2015) and the so-called “socialist” 
structure has largely been changed since the reform. So how does the general population 
interpret the ideological position and the nature of the current economic system in China? Is 
private knowledge consistent with or variance with the public discourse? One of the interviewees 
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who works in a private equity company expressed concerns about the disjunction between the 
perceived situation and the public discourse: 
“In our current (economic) system, I think the state of affairs and the public propaganda 
don’t match. The state-owned economy serves political ends, but does nothing to improve the 
market efficiency … Some people admire the state’s capacity to use collective resources to 
solve big problems. I certainly don’t doubt it but I’m not quite convinced. 
 [Would you agree that different kinds of market economy and governance rationale exist?]  
I don’t think so. I know many people argue that there are different forms of market 
economy, such as the ones with Chinese characteristics. I don’t agree. There is one single 
concept of a market economy and there is only one governance rationale with respective to it, 
which consists of the market, democracy and the rule of law. If the state claims that it is 
serving the interests of the people, the only object of people’s interest is to have a living 
standard comparable to that in the developed countries … A market economy and the rule 
of law are indispensable. I agree there are local scenarios for each country. We all have our 
peculiarities and should definitely try to find our own path. But what I was talking about is 
the ideal type, the ‘should be’ type, the one we all want to reach in the end” (No. 8) 
Unlike the view from a respondent that “there is only one type of governance rationale”, 
I more commonly noted opinions (in public and in private) that emphasised the special situation 
in China and the country’s own institutional rationale with Chinese characteristics. For instance, 
one interviewee found it rational to pay attention to tradition and history in discourse about 
possible institutional routes for the state:  
“I think the cleverest people are among the government officials. In their minds, the so-called 
capitalist-socialist division is just a conceptual classification. No matter what the form of the 
politics, the ultimate aim is to rule. The state is essentially a force machine and the nature of 
human beings is selfish. So, they must have institutions that can rule the population. 
Different countries have their different culture and history. The Chinese, or Asian culture is 
so different from those in Europe and North America. Europeans have the accumulated 
political culture of democratic decision-making, but we have a long history of one-man 
decision-making, or dictatorship, as some might call it. I would personally support a 
parliamentary system if I could choose, but I would not prefer a parliamentary system which 
only had the format and lacked the spirit. Look how Taiwan has gone. We have a quite 
different history and culture and communication with other countries and systems will surely 
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help us to find a way that suits us” (No. 9) 
Another interviewee made a similar judgement when discussing leftist or rightist 
positions in the politico-economic spectrum and their indication of the direction that economic 
reform would take in China:  
“I would say, we are in a situation where it doesn’t matter whether its leftist or rightist, so 
long as it’s useful. In recent years we see clearly that the ‘the state enterprises advance, the 
private sector retreated’, which is definitely a left turn in the Chinese context …We have a 
system called socialism with Chinese characteristics, which literally means that whatever is 
useful and effective for the authority’s rule can be employed by the authority—without 
completely crashing the economy, society and people’s lives, surely. From my point of view, the 
left-right argument doesn’t really matter, and this is also consistent with my observation of 
the society” (No. 13) 
From these two sample opinions, we can identify a pragmatic logic similar to that in 
political compliance towards the state’s representatives. Constitutional change doesn’t matter, 
information restriction doesn’t matter, ideology position doesn’t matter, as long as they are 
useful to the society and development. In the following analysis, I discuss this feature further and 
show how it shapes the political culture in China. More importantly, I show how it affects 
people’s choices in everyday life, shapes the scenario of political participation and relates to the 
governmentality of the state. 
In addition to the pragmatic logic, the crisis of democracy in recent years in fact caused 
confusion for many people who used to firmly doubt the official discourse and believe that 
China should aim to have democratic politics. As one interviewee said: 
“In the old days when our country was still struggling for food, we may have been quite lost 
about the direction of the political reform. Recently, we have gained some knowledge of a 
political way out. However, watching how the US and the EU has got on lately, I’m not 
really sure if we want to follow in their footsteps any more …quite disappointed about 
democracy, to be honest” (No. 11) 
Mitigating cognitive dissonance or living with it? 
One noticeable feature of individuals’ political attitudes from the examples above is that 
they are full of conflict. It seems that people recognise the misbehaviour of the authority, but 
also assume that it has kind intentions; some are aware of and feel uncomfortable about the 
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heavy pressure of party regulations and performance evaluations, but still find it necessary to 
have the rules tightened. Interviewees sometimes noted that it is unacceptable to ask someone to 
check on a teacher’s talk in class, while also agreeing with the idea that they “would rather go 
further ‘left’ than further  ‘right’”; and some people argued that the government stretched its 
hand too far into the society/market, while complaining about the government’s inaction 
regarding the high cost of housing. 
Psychological studies note that people tend to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1962). However, as Tim Kuran identified in his work on preference falsification, “the models 
that an individual applies to an issue need not be mutually consistent. A person may subscribe to 
conflicting models, for instance, a ‘big government’ model that justifies lower taxes together with 
an ‘educational crisis’ model that calls for more government services.” (Kuran, 1997, p. 159) In 
most cases, individuals are leaning to use a coherent supermodel consolidated from multiple 
explanatory models. People may not be aware of the costs of inconsistency between distinctive 
models, so long as these models “yield reasonably satisfactory choices and generate fairly 
accurate predictions” (Kuran, 1997, p. 179). 
In China’s case, one formula that individuals use to justify seemingly controversial 
statecraft and public discourses which are not consistent with personal knowledge is: “It’s common 
in every country to find the state needing to rule the population in many areas. [Countries merely differ in specific 
actions, but essentially, we are the same” and “It’s all for the state’s governance, all about legitimacy”. By 
dissolving the division between the role of the state and of society and seeing things with the 
ruler’s eyes, individuals can find ways of living with the inconsistency in their minds. At the same 
time, a smooth change between the political attitudes belonging to different faces allows 
individuals a little space in which to buffer themselves from the external shocks that may 
challenge their original beliefs.  
To briefly sum up the discussions in this section, falsified compliance does exist among 
the Chinese regarding the current political system and the authorities, but it is a mixture of 
intentional falsification and cognitive dissonance. In the following sections, I explore the 
mechanisms of intentional or unconsciousness “hidden words”. 
Possible sources and mechanisms 
The reason why people assume different faces in public and in private and construct a 
public preference for public display, has been examined by scholars from different areas of social 
science. Explanations such as fear of punishment, desire for reward, ignorance of the general 
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opinion, or the motivation of fitting in have been identified separately or simultaneously. In 
authoritarian regimes, the mechanism of compliance as falsified by the general public can be 
explained similarly, but has some specific features. For instance, in China’s case, many people 
who work in the public sector receive more respect from the society and treat this reputation as 
a reward from the Party, thus creating more loyalty. Rewards for them can either conduce to the   
individual’s self-interest such as living standards, or take the form of a long-term payback which 
can be extracted from the state’s stability and development. Some scholars argue that socialist 
education has a strong influence on the individual’s action preference to express loyalty and 
conceal discontent. My interview evidence, combined with the observational data, shows that the 
mechanisms in people’s choosing to falsify their public compliance are complicated, intertwined 
and sometimes contradictory of each other. 
Persistence of ideologies and fear 
Persistence of social knowledge and historical events 
People’s actions or preferences are strongly directed by the social norms and their past 
education. Their knowledge about the society and the desired social behaviours that people have 
encountered in the past are crucial motives of their choices. In understanding Chinese people’s 
preference for political participation and political attitudes, we should address the core features 
of its political culture. The traditional Chinese culture, which is selectively promoted by the state, 
emphasises concepts such as the “middle course” (zhongyong, 中庸), “tolerance” (rongren, 容忍) 
and “ethics” (daode, 道德). These notions can still be identified in today’s Chinese politics. For 
instance, “LI” (礼) in traditional political culture is a layered and societal concept. It can be 
interpreted as ethics, manners and rules; it can only be established when the whole society 
accepts and obeys it. Therefore, it nurtures the culture of collectiveness, in which the community 
rather than the individual is treated as the ultimate principle of achievement. All individuals can 
realize their personal value only when they have fulfilled the society’s requirements. With such 
cultural incentives, collectiveness and conservatism are prevalent in China’s contemporary 
political culture.   
The consistency of Chinese history for more than 3000 years also leads to the 
phenomenon that people still (consciously or unconsciously) use concepts or terms from 
Chinese history to describe the conditions or institutions in the contemporary world. One 
example is the term “CI SHI,” which was used by one interviewee to describe an inspection 
group from the central government during the anti-corruption campaign period (explained in 
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footnote 53). The idea of a “crown prince” that is used to refer to the successor of a top leader is 
also a concept from the period of monarchy. These terms were attached to a systematic “ruler 
and ruled” ideology. Although people often use them unconsciously, they still indicate the 
enduring shadow of admiration of authority and obedience to it. 
Even though the CCP came to the fore by breaking the chain of (worthless) traditional 
culture and promoting the revolutionary spirit, cases of the state’s promotion of traditional 
values so as to maintain its authority have actually become very common in recent years. One 
example is the concept of the “Harmonious Society”, which was introduced by the then 
president Hu Jintao in his ideology, or “thoughts”, during the “Scientific Development Concept” 
around the mid-2000s, before being written into the constitution in the National People's 
Congress Conference of 2005. The idea of a “harmonious society” (which strongly discourages 
any attempts by the public to “make a fuss/trouble”) was a response to the increasing outbreaks 
of social unrest in the early 2000s due to economic inequality and the flaws and injustice of 
government actions. Ironically, over the years, the notion of “Harmonious Society” has 
developed into a substitute for “stability at all costs,” and what was “harmonized” actually 
referred to what had been censored on the online platforms. In Xi’s presidency, the central 
authority also was in favour of “enhancing the national cultural heritage… and building up our 
cultural confidence”54. As indicated above, borrowing the ideas from traditional culture also 
magnifies the structural features behind it. It reveals the way that the authority imagines its 
population and the approach it finds (thinks) most appropriate for persuading the public. 
Some attributed compliance falsification to the socialist education. As one interviewee 
remarked, “I don’t think the public choice of staying silent comes from the traditional culture; 
it’s implanted in the education we’ve received through the past 70 years.” Other qualitative 
evidence from interviews also confirms that such core concepts as “people’s democratic 
dictatorship”, “leadership core55” and “maintaining social stability” are unconsciously accepted 
and used in daily dialogue. Existing studies also confirm that the part played by education (such 
as the high school politics curriculum) shapes students’ political attitudes (Cantoni, Chen, Yang, 
Yuchtman, & Zhang, 2017). The socialist education leads to a belief in collectivism and 
meritocracy and dismisses personal appeals and universal citizenship.  
 
54 A related theoretical article on the official website is Jing, Qi, Cui, Xiantao, “Inheriting and promoting traditional 
culture”, 2015-07-22,  http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0722/c83859-27343299.html, [Accessed 2019-06-01] 
55 A related article and explanation is “Xi Jinping becomes ‘core’ leader of China”, 2016-10-27, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/xi-jinping-becomes-core-leader-of-china, [Accessed 2019-06-
01] 
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In spite of the ideologies, social memories brought by core historical events also shape 
the population’s political preference in the long term. In his work Kuran uses a thought 
experiment to reveal that small events can be responsible for the establishment of a particular 
equilibrium of public opinion and are not averaged out over time (Kuran, 1997, p. 108). 
Moreover, once an event has tipped public opinion toward one equilibrium or another, 
subsequent events do not necessarily weaken its impact. In China’s case, there are many specific 
actions from the revolutionary period are still carried out at present, such as reporting speech 
that one dislikes to higher-level supervisors (such as the upper government, or the school, or the 
administrator of the online forum). Other past events, such as the cultural revolution or the June 
4th movement, become terms that cannot be mentioned either in public or in private 
conversation. 
No matter whether the cautiousness of political preference comes from the traditional 
political culture, the socialist education, or past events, once the intentional concealment of 
certain individual attitudes (or the meticulous avoidance of certain topics) is established, the 
interaction of certain preference with everyday rituals form a circle that constantly reinforces 
itself in the long run. I discuss this “circle” again in the section on “ideological involution”.  
Censored voices and the fear of punishment 
In addition to the pressure brought by social knowledge and historical events, external 
pressure from state coercion and censorship is also frequently observed in my qualitative 
evidence. For instance, the pressure on public speech from early 2019 had accelerated, as many 
interviewees identified from their own experience: 
“Recently many public accounts on Wechat have been blocked, sometimes you just don’t 
know why and where you have stirred up a sensitive point in your words” (No. 6)  
“There are many restrictions online, like certain topics, issues, certain people and even 
certain dates. It feels like most people are quite afraid to say something meaningful … If you 
do [have a serious discussion] your post will probably be censored or your account will be 
blocked. We all treasure the Weibo or Wechat accounts which we devoted much effort to 
maintain, so after several attempts, everyone gets to be docile in their behaviour” (No. 5) 
One interviewee told me of the everyday regulations on an editor for a commercial press: 
“On average I would receive about 30 messages or emails [from the relevant supervision 
departments] with instructions on what I should or shouldn’t do. It’s regulations on every 
hand. Sometimes the instructions can refer in detail to the words, or phrase corrections in the 
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articles … We have a massive bureaucracy which specialises in media management. If you 
want to join the bureaucracy you need to pass the proper exam …I know most of the 
officials in the system genuinely agree on the idea that the propaganda is the tool for the 
ruler” (No. 13) 
When I asked, “How does press, like your institution, find the line between publishable 
and unpublishable issues”, he replied:  
“…through careful trying and summarising the existing cases. Like recently one self-media 
site got censored on the topic of the ‘trade war’. After communication, we found that it was 
because they had directly cited a report from the New York Times. So we realized that even 
on the most heated topic, we are not expected to cite the foreign press directly. It would be 
safer to cite official reports in that case”  
Another interviewee who works for a new media institution faced similar supervision 
from the government in the selection of content.  
“This year we have a special column which is designed to deliver one poem every day to our 
audience, called the “poem calendar”. On June 4th, we published a poem entitled ‘There isn’t 
a day in our life’. We didn’t initially intend to signal a memorial or anything special and we 
didn’t even realize the title had some relevance for this special day. But soon after it was 
published on our website, I received a call from our leader and got reproved for not being 
careful enough. I didn’t get a chance to explain … We can’t control people’s interpretation 
though …The selection of topics needs extra care when it relates to issues of the party, 
minorities and religions. … Strict external inspection [by the government] surely leads to 
stricter self-censorship” (No. 10) 
The control on information has considerable impact on people’s public knowledge about 
current society and shapes people’ attitudes in the form of the attitude desired and expected by 
the authority. For instance, one event in June 2019 that has attracted the headlines in media all 
over the world is the anti-extradition bill protests in Hong Kong56. The protest is the most 
significant political protest since the umbrella movement in 2014; nearly two million people 
turned out to demonstrate. However, all information about this protest was blocked in mainland 
China. One of my interviewees who went to school in Hong Kong and now works in Beijing 
 
56 “Hong Kong democrats urge leader Carrie Lam to drop extradition law plans entirely and resign; Sunday protest 
to proceed”. Hong Kong Free Press. 2019-06-15. https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/15/hong-kong-democrats-
urge-leader-carrie-lam-drop-extradition-law-plans-entirely-resign-sunday-protest-proceed/, [Accessed 2019-06-16]. 
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told me that, even though she personally uses VPN sometimes to access to external news, she 
learned about the massive protest only after several days. Until then, most of her colleagues still 
had no idea what was going on in Hong Kong.  
“To be honest, even I, who still have the knowledge and ability to (occasionally) climb the 
wall (the great firewall57) and get access to the external world, was a day or two late in 
discovering the situation in Hong Kong. There hasn’t been a single mention of Hong Kong in 
the mainland’s social media” (No. 11) 
Several days after the protest, the official government account issued a statement which 
identified the nature of the protest in Hong Kong as a “riot” and supported the Hong Kong 
government’s “sensible treatment”. The statement tells a one-sided story of the Hong Kong 
movement and leaves no space for argument or defence. My interviewee told me that after she 
read news and reports of Hong Kong’s protest, she tried to explain the complexity of the Hong 
Kong issue and the appeals of the Hong Kong people to her colleagues and they seemed to be 
very open to this information and recognized that the protest was not simply the riot that the 
central authority had claimed. But she still cannot discuss these issues openly online.  
“Recently bloggers have complained of the many rules about public discussions and the many 
topics/issues are not allowed to be discussed. Feels like the restriction has tightened up and 
the list of sensitive words is somehow extended.” 
Not everyone feels this pressure, however. Some voices still argue “I don’t think that the 
so-called pressure on free speech will affect daily life too much; most of the pressure still comes 
from the struggle to live without overspending in this competitive society.” I discuss such ideas 
in the following part to show how censorship shapes public choices and actions.  
Ignorance, apathy and collective conservatism 
In spite of the structural factors that may shape or constrain people’s choices to express 
opinions, or signal their preferences, there are many mechanisms that relate to internal reasons 
on the personal level58. For instance, when the interviewees were asked why they would not say 
something about the issues that they felt to be unfair, they would reply “For what?” and “What 
would be the point? It won’t change anything”. Problems such as weak political efficacy, or sometimes 
 
57 For more information on the Great Firewall in China’s Internet Blocking, see (Ensafi, Winter, Mueen, & Crandall, 
2015; M. E. Roberts, 2018). 
58 The structural factors and the personal level factors are surely correlated in many ways. Here I make no causal 
inferences or comparisons between different mechanisms, but present a description of some observable factors. 
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incorrect evaluations, in the general view, also lead to reluctant political expression and further 
appeals for social change.  
Low efficacy and political apathy 
Political apathy normally refers to a situation where individuals lack interest in 
participating in political activities. In China’s case, many interviewees mention the scenario that 
people are not interested even in talking about social or political issues.  
“In my current working environment, in which most of my colleagues have a background in 
science education, most of them have no clue about the social or political issues. They kind of 
live in their own small space, and will even blame you for not ‘having your feet on the 
ground’ if you bring up some socio-economic topics. They basically care about their own lives, 
just trivial things really.” (No. 3) 
Why would this happen? The unaccountability of the authority regarding social issues 
tends to weaken the intention to take part in politics. The weakened external efficacy interacts 
with and reduces people’s internal political efficacy. For instance, one interviewee recalled the 
days when many people still hoped to participate (in whatever forms) so as to push the 
government or policy to change and when disappointment gradually led to silence: 
“In the past, like 10 years ago, people still believed that crowds of onlookers could somehow 
change society, or China’s politics someday. The internet provided a great opportunity for 
everyone to pay attention to and support people who were miles away when they were 
suffering injustice. The logic was, crowd attention can bring pressure on the authority and 
force them to make changes. But now it’s totally useless. You can’t change anything. 
Meanwhile, everyone is so pre-occupied by the struggles in their own lives, they barely have 
enough energy to really engage in social issues. It really takes time, energy and passion and 
watching things end inconclusively definitely kills the crowd’s enthusiasm” (No. 6) 
One radical explanation that I received regarding the public’s weak political efficacy is 
that ordinary people are not capable of discussing the political issues seriously and we should 
trust the wisdom of the government.  
“Things are much more complicated than we thought. For instance, for the events of June 4th, 
there has been much criticism at home and abroad. Some people ask why the government 
doesn’t just make the archives public and then all the criticism and puzzles will be clear. I 
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would say, the Zhongnanhai59 must have thought about this solution and they definitely have 
a reason for not choosing to do so. There are many things we ordinary people have no clue 
about, so we can’t really comment on them” (No. 4) 
Although it seems as if most people care nothing about the political issues, some studies 
mention that the Chinese make a cult of political rumours (H. Huang, 2017). Many local websites 
gossip about such things as political factions and conflicts, the direction of international or 
domestic policies and even the personal lives of government leaders. However, one comment 
from a friend in a private conversation denies the role of these rumours in Chinese politics: 
“All this gossip and rumour is just natter. China’s politics is 100% closed-door politics.” 
(N. 23) 
I’m all right, Jack 
In addition to the changes in political efficacy, the benefit that each person has received 
or perceived also determines his or her chosen attitudes. Hence, another common reason for not 
discussing political issues is that some people feel that life is much better now and there is no 
need to change the current system further or criticize the politics. The self-interest to which this 
refers is not some dramatic benefit from the current system, but a simple and everyday 
convenience that one may derive from interaction with current system. 
“I think our country is doing very well lately, especially since the Xi’s rule. In the old days, 
we had an old version of ‘official accountability’, but it turned out to be nothing but swagger 
and exaggeration. The new version nowadays is more solid. Each level of government takes 
its role and the general secretary takes full responsibility. Any officials who are not doing 
their get punished. For example, in the past when you wanted to be reimbursed from the 
health insurance scheme, you had to go through many offices and counters. Now the whole 
process is simplified and the officers are friendly to our patients …This is what I call 
satisfaction. I definitely thank the government and the Party for that” (No. 12) 
“My experience is, the payment for scientists nowadays is far better. Like the 
decentralization of the funding management, we enjoy more space to maximize the use of 
project funding. Our research also has nothing to do with politics or society, so why would I 
care about the change in the term limit, or Hong Kong issues?” (No. 27) 
 
59 Current residence of the top leaders of the Party and central government (such as Central Politburo Standing 
Committee members). 
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The trifling but recurring benefits that individuals receive from the current system 
somehow disguises the risks they might incur from the inefficiency of the society as a whole. 
These benefits also divert people from serious reflection on the state-individual relationship. 
Personalized longitudinal comparison sometimes shoulders aside the horizontal and societal 
comparisons with other disadvantaged groups, especially when the information is asymmetric 
and controlled by the state. In other words, it tends to lead to pluralistic ignorance in the society. 
Pluralistic ignorance: the population is just too diverse to tell 
If individuals feel personally unable to make a difference, or if personal interest is not 
affected, how do they imagine other people’s attitudes? Would they perceive potential discontent 
from their peers? As I explained in the theoretical discussion, social psychology scholars 
identified a bias in group opinion whereby the group members mistakenly assume that the 
general group accepts a norm even though most of the group members privately reject it. 
Pluralistic ignorance, therefore, sums up the scenario in which no one in the population believes, 
while everyone thinks that all the others believe. Kuran also argued that the fear inside 
individuals would lead to pluralistic ignorance, since the multitudes who objected to communism 
did not know how widely their resentment was shared (Kuran, 1997). “Even if they could sense 
the repressed discontent of their conformist relatives and close friends or observe the hardships 
in the lives of their fellow citizen, they lacked reliable information on how many of their fellow 
citizens favoured radical political change” (Kuran, 1997, p. 125). The interview data verified part 
of the mechanism of “unknowing” other’s private opinions. Some of my interviewees personally 
realized the problems of the current system, but felt that the other people in the community 
would certainly support the regime at whatever cost. For instance: 
“If you ask me, I really think most people, especially the ones who suffered a lot in former 
times, like farmers and rural residents, sincerely support the government. And it may also be 
true for people whose interests are not directly related to the social problems. They will surely 
support the party. I mean, if we really open up and get to the stage of a general election, like 
everyone has a right to vote, I believe most people, maybe 90%, will still vote for our current 
system” (No. 13) 
“I feel like most people in the society don’t really find ‘big government’ problematic. They 
think that there is nothing wrong with ‘imperial power’; the only problem is ‘there isn’t a 
good empire yet’. In their mind, there’s nothing fundamentally wrong in the system” (No. 
10) 
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Some respondents were even more cautious in identifying other people’s opinions, 
arguing that the whole population is too large to generalise about.  
“Everyone has his or her own ideas, I mean, based on their experiences and their affiliation 
to certain social groups. I really have no idea of their true feelings. There are some popular 
opinions on the internet, but who knows, many people are not keen to express their ideas. So 
many people live in our country, it’s impossible to have a general idea regarding political 
issues, not even social issues. If any voice supports something, there must be some voices that 
disapprove of it” (No. 15) 
The pluralistic ignorance in individuals can actually interact with their weak efficacy and 
political apathy and make people lose confidence and hope that they can change things through 
any kinds of participatory approach.  
Heterogeneity of social groups: education and one’s generation 
One important reason why people are unwilling to infer the nature of general public 
opinion is that the diversity of the sub-populations is so great. This diversity leads to different 
reactions to the socio-economic changes, while their own experience and endowment varies the 
weights of the mechanisms that lead to compliance falsification. As one of the interviewees 
argued: 
“Falsification? I’m sure it exists in the population. However, I cannot really make a 
judgement on the society as a whole. It really depends, depends on the subgroups in the 
society. We have over 1.4 billion people, there are huge internal differences and variations, 
and there are many social classes. I can’t really imagine it, to be honest.” (No. 10) 
In this section, I try to identify several important variations of the population that have 
marked implications for the diversity of falsified compliance. Education is one of the most 
important factors, in that it correlates with people’s knowledge, cognitive capacity and possible 
experiences. In a society such as China’s where the social, political and economic capital are 
highly integrated, education-based social capital is also highly correlated with the distance to the 
core political power. Hence, more education may bring rights consciousness, independent 
thinking, and more resource for political participation. From the viewpoint of the authority, 
education is a crucial approach to socializing the governed, especially useful when no alternative 
explanations/stories are allowed/available. Therefore, it may be the case that people who are 
doing well in the official education system are more likely to approve the notions and ideologies 
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of the current system. In the heterogeneity section, I briefly unpack the complex ways in which 
education indicates people’s political compliance, with evidence from formal interviews, informal 
conversations and observations. In addition to education level, a person’s age group is another 
factor that correlates with her/his social status, experience, cognitive capacity and knowledge. It 
has been identified as a core factor that determines people’s political attitudes and behaviours 
(Braungart & Braungart, 1986). For instance, people who are born in a certain period are likely to 
experience similar social events, and therefore are quite likely to share a similar social memory 
(e.g., Schuman & Rieger, 1992). Meanwhile, people in a different age group are in a life stage of 
their own and the issues and themes that they worry or care about are different. Thus, 
investigating the heterogeneity in political compliance brought by generational variation is 
another main theme in this section.  
Education as a double-edged sword 
Be aware of the punishments and rewards 
People who are more educated are generally more likely to be aware of the potential 
rewards brought by signalling loyalty to the incumbent authority. They are also more likely to 
acknowledge the potential punishment that follows undesired actions. Hence, educated people 
are more likely to choose a specific public image that differs from their private image. One 
interviewee with a college degree addressed the notion of public/private faces as follows: 
“In current society you can enjoy a really good life if you have enough power. It’s not like we 
never talk about the social or political issues, just it’s only with people you are really familiar 
with …There is no need to discuss political issues too much in public, why do it? The upper 
level will never appreciate your sincerity it just [needs] your loyalty.” (No. 5) 
If they are rational enough in reaching their decisions, would educated people show less 
compliance regarding nationalist requests from the state, such as helping in meeting the costs of 
the trade war? Not necessarily. My qualitative evidence shows that many highly educated people 
would identify the trade war as a good opportunity for China to establish itself, and therefore 
they are tolerant of the costs they may need to bear.  
In addition to the rewards, people who enjoy more social capital are more likely to react 
more strongly to the possibility of punishment compared to people ones who are relatively far 
from the system. For instance, one friend who works in the public organisation affiliated to the 
State Council told me in a private conversation: 
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“When you have seen or experienced more, you are more likely to understand the ruling 
tactics, whatever kind of authority is in power. Punishment will definitely come if you cross 
the line, so you will become more and more cautious in your choices …Especially when you 
have too much to care about, your family, your career, all these (things) will hold you back 
when you are making choices. In making a decision, the more you have, the more concerned 
you are.” 
The pressure is also high for people who work in education, such as researchers and 
teachers. One friend who teaches in a university said: 
“The intellectuals are less likely to express their true opinions about the society and politics. 
If you conduct research in a mainland university and your topic entails sensitive issues, such 
as the constitution, modern or contemporary history, or civil society, you need to be very 
careful. There are cases in which a teacher in class was reported by the students because they 
found the teacher’s speech not ‘[politically] correct’.” (No. 23) 
Informal conversations with several social science scholars who work in the top 
universities in mainland China verified the high pressure that they feel on their daily research and 
life. One of them complained in private that the landline in his office is monitored; another 
mentioned that, because he came from Hong Kong, his mother-in-law (a government cadre in 
mainland China) was investigated on tax issues, quite unjustifiably; a third case concerned a 
research topic, which, a scholar told me, had had to be changed due to political pressure from 
politics to methodology to avoid potential disputes60. These directly perceived pressures cause 
the people concerned to drastically disguise their public political attitudes. None of them believes 
that it would be a good idea to reveal their discontents in public. 
Illusion of individual autonomy 
Theoretically speaking, the social capital brought by education may increase individuals’ 
confidence in political participation and raise their motivation to pursue their own interests. As 
Kuran argued, an individual’s proficiency in pursuing her/his own interests may add to the 
inefficiency of the society. Moreover, the falsified public preference of individuals could cause 
societal inefficiency to persist (Kuran, 1997). In the interviews, we can identify many pragmatic 
opinions that exaggerate the autonomy of individual level choices in the current system and take 
a seemingly “objective”, “neutral”, or “rational” stand on controversial social issues. Many 
 
60 Due to the sensitivity problem, I have intentionally blurred some detailed information about the person involved 
in the case. 
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people who have less sympathy for others’ suffering would imagine that under the current 
system the space for the individual’s personal choice is generous enough. So long as people do 
their best, it is possible to achieve social mobility and defend personal property. For instance, 
when they talked about the inequalities in education and the troubles for individuals brought by 
the inconsistency of educational policies, the respondents said: 
“I don’t feel the current system puts many restrictions on me. I mean, sure, there are some 
rules imposed by major structures, but the private space is quite enough for us to develop …I 
don’t deny that difficulties prevent some people from gaining access to educational resources, 
like some migrants from rural areas. I won’t judge them on their actions or choices, like, if 
they choose to defend their rights through exposure in the news or political appeals, that’s 
totally fine. But every person in a society has a position that decides the [available] choices. I 
don’t think I will end up in a similar [difficult] position … Of course, we need social 
responsibility and caring, but not [from] me.” (No. 8) 
“The specific issues such as urban-rural inequalities, educational justice, resource 
distributions, all are crucial challenges for the government. But I feel like the main issue is 
still the limited resource in our country …the cake [of the economy] is not large enough for 
everyone to enjoy; some people must be left behind or sacrificed … Educational injustice is a 
problem of our time and it can be solved by creating more education resources … For 
individuals, there are many other solutions you can try. Like immigration, (attending) 
international or private schools (if you don’t have a Hukou in your area). Do use your 
power to act. It won’t help if you are too stubborn and just want to fight against the 
government. It’s a waste of your time and energy keep an eye on the institution. These are the 
facts, I would say; it’s your problem if you remain disadvantaged” (No. 4) 
“As far as I know, the political opportunities are plenty. The key issue is still your own 
efforts. Society is already quite open.” (No. 12) 
There is nothing wrong with the “perceived” potential space at the individual level. 
However, the illusion of “free choices”, whether social, economic or political for different 
people, actually leads them to underestimate the disharmony between public and private faces. It 
also prevents them from sharing the pain of other disadvantaged groups and questioning the 
systematic problems in the society. 
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Generational difference: Unthinkable or unthought? 
Due to the lack of statistical evidence, I give merely a brief summary of the perceived 
generational difference from the interviews and the observational data. Existing studies suggest 
that the older generation is more cautious on political topics while the younger generation is 
more liberal (e.g., Hahn & Logvinenko, 2008; Rose & Carnaghan, 1995). Qualitative data in my 
study reveal a generational difference as regards political compliance and the contradictions in 
whether or not to hide discontent. More importantly, the interaction between any two 
generations indicates the long shadow of falsified political attitudes in preserving a socially 
conservative ideology. 
As I noted in the previous section, social knowledge can persist quite strongly in the 
shaping of people’s political attitudes. The transmission of knowledge from one generation to 
another is one of the forces that helps social knowledge to persist (Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 
1986; Jennings, 1996). The younger generation learns about what is “thought” and “unthought” 
from the society, the family and their education. However, the existence of falsified public 
opinion has some long-term repercussions. If certain ideas are blocked due to social or political 
pressure, the younger generation cannot renew them and the older people will die with their 
ideas unspoken. The distribution of young people’s public opinion will undoubtedly reflect the 
existing bias in social discourse. Imagine certain issues or topics that are unthinkable for one 
generation because of certain political or social constraints. The unexpressed ideas are less likely 
to be heard and incorporated into the ideas of the younger generation than the ones in public 
discourse. In this way, “unthinkable” turns into “unthought” as the generations succeed one 
another (Kuran, 1997). In the interviews, I encountered some cases where a child has certain 
ideas or thoughts about politics or historical events, while the parents refuse to share their 
opinions: 
“My education and my overseas experience have made me think a lot about politics and the 
history of Chinese politics. … But every time I plan to have a serious discussion with my 
parents about my ideas, they refuse to have a real conversation with me. They just dodge 
when I mention related topics.” (No. 25) 
Another interviewee who is currently in the UK told me about is interaction with his 
parents:  
“My father worked abroad when he was young, it was something like a governmental 
delegation. I thought he might be quite open to different political attitudes …There were 
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times I expressed my disagreement with the government’s behaviour, my Dad wasn’t very 
happy and blamed me for being brainwashed by the foreign forces” (No. 14) 
The case of several interviewees who had different political attitudes from their parents 
demonstrated the pressure, but also indicated the possibility of breaking apart the 
intergenerational heritage (Inglehart, 2018; Svallfors, 2010). As one friend said, “as long as the state 
keep open and allows people to interact with the outside world in different ways, the younger generation will have 
some new ideas denied to their parents and will ultimately change the societal scenarios.” However, it might 
take a great effort from the younger generation to generate a counteracting bias against the 
existing bias in public opinion. People will not automatically reflect on existing theories or facts 
or become critical, even they when have received new information. Unless this information is 
powerful, their thoughts will tend to conform to the dominant ideas of their parents’ generation 
and internalize the viewpoint that dominates public discourse, due to inherently lazy thinking 
(Kuran, 1997). In the last part, I want to consider further the potential breakthrough from the 
existing structural forces, social pressures and the trap of generational knowledge transformation 
for individuals. 
Heading (no)where: actions or agencies 
Action or inaction: exit, voice or loyalty 
One popular model that describes the interaction between the state and its subordinates 
is the “exit, voice and loyalty” model originally proposed by Hirschman (Hirschman, 1970). The 
state can be treated as an organization and the population may choose to stay loyal, or voice their 
discontent through formal and informal political participation, or leave the state through 
emigration when they are unhappy with the authority’s certain actions. Individuals’ choice of 
reaction is evaluated on the basis of the benefits and costs of each option. The authority will also 
evaluate the possibilities of its population’s choice in the policy making process or subsequent 
amendments. If the citizens can make a credible threat of leaving, the authority is less likely to 
impose controversial policies. Conversely, the option to exit will be reduced if loyalty is strong, 
or is not wholly appealing/feasible. At the other extreme, sincerely loyal members may be more 
likely to voice their opinion since they care more about the welfare of the organization. 
How would falsified compliance affect these strategies? In other words, which of these 
three options would be chosen by people who falsify their loyalty to the authority? Theoretically 
speaking, preference falsification is often cheaper than escape or voice and it avoids the risks 
entailed in public protest. Yet disguised public opinion may cause many to underestimate the 
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extent of popular dissatisfaction and conceal the possibilities of change. In this part, I give some 
preliminary evidence of individuals’ opinions regarding the political participation, the degree of 
loyalty when controversial policies are imposed and the choices of emigration. Further 
explorations such as formal models and statistical inferences can be made in future research.  
Existing studies have argued that the Chinese government encourages many innovative 
approaches to public participation, such as the Mayor’s mailbox, local government’s comment 
boards, and so on (Distelhorst & Hou, 2014; Su & Meng, 2016). Does the general population 
find these voicing approaches valid or helpful? How do they personally rate the effectiveness of 
individuals’ voices in the policy-making process and politics in general? And what do they think 
of informal political participation (such as appeals, protests, or assembly) compared to formal 
approaches? The feedback from interviewees who had perceived more constraints in the past 
several years were generally negative/passive regarding people’s function in the current political 
system: it was both objectively not possible and subjectively not necessary. For instance: 
“About the so-called ‘deliberate decision making’, like the ones you mentioned, the Mayor’s 
mailbox, or Wenling’s case of a collective meeting, I would say that only individuals who 
were desperate to solve their problems would participate. Normal people won’t voice their 
opinions if they do not have to. …Several years ago, there were some cases of informal 
gatherings to protest against local government’s misbehaviour or against some factory or 
something. [I] don’t see many similar reports in recent years, maybe very occasionally 
…Especially this year, these issues would definitely get blocked online” (No. 11) 
“I don’t think individual citizens have a say in policy making. If some policies are claiming 
to encourage the public’s opinion, we are mostly represented by some ‘officials’. Even if votes 
are used to decide [something], I don’t believe they are legitimate or transparent enough 
…You don’t know where those samples come from. I can definitely say, me and my friends 
have no idea or interest on these [political participation approaches …they are] just for 
show” (No. 10) 
How do people who are loyal to the authority explain the voicing space in the current 
system? Two interviewees analysed their views: 
“I understand that most people don’t really want to publicly discuss issues of political reform, 
or controversial social issues. The key issue nowadays is still development. To achieve that, 
the state can’t [afford to] be in a mess and no one really wants it become a battlefield (of 
opinions).” (No. 2) 
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“I would say, seize the day. Any discussions about politics should be done under the 
umbrella of development and the stability of the whole society…We should trust the 
judgement of our peers , the current authority is elected to power, so is Xi …we should 
support whoever is in that position …It’s totally ok to express your own opinion, about the 
society or about politics, but it should be done in an appropriate way. It’s better to engage in 
formal ways, like the Mayor’s mailbox; things can be solved very quickly …It’s definitely 
unacceptable to ideologically oppose the state or the party …The social problems we are 
encountering right now are accumulated problems from the past 40 years. We cannot rush, 
cannot solve the problems of certain social groups in a flash …Some people will unavoidably 
be sacrificed during the process” (No. 4) 
The importance of social stability is confirmed by many people, as in one summary from 
an informal conversation: “stability suppresses all, this is the motive power of the current authority, higher 
than any other noble notions.” One interviewee who is an ethnic minority and born in the frontier 
region and who later lived and worked in Shanghai, told me  
“Being a minority does have some inconveniences, such as applying for a visa, the process 
takes much longer than it does for my Han friends …But I think so long as I don’t commit 
any violation of the law, there is no need to worry. Cooperation with the police is everyone’s 
obligation, it’s especially necessary for security reasons …Like, the security check on 
Shanghai’s tube-trains is stricter than in any Japanese airport. People may complain but I 
don’t really advocate abolishing it …The anti-terrorism situation is serious for every country 
in the world. China just takes it more seriously than some other countries do. We value 
safety and security more …Most of us citizens are willing to cooperate with the security 
checks at tube stations, as long as the process is efficient and the officers’ attitudes are 
friendly …We Chinese can really endure hardships and work really hard; we also have a 
high threshold of tolerance” (No. 3) 
If voices are not possible and if someone is not sincerely loyal, is there any preference for 
“exit”? When I talk about the option of emigration, many people are concerned about the 
cultural problem: 
“I don’t consider emigration as an option. Neither culturally nor in daily habits is it easy to 
change for people of our age. We also have jobs here, why ask for trouble? Besides, people in 
other countries won’t really take you in as a fellow-citizen, I don’t want to expend my energy 
and efforts in a foreign land” (No. 4)  
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But if there was a chance, they would be happy to send their children abroad for a better 
view of the world: 
“I’m not saying it’s a bad idea to move to other countries if possible, just not for myself. The 
culture, habits, politics and even legal systems are so different.  I don’t think I can adjust to 
a new environment. Children might do, maybe when they were grown up and if they 
themselves wanted to go abroad” (No. 9) 
Some interviewees who are more capable (or more confident) or more worried about the 
current system would more readily decide to choose “exit”: 
“I am not sure who is going to take the leader’s role and don’t know what the society is 
going towards. So, I do consider moving abroad as an option, maybe once the child is a little 
older” (No. 5) 
“Yes, (for me) emigration is a possible choice, although I’ve not decided yet. Will (decide) on 
the basis of my further career plan” (No. 8) 
However, for most people who don’t possess the resource to leave, even if they are 
discontented and would wish to move to some other place if possible, the possibilities are not on 
their side. 
Falsification, pressure of ideological involution and possibility of “free will” 
We have talked about the ideological involution in current Chinese society due to the 
totalizing and individualizing effects of the strong government. The confined resources of social 
knowledge result in a diverged but limited increment. We have also seen much evidence in 
previous sections demonstrating the cognitional counter-conduct of individuals through 
assuming different faces in daily life. However, we may also notice that, in many cases, the 
falsification of compliance or the change of faces is for many people unconscious. They tend to 
show more honesty on political issues in private without any distinguishable awareness. Many of 
them can recognize the obvious restrictions from the authority, such as censorship, the risk of 
punishment, lack of government accountability (and related weak political efficacy), but many 
people (and their friends) do not intentionally pay attention to or reflect on these issues. 
From the interview data and observational data, another factor that might leads to the 
involution of people’s social knowledge and political awareness can be identified. Many people 
who seem politically apathetic, or feel ignorant of political issues, are mostly heavily pre-occupied 
by social pressures, or everyday life: work, society and life. One example is the recent debate on 
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the “996” work schedule (from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week), which is a common and even 
rampant phenomenon in the high-tech and internet companies. In spite of the fact that the 
“996” work schedule already violates labour laws, many people actively supported the idea of 
“hard work”. When the debate was at its peak, Jack Ma, founder of the Alibaba Group, stated in 
public that “employees who get the ‘opportunity’ to work according the ‘996’ schedule are the 
lucky ones”, because “in many companies employees don’t even get the chance to work long 
hours”61. The excessive workload in China leaves people no time to think, read or question the 
problems in their lives. As one interviewee told me, she feels like “the capitalists and the politicians 
collude with each other, just to exploit people’s labour, time and minds. Sometimes even our dignity” (No. 11). 
There are some other “tailored” social and political pressures for social subgroups in the 
population. For instance, females are more and more commonly encouraged to go back to the 
family and resume the traditional role of “good wife”. In recent years, the official policy of 
encouraging families to have a “second child”, the official propaganda promoting traditional 
cultural values and the popularity of “moral women”62 modules have formed a political, cultural 
and economic cage, which prevents females from achieving their self-value and self-awareness. 
Another example is the younger generation, whose members enjoy less and less possibility of 
upward social mobility. From the interview data, many young people complained of the pressure 
when they were asked about their ideas on the future of the state and themselves in the next five 
years. Even some who are positive about the state’s development are concerned about the 
opportunities for younger people. All these pressures, initiated by the state or generated from the 
economic environment and traditional culture, leave no space for many people to really think 
through the current political and societal conditions, to say nothing of deep reflection on the 
state-individual relationship.  
Luckily, we still have some voices which attest to the possibility of “free will”. Unlike 
those who accept the illusion of individual autonomy, there are some who want access to more 
knowledge and reflections on the state of society. One interviewee said, “I want to read more, books 
or news, to really understand what is going on with myself and the country. I truly want to be clear enough and see 
through the society” (No. 10). Another friend from Hong Kong, who also posts frequently on 
mainland social media, insisted that “in this time, ask yourself to never be lazy in thinking, never blindly 
follow the others. Try your best to understand the truth of all kinds of events, keep your sympathy for the 
 
61 China Daily, “’996’ schedule must not be imposed on workers”, 2019-04-15, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/15/WS5cb411e2a3104842260b63fc.html, [Accessed 2019-06-26] 
62 For further introduction, see: “Some ‘Moral Women’ promotions already touch the red line of the law” (in 
Chinese), 2017-05-22, http://www.guancha.cn/Education/2017_05_22_409561_1.shtml, [Accessed 2019-06-26] 
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disadvantaged, be aware of any kind of power. This is already a form of resistance. Even save an article that you 
find reasonable (and might disappear soon) and share it with others. This is resistance, too.” 
Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I explored a complex phenomenon of potential “falsification” 
in Chinese political compliance. The rationale is the “people-side’s story” of the overarching 
question of my dissertation—state governmentality and the answering compliance in transitional 
Chinese society. As argued in the previous chapters, the state may intentionally use knowledge 
construction, policy experimentation and interest allocation, among many other tactics to 
effectively shape public opinion and maintain compliance from subordinates. However, 
individuals enjoy the possibility of hiding their true discontents or opinions when there are 
limited choices of voicing or exiting and falsified compliance can be dangerous for the authority 
regarding its long-term rule. To better address the complexity of individuals’ cognitional 
rebellion, I used a design of interview and observations to collect data.  
Even though the qualitative data cannot infer to the situation in the general population, 
we can still extract some details of falsified political compliance, various potential factors that 
might lead to a change in people’s public/private faces and heterogeneity across social groups. 
The information from qualitative evidence can be useful in advising on the research in the 
future. My analysis shows that people’s compliance regarding different representatives of the 
state changed substantially with regard to specific issues and the atmosphere at the time. 
Although the central government, the party and the top leader now enjoy more approval, people 
in private conversations sometimes object to bearing the political cost at the individual level. In 
addition to political trust, people’s private political knowledge and public discourse, sometimes 
run along a separate track. However, even though many people register the disconnection 
between public and private knowledge, as well as the discontinuity within official discourse, 
many choose to tolerate it without further questioning. Why would many people still choose 
(intentionally or unconsciously) to arrange their public/private faces regarding certain 
political/societal issues? The reasons can be traced back to the existing cultural, historical and 
educational factors that have socialized their ideas from the beginning. They can also be 
identified in the external force imposed by the state and society and the resulting fear, political 
apathy and group ignorance in the population.  
Does falsified compliance vary between the people in different social groups? Although 
my qualitative data cannot make an inference about the population as a whole, the people in my 
sample with their different endowments, experiences and human capital, do present different 
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preference of political compliance. For instance, education can bring people more 
socioeconomic capital, as well as a certain illusion of autonomy, but it also imposes a binding 
power when individuals face a threat from the state. Regarding generational differences, the past 
experience of the older generation may turn some of their “unthinkable issues” into “unthought 
issues” for the next generation. What, then, are the implications, for one’s actions and for the 
possible breakthrough of individual subjectivity, of falsifying one’s political attitudes? My 
evidence shows that, although many people are pessimistic about any kind of political 
participation, some tend to preserve their awareness, consciousness and rationality despite the 
pressure from the state and society. 
Going one step further from the qualitative data of public opinion and individual private 
opinions, we can also identify some possibilities of subtle statecraft in the management of 
people’s views. Drawing on the population’s propensity to admire authority, the state may take a 
number of steps to direct popular opinion: it may allow public debate at a controllable level, send 
opinion leaders to set the rhythm; and, once the public debate reaches a certain level, issue an 
“official statement” in the name of “neutrality” and “justice”; if necessary, it may sacrifice some 
lower-ranking officials as scapegoats; and utter credible threats to the society at critical moments. 
However, when the manipulation of popular opinion causes the state’s credibility to backfire, 
leading to severe distrust or even considerable compliance falsification, it may produce a serious 
challenge to state rule in the long term. For individuals, it takes an effort to break out of the 
aggregated ideological and political power constraints, but it is not impossible. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
The fact that the long-lasting and extremely intense transformation has been ongoing in 
China for forty years now without meeting any fundamental challenge has attracted much 
attention from social scientists. My work in particular is motivated by having observed that the 
central authority in China actively seized the opportunity and the benefits of modernization that 
the social and economic reform offered and effectively absorbed the risks inherent in the 
dramatic socio-economic transformation. My dissertation project, therefore, asked how the state 
maintained compliance from its people in periods of rapid social and economic transformation 
and how did the logic of its governmentality change? My empirical work, taking the case of the 
changes in pension policy in the social welfare reform conducted by the Chinese government 
after 1978, deciphered the strategies of consent manufacture that it used and the changed 
rationale behind the governmentality. In this final chapter, I first revisit the research question 
cross-referencing the evidence drawn from each empirical chapter. Then I sum up the 
theoretical, methodological and practical contribution of my work. Finally, I address the 
unanswered questions of the dissertation project and set out some possibilities of further 
investigation.  
A recap: elaborating on the analytical model with empirical evidence 
My whole project uses empirical evidence of the Chinese government’s efforts to lead a 
rapid social and economic transformation without losing its legitimacy to elaborate my analytical 
model of compliance manufacture in the interaction between the state and the individual. The 
model I proposed of the state’s strategic governance highlights the ruler’s general design, which 
is constantly updated in light of its understanding of the current situation, the public and its own 
objective; otherwise known as its “governmentality”. With an extensive understanding of its 
subjects, the state is like a DJ on stage, wielding a mixture of tones to affect people’s emotions, 
interests, desires and actions. These tones can be used both individually and simultaneously and 
can also be tailored for distinctive social groups. My analytical model covers many types of 
statecraft that can be used by a modern state to generate compliance: constructing social 
knowledge through propaganda and education, or manipulating information; building consensus 
through policy experimentation; or using interest exchange to buy off the population. The state 
may also use coercive approaches such as censorship and force to maintain a compliant surface.  
Building on the statecraft paradigm, I clarified in the introduction chapter the two-way 
interaction between the state and its population in the process of optimizing its objectives. The 
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state as a player who intends to maximize the population’s compliance and minimize its non-
compliance must balances a mixture of various strategies and actively adjust its statecraft in a 
dynamic process. Under the constraints of state capacity and information demand, tolerant and 
intolerant approaches are strategic substitutes limited by specific capacity at any given time; these 
approaches strategically complement one another to elicit information from the people. The 
individuals, whose objective is to optimize their personal situation, make choices in response to 
the statecraft that they encounter. In a situation where active counter-conduct such as rebellion, 
protest and appeals are not possible, individuals may still use cognitional counter-conduct, such 
as falsifying their public compliance. Facing changing parameters—such as changing social and 
economic patterns of distribution and actors’ strategies—their interactions adjust accordingly.  
My whole dissertation, therefore, built on the thought map (Figure 3) and each of my 
empirical chapters addressed part of the typology. In Chapter 3, by investigating the trajectory of 
pension reforms in China, I identified the state governmentality of combining knowledge 
construction and benefit allocation. When the government was promoting a retrenchment 
reform under economic pressure, it reallocated resources strategically in order to maintain 
reasonable compliance from the whole population. My examination of the variations in the 
timing, direction and content of the reform together compose a holistic picture of the 
government’s general design of welfare differentiation. By changing the practice of welfare 
provision and adjusting the definitions of “privileged” and “marginalized” among the recipients, 
the state lifted the heavy burden from the beneficiaries of the old welfare system and created 
new bases of support from social groups which required less in the way of financial investment. 
In step with the welfare reform, the government used official propaganda to promote the 
principles of “contribution and rewards” and “rights and obligations”. The knowledge of such 
concepts as the “socialized self”, “fairness in social redistribution”, “contributing to the general 
good,” and so on, was designed at different stages, tailored for different target groups and aimed 
at different reform targets. During the process, the state evaluated various social groups on the 
basis of their membership, the value they could contribute to the state’s legitimacy and the 
resources they could bargain with. Individuals’ personal lives were also gradually socialized and 
initiated into a broader system in which only self-motivated, self-regulated and prudent citizens 
deserved respect from society. 
The specific statecraft tools identified in Chapter 4 were policy experimentation and 
propaganda, combined in the reform of the social insurance scheme for elderly enterprise 
employees. To promote the reform and ease the anxieties of the target population, the state took 
a moderate approach and experimented with the new regulations in selected regions, allowing 
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enough space for “trial and error”. Meanwhile, official newspapers played the important role of 
buffering the negative effects that might have resulted from implementing the policies. In 
addition to addressing the strategies that were used, one important task of Chapter 4 was to ask 
whether these strategies were successful in changing the public’s attitudes to the reform and the 
state. For this reason, I employed causal inference in this chapter and discovered that the 
government’s strategies had had a mixed effect. Through the dynamic governmentality (here in 
the format of policy experimentation) that had been designed and adjusted by the state, the 
boundary between “public (state)” responsibility and “private (individual)” responsibility was 
redrawn. Chapter 4 also presented a crucial flaw in state governmentality: the complexity of its 
constitution and dependency on past tactics risked causing a mismatch between policy 
experimentation and local propaganda, and kindred simultaneously used tools. This flaw can be 
seen as an important gap for people’s cognition to break through. People are capable of 
identifying potential inconsistencies in the state’s governmentality and their reflections on these 
flaws may result in a serious challenge on the state’s legitimacy. 
In Chapter 5, I investigated the issue of falsified compliance in China’s population and 
used various approaches to identify its existence, variations and implication for people’s actions 
and for the long-term legitimacy of the state. Falsified compliance exists in a coercive 
environment where people’s common sense somehow does not match the external scenario 
constructed by the authority. It should be noted that the state may not necessarily be using 
observable threats at the time because the prospect of pressure can effectively be inferred from 
historical events and reputation. The coexistence of “the state as a moral icon” and “the state as 
benefit provider” in Chinese political culture has presented a differentiated compliance 
falsification towards different representatives of the state. My evidence also pointed to a 
mismatch in people’s political knowledge: although it seems self-contradictory, private political 
knowledge and public political discourse sometimes run along different tracks. But many people 
choose to tolerate it without further questioning the persistent disconnection and discontinuity. 
Individuals’ tolerance regarding the inconsistencies in their knowledge and everyday lives acts as 
a buffer absorbing the external shocks from the political apparatus and preserving some private 
space. 
From the qualitative evidence, many Chinese people seem to be pessimistic regarding any 
kind of political participation. However, some people are still keen to preserve their awareness, 
consciousness and rationality, in spite of the pressure from the state and the society. These 
people’s reflections on individual life choices, the state-individual relationship and sometimes the 
subjectivity that they present every day can empower positive counter-conduct. It can turn into 
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actions such as emigration (voting with their feet), or active political participation at the level of 
local communities (local elections, public hearings, etc.). Moreover, when the manipulation of 
popular opinion reveals flaws and leads to severe distrust and falsified compliance, it may lead in 
the long run to a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. An active state, however, will 
register the changes, readjust its understanding of the current scenario and improve its tactics 
before the flaws end in a “cascade”.  
Contributions and Implications 
Revisiting “governmentality” and “legitimacy” in state theory 
My overall theoretical paradigm is constructed by integrating two important theoretical 
approaches to investigating state politics for dealing with the population. Moreover, I take 
advantage of an interactive relationship, whereby governmentality is treated as a means and 
population compliance as the outcome. In regimes where normative legitimacy does not exist, 
the method of using governmentality in response to various types of compliance from the public 
helps the regime to survive. Compliance as the objective of state governance here represents the 
condition of no public non-compliance, or, more specifically, no collective public non-
compliance. The umbrella concept of “compliance” used in my work covers many possible 
sources of legitimacy built up through individuals’ expectations and judgment based on   
experience and the information in existing studies. For instance, Weber distinguishes three ideal 
types of authority—traditional authority, charismatic authority and legal-rational authority—as 
bases of the legitimation of power in modern states. Gramsci talks about “consent” from the 
dominated population, which can be generated by the civil society. Legitimacy can also be 
secured by the state’s socio-economic performance. 
My work argues that these different sources of “legitimacy” do not exclude each other 
but may coexist in a regime. Essentially, belief about the state’s right to rule is a synthetic thing 
based on people’s cognition and their perceived information, or, to borrow a Foucaudian term, 
based on a person’s choice to “disposer”63 the external factors. Individuals choose whether or 
not to offer compliance to the state authority according to their disposition of external 
information, personal experience and aspirations. In this way, the individual story of “belief” and 
“consent dovetails with the state story of “compliance from the population” and “legitimacy”.  
 
63 Foucault describes the state’s way of dealing with people and things using “disposer”. 
  231 
With compliance as the state’s aim, governmentality works as the means whereby the 
state—through information management, benefit distribution and coercion, among many other 
approaches—maintains its rule over the population. Scholars have examined various tactics used 
by the state and emphasised the value of “coercion” for generating passive compliance in non-
democratic regimes. However, as clarified in the introductory chapter, the state is an active actor 
that can take the opportunity to enhance its rule by its methods of managing the trade-off 
between opportunities and challenges when dramatic social change presents them. Moreover, its 
governmentality is not isolated but is part of a comprehensive design. I discuss the sophisticated 
tactics used by the Chinese government and its dynamic adjustments to cope with the challenges 
in its reform process. The skilled use of policy experimentation, in particular, exemplifies the 
idea that governmentality is a process with careful design and the authority has a strong 
consciousness of “feed-forward” (A. Schneider & Sidney, 2009) in its policy making. 
In addition to revealing the intertwined relationship of “legitimation” and 
“governmentality”, my work also addressed individuals’ subjectivity in the grand “state theory”. 
Throughout Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we see how the government manages to objectify the 
population with well-calculated welfare reform, political status-based reallocation of benefits and 
strategic use of rationales from tradition, culture, communist rhetoric and economics. Individuals 
struggle with the subjectivity imposed by the state and external society. Their counter-conduct 
can take shape only passively, through falsified political attitudes when fear persists and 
information is controlled and manipulated by state power. However, reflections on the state-
individual relationship can be seen in the population and collective reflection is sometimes 
possible. This recalls Foucault’s words about the counter-conduct of people: “Probably the 
principal objective today is not to discover but to refuse what we are . . . We have to promote 
new forms of subjectivity while refusing the type of individuality (more like ‘collectivity’, in China’s 
case) that has been imposed on us for several centuries” (Foucault, 1982, p. 785) 
Methodological innovations 
My work addresses some important methodological issues in sociology. This is shown in 
my analysis of China’s pension reform, in which I address the trajectory and rationale of the 
reforms with a methodological approach combining the holistic and the positive (Durkheim, 
Catlin, Mueller, & Solovay, 1938) with individualism and understanding (Weber, 2017). 
The holistic and positive approach— in particular, comparative historical analysis, in the 
broad sense—focuses on the structure and involvement of the institution and interprets social 
facts in their historical context in order to understand the reasons for their emergence or change. 
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This approach assumes that institutions or events unfold over time and in time. Therefore, 
features such as the length of the events and the timing of the appearance of the events affect 
the outcome or turnover of social facts. Studies following this tradition highlight processes over 
time, employing systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). 
This analytical approach is commonly used in social policy studies (such as Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Flora, 2017) to identify the reasons for, differences in and outcome of social 
policies/programmes. In my thesis I traced the design of governmental programmes, sorted out 
the proposed timing of the reform and duration of the pension policy schemes for different 
social groups and compared variations such as their generosity, coverage and fairness. More 
importantly, I settled all these features in their own historical context and addressed their 
motivation as driven by other social and economic reforms at the time itself. With a systematic 
approach and treating social change as a dynamic process, I presented the changing design of 
different schemes together with the state’s rationales for each. 
The other face of analysing governmentality is “man” and the “things” attached to 
“man”. A sophisticated design of statecraft draws from the state’s understanding of individuals’ 
possible choices and the possible formats of collective behaviour. In this sense, the approach of 
methodological individualism is useful for addressing the details in statecraft, such as why 
specific information is emphasized in a certain policy, or why certain types of public knowledge 
are blocked, but not others. Individualistic analysis also confronts comparative historical analysis, 
by highlighting change in people’s cognitional mode, people’s expectations of others and the way 
that these in the long term put pressure on institutional change in their turn. The individualistic 
approach which can address the connection between institutional reforms and individuals’ 
cognitive reorientation is also important in investigating people’s choice to report or conceal 
compliance/non-compliance in public or in private, as suggested in Chapter 5.   
 My work shows that methodological approaches are tools with which to investigate 
questions that are thrown up by social facts. With appropriate design and modification, different 
approaches can complement each other in answering the research question. More importantly, as 
sociology has long debated the tension between “understanding social action as a product of 
interest-motivated, conscious choices by actors [and] as a product of normatively-constrained, 
habitualized responses” (Hinings, Tolbert, Greenwood, & Oliver, 2008, p. 486). My approach of 
treating as a continuum the range of actors’ choices and behaviours (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) in 
reaction to different socio-economic/historical situations is helpful for shedding light on 
complexities so long as the researcher can specify the details of these situations.  
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Brief thoughts on regime future: empirical implications 
The substantive puzzle that motivated this research is the Chinese government’s active 
effort to grasp the opportunities presented by social change while using governmentality to avoid 
fundamental challenges from the population. As my empirical evidence showed, the risks of 
leading a reform can largely be addressed by the state’s constantly adjusting design of statecraft. 
What can also be figured out from the past 40 years’ reform in China is that the Chinese 
government placed considerable bet on economic development as a way of maintaining its rule. 
Enlarging the cake for all to share not only increased the state’s ability to allocate social and 
economic benefits, but also enhanced its capacity to issue propaganda and information monitor, 
imposing censorship and threats.  
If economic growth declines, therefore, it can be dangerous for the state, pushing it to 
adjust and refine its governmentality again. Meanwhile, given the general trend against 
globalization, the surging conservatism, increasing ideological polarization and more heated 
conflicts over resources across the world as the late 2010s have proceeded (as seen in Trump’s 
administration, Brexit, conservatism across Europe, the US-China trade war, and regional 
conflicts in the Middle East), China’s governance will also change as it suffers more from 
external pressures. This pressure may become heavier because of the tight economic connections 
with the rest of the world that China has built throughout its opening up and reform. This 
period could be a significant turning point comparable to 40 years ago, when the leaders of the 
Chinese government actively abandoned the socialist package and led the grand social and 
economic reform.   
China’s present situation could bring advantageous opportunities for it to reduce the 
risks to its governance implicit in its deteriorating economy. For instance, as noted above, the 
modernization process of Chinese society has been extremely intense: its transformation from an 
agricultural society to an industrial society and then to an information society, a process which 
took Western countries hundreds of years, was compressed into half a century. Such an intense 
process can be a risk for the incumbent authority, since the ideologies and thoughts of the 
population must change so fast. However, it can also be an opportunity for the government to 
manipulate public opinion with the appropriate guidance. As evidence from Chapter 5 shows, 
even after 30 years of opening up and reform, Chinese society still has no established 
consciousness or consensus regarding modern ideologies or values. Concepts such as freedom, 
justice, fairness, and so on are doubted by many in such a highly divided society. Many still 
interpret the world with concepts and logics drawn from a traditional or a socialist political 
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culture. Once information and knowledge are controlled by the authority, it can easily lead to the 
aggravated involution of the public’s political ideology. If the government could take full 
advantage of the population’s characteristics and information asymmetry, it could persuade the 
whole country to accept the present economic stagnation and believe that the so-called political 
system of “Democracy with Chinese characteristics” is legitimate, needing no fundamental 
political reform. 
Some initial changes in China’s governmentality are already being made. From 2015, we 
have seen a tightening up of political power, an increase in the regulatory power of the party and 
a trend of “Delicacy Social Management” promoted by the government. Taking the “Delicacy 
Social Management” as an example, a case of city governance in Tianjin shows that the power of 
the social infrastructure infiltrates into the local community through the party system, mobilized 
community members and technology:  
“Nowadays, Tianjin has expanded the party organization into the buildings and blocks of 
the city. … the governance network is coordinated and all parts of the community are 
actively involved. ‘Network governance is not new, but in the past, each department had its 
own grid – they are all of different sizes. The governance responsibility lies mainly on the 
local community officials who don’t really have enough energy or specific knowledge of social 
problems’… Therefore, Tianjin city divided the 16 districts into more than 170,000 grids 
and recruited specific officials as coordinators. … For instance, Beichen district has become 
120 grids, each with 1 community police officer and 3 coordinators. Once they see a problem 
that they can’t solve, they report it to a higher ranking governance centre and the centre 
organizes the proper department to solve the problem …There are also communities and 
villages organizing volunteers from the public in order to extend the power of this network 
governance … such as the Chaoyangli community. Nowadays we have 1382 registered 
volunteers, comprising 22% of the community population …Technology is also helpful for 
Tianjin’s social governance. In addition to the increased number of monitoring units, we have 
also designed Apps such as ‘Hexi power’, ‘Beijing integrated governance’ and so on, so users 
can upload pictures whenever possible.”64 
In addition, further examples show the official propaganda tending to play the nationalist 
card when addressing the international situation; more technology-based monitors, both online 
 
64 Li Kun, Tianjin: Enhancing the Party’s leadership, construct a “three in one” new version of social governance 
system. Xinhua Net, 2018-12-20, (https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2018-12-20/doc-ihqhqcir8655702.shtml) 
[Accessed 2019-06-12]. Author’s translation. 
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and offline; more barriers when individuals want more information than the state mouthpiece 
provides. As regards the economic stagnation, the state has accelerated the pace of its expanding 
investment and influence in Africa, trying to help the state’s capital to increase and the domestic 
industrial structure to make the transition. These tactics, however, are inadequate and cannot 
completely remove the risks of economic collapse and social unrest. They themselves contain the 
possibility of collective non-compliance that may endanger the authority’s rule. For instance, the 
state’s strict preference for social monitoring and sustained social stability may lead to more 
conflicts when individuals or social groups seek to defend their personal interests. The expansion 
of state capital may usefully steady the current economy; however, it will squeeze the space 
available to of the private sector and damage the long-term economic environment. It is still very 
uncertain which direction the regime will follow and is open to further academic investigation. 
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Appendix A Data Explanation and Model Validations 
Appendix A presents explanations on additional data, variables, case lists and so on for 
the main content of the empirical chapters and provides more statistical results for cross-
validation. 
A1. Additional data for Chapter 165 
 
65 Data source: CEIC data (https://www.ceicdata.com/en) 
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Figure A17. Urban Labour Type 
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A2. Statistical data in Chapter 3 
The statistical data about pension schemes in Chapter 3 were collected from the China 
Labour Statistical Yearbooks, Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbooks, National Statistical Bureau 
Dataset and other datasets. The China Labour Statistical Yearbook is issued by the National 
Bureau of Statistics (Department of Population and Employment Statistics) and the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic of China (Department of 
Planning and Financial Affairs). The Local Fiscal Statistical Yearbook is issued by the Ministry of 
Finance of the People's Republic of China (Budget Department). The National Statistical Bureau 
Dataset is an online dataset provided by the National Bureau of Statistics through 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/). In the table below I present a codebook for the variables used 
to picture the coverage, generosity and funding sources of different pension schemes. 
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Table A21. Codebook of pension schemes comparison and statistical data 
Comparison 
category Variable name Variable label Variable type Data source (Cross-validated) 
Coverage 
 
Total Employees 
(eligible participants) 
Number of  eligible people (employee 
plus retiree) continuous 
Local Fiscal Statistical 
Yearbooks (Manually 
calculated) 
Persons Participated at 
the Yearend 
Number of  participants of  pension 
scheme continuous 
China Labour Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Coverage rate Participated/Eligible participants continuous Manually calculated 
Residents Number Population of  Residents (by Pension scheme recipient’s type) continuous 
National Statistical Bureau 
Dataset 
Generosity 
Revenue and expenses 
of  Pension fund 
Revenue and expenses of  Pension 
fund continuous 
China Labour Statistical 
Yearbooks 
Benefit (per person) Pension benefit per person (yuan) continuous 
China Labour Statistical 
Yearbooks (Manually 
calculated) 
Increase Rate Increase rate each year of  pension benefit (per person per year) continuous Manually calculated 
Salary Employee Salary (weighted by employee numbers) continuous 
China Labour Statistical 
Yearbooks (Manually 
calculated) 
Replacement rate Pension benefit/Average Salary continuous Manually calculated 
Funding 
source 
Government Funding source including government binary Policy documents 
Enterprise Funding source including enterprise binary Policy documents 
Individual Funding source including individual binary Policy documents 
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A3. Textual data in Chapter 3 
Corpus descriptive statistics 
 
Figure A18. Number of Documents in the Full Corpus 
 
Validation of Topics: optimal K  
The text data include official news data from the People’s Daily dataset supplemented by 
data from the China Knowledge Resource Integrated Database (CNKI database) and the 
Wisenews dataset. To find the optimal number of topics that can be drawn from the corpus 
using unsupervised models, I present the validations from topicmodels and stm 
respectively (with different pre-processings of the text), including a 5 fold cross-validation of 
perplexity.  The results from topicmodels indicate a k range around 100 to 140, while the 
results from perplexity and stm package indicate a k range from 30 to 60. In my main analysis in 
Chapter 3, I use the k number of 30 since it’s relatively manageable. 
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Figure A19. Optimal Topic Number (FindTopicsNumber in topicmodels package, 
segwords version 1) 
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Figure A20. Optimal Topic Number (FindTopicsNumber in topicmodels package, 
segwords version 2) 
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Figure A21. Optimal Topic Number using Perplexity (5-fold cross-validation) 
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Figure A22. Optimal Topic Number (searchK in STM package, segwords version 1) 
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Figure A23. Optimal Topic Number (searchK in STM package, segwords version 2) 
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Validation of Topics: topic content 
In this section, I first show all the topics generated by the STM package with topic 
number K=30.  
Table A22. Topics with keywords (STM package, K=30) 
Topic 1 “Global Issue” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: day, month, meeting, hold, 
problem, government 
 FREX: hold, Soviet Union, contact, Stan 
 Lift: Judge, Baghdad, US Army, discharge, 
agreement, news 
Score: president, China-Portugal, parliament, 
date, Ukraine, Soviet Union 
Topic 2 “Commercial Insurance” Top 
Words: 
 Highest Prob: insurance, company, invest, 
bank, market, China 
 FREX: client, life, annuity, life insurance, 
company, business 
 Lift: be clever, actuary, collusion 
Score: insurance, life insurance, company, 
life, annuity, client, bank 
Topic 3 “HK-Macao” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: Macao, administration, district, 
special, representative, law, Hong Kong 
 FREX: Macao, legislation, motion, 
administrator, member of  the standing 
committee, review, conference/meeting 
 Lift: call out the votes, politician, offspring, 
blood line, roundabout 
Score: Hong Kong, Macao, administration, 
administrator, One country two system, 
motion, legislation 
Topic 4 “SOE Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: enterprise, reform, state-
owned, market, economy, operation, 
management 
 FREX: state-owned, amalgamation, shares, 
transfer, bankrupt, enterprise, assets  
 Lift: final fight, bad debt, strategy 
Score: enterprise, state-owned, reform, 
market, operation, assets, amalgamation 
Topic 5 “Old-age Care” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: old, old people, society (social), 
disabled, elderly care, age, service 
 FREX: old people, disabled, old age, care, 
recover 
 Lift: few children 
Score: old people, old age, disabled, age, old, 
home-based, care 
Topic 6 “Rural Development” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: development, rural area, 
construction, enhance, promote, society, 
speed up 
 FREX: promote, speed up, grain, enlarge, 
continue, strength 
 Lift: function, law department, exaggerate, 
indigenous 
Score: rural area, promote, speed up, 
strength, construction, perfection, 
agriculture 
Topic 7 “Community Care” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: old people, life, family, 
difficulty, model worker, society 
 FREX: model worker, visit, (Wen) Jiabao, 
supermarket, philanthropic, street level 
 Lift: spare time, carefully care, filial daughter, 
depressed, filial 
Score: old people, work model, children, Wen) 
Jiabao, street level, community 
Topic 8 “Rural Officials” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: village, officials, county, rural 
area, city, Yuan, Party 
 FREX: Party branch, Party member, 
officials, village, town, committee secretary, 
county 
 Lift: shorts, Xichang, village commune 
Score: village, officials, rural area, county, 
Party branch, Party member, town 
Topic 9 “Laid-off  Workers” Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: employment, employee, laid 
off, enterprise, labour, insurance, staff   
Topic 10 “Europe/US/Russia” Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: employment, employee, laid 
off, enterprise, labour, insurance, staff   
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  FREX: laid off, employment, 
unemployment, Liaoning, assure, positions, 
difficult 
  Lift: apathetic, bureaus, bring 
  Score: employment, laid off, employee, 
unemployment, state-owned, enterprise, 
insurance (protection) 
  FREX: laid off, employment, 
unemployment, Liaoning, assure, positions, 
difficult 
  Lift: apathetic, bureaus, bring 
  Score: employment, laid off, employee, 
unemployment, state-owned, enterprise, 
insurance (protection) 
Topic 11 “Rural Residents” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: village, Yuan, 10,000, villager, 
home, town, district  
 FREX: Nanling, whole village, Shaoxing, 
village 
 Lift: loyal and filial, large and bright, orange 
tree, songs, green 
 Score: village, villager, whole village, Nanling 
Topic 12 “Overseas Chinese” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: regulation, teacher, should, 
Chinese residing abroad, state, education, 
organization  
 FREX: crew, Chinese residing abroad, 
returned overseas national, family, teacher, 
ship  
 Lift: academic group, family, short, 
bequeath, crew  
 Score: crew, family, returned overseas 
national, Chinese residing abroad, teacher 
Topic 13 “Auditing Supervision” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: management, department, 
work, supervise, construction, audit, problem  
 FREX: audit, migration, check, supervision  
 Lift: officials and merchants collusion, take 
care, code, Wushan, Fengjie  
 Score: audit, migration, supervision, law 
enforcement, management, examine 
Topic 14 “Labour/Contracts” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: labour, contract, work unit, 
employ, regulation, work, salary  
 FREX: contract, employ, labour, issue 
(laws), trade union  
 Lift: take advantage of  others’ misfortunes, 
doubtful (unsure), start (calculation), show 
permits, case, day-month-year  
 Score: labour, contract, employ, set up, 
work unit 
Topic 15 “State Budget” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: finance, Yuan, a 
hundred million, central (government), tax, 
budget, revenue  
 FREX: budget, finance, expense, tax, central 
(government), tax revenue, national debt  
 Lift: input VAT, pay, deduct, output VAT, 
Break-even, Wire transfer, stamp duty  
 Score: finance, a hundred million, budget, 
Yuan, tax, expense, central (government) 
Topic 16 “Birth Control” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: reproduction, plan, 
population, giving birth, work, women, 
development 
 FREX: reproduction, women, plan, female, 
population, couple 
 Lift: still, early marriage, boys, 
contraception, pregnancy, as low as 
 Score: reproduction, population, women, 
plan, contraception, couple, giving birth 
Topic 17 “Family” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: one, in, old, money, month, 
two, no  
 FREX: Yongshun, father 
 Lift: one side, never die, Spruce, school 
students and teachers, ten bucks  
 Score: son, child, daughter, elder, father 
Topic 18 “China” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: China, in, one, worker, 
culture, work, now  
 FREX: sports games, performance, art, 
professor, giants 
 Lift: serious and reserve, sampling, 
historical study, noisy, reputation, bullet 
 Score: sports game, China, giants, workers, 
performance 
Topic 19 “EE Pension Plan” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: insurance, elder-care (social 
security), social (society), enterprise, 
protection, employees, fees  
Topic 20 “Economic Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: economy, development, 
reform, market, society (social), job, state 
  273 
 FREX: elder-care (social security), pay, 
insurance, trust, participate, social 
coordination, account  
Lift: rest of  the life, transgression, account 
division, current, employed 
 Score: insurance, elder-care (social security), 
pay, employee, society (social), protection, 
enterprise 
 FREX: macro, control, current, price, 
rectify 
 Lift: international market demand, victory, 
soft landing, signs, Keqiang, braveness, 
nothingness 
 Score: economy, macro, reform, currency, 
finance, development, market 
Topic 21 “Soldier/Social Service” Top Words: 
  Highest Prob: army, Yuan, civil service, 
excel, 10,000, work, province  
 FREX: soldier, support, military personnel, 
ex-serviceman, disaster (affected) area, 
Shantou, civil service 
  Lift: new soldier, military district, storm, 
25,000, patrol and defense, immediately, hide 
 Score: police, soldier, civil service, off-service, 
support, army 
Topic 22 “Growth” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: a hundred million, growth, 
ten thousand, Yuan, ten thousand people, 
whole country, point 
 FREX: yearend, ton, whole year, compare, 
hectare, percent, output 
 Lift: ten thousand boxes 
 Score: growth, ton, a hundred million, 
yearend, whole year, Yuan, ten thousand 
Topic 23 “Institution Reform” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: society (social), development, 
protection, institution(system), economy, 
reform, construction 
 FREX: harmony, distribution, public, society 
(social), institution (system), ideology, fairness  
 Lift: missing parts, variables, overstep, should 
 Score: society (social), protection, 
institution(system), reform, economy, 
ideology, market, harmony 
Topic 24 “Tech/Talents” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: technology, talents, 
development, innovation, industry, 
enterprise, high 
 FREX: talents, develop, technology, 
scientific research, skills, technology, 
industry  
 Lift: new knowledge, ornaments, wood 
shavings, Shekou, dissolve, goods in stock, 
unique skill 
 Score: talents, industry, skills, innovation, 
develop, technology, market 
Topic 25 “Rural Migrants” Top Words: 
Highest Prob: peasant, rural area, worker, 
urban-rural, agriculture, city 
 FREX: peasant, lose land, urban-rural, land, 
migrant, city 
Lift: Dujiangyan, deep water, whole scale, 
Pujiang, Xinyang 
Score: peasant, rural area, urban-rural, lose 
land, agriculture, worker, rural 
 Topic 26 “Develop/Party” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: development, construction, 
society, Party, economy, new, persist in  
 FREX: view, persist in, characteristic, Hu 
Jintao, thoughts, ecology, comfortable (life) 
 Lift: key knot, explore, not afraid of  
difficults  
 Score: development, construction, Party, 
ecology, innovation, principle, Hu Jintao 
Topic 27 “Income/Production” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: production, income, economy, 
ten thousand, development, equal, labour  
 FREX: Kunshan, a thousand, two hundred, 
commune, one hundred, reclaim (wasteland) 
 Lift: 1958, village, nine hundred, spice, dry 
land  
  Score: Kunshan, commune member, 
commune, one hundred, output value, income 
Topic 28 “Courts/Cases” Top Words: 
 Highest Prob: official, work, organization, 
case, court, Hong Kong 
 FREX: trial, court, judge, police, people’s 
court, public service, case  
 Lift: salary, innocent, sensitivity, fair judge, 
court, overseas business, embezzled funds 
 Score: trail, judge, court, people’s court, 
public affairs, Hong Kong, supervision 
  274 
Topic 29 “Retired/Pension fee” Top Words: 
 Highest Pro: retire, employee, yuan, fees, 
salary, enterprise  
 FREX: factory director, factory, own, 
working years, surrender insurance, retire  
 Lift: rumors 
 Score: retirement, factory, employee, yuan, 
salary, fee, pension 
Topic 30 “Letter/Visits” Top Words 
Highest Prob: people (general public), 
municipality (city), problem, appeal/visit, 
solve, government, work  
 FREX: appeal/visit, Langfang, mayor, 
municipal communist party committee, 
letters, provincial communist party 
committee, municipal government  
 Lift: notice in advance, flight, website, 
posts 
 Score: Langfang, people (general public), 
municipal communist party committee, 
appeal/visit, municipality (city), provincial 
communist party committee, municipal 
government 
 
 
To further validate the topics generated from the original text, I also present the topics 
generated with the package topicmodel, while these topics were generated using an estimated 
LDA model, for example the Gibbs Sampling model. It is considered that the topics in Table 
A23 roughly correspond with all the topics identified in Table A22 above.  
 
Table A23. Topics with keywords (topicmodel package, K=30, terms=15) 
Topic 1 
difficulty, life, disable, people, service, government, household, help, housing, family, district, 
difficult, poverty, social assistant, residents 
Topic 2 
development, construction, enhance, service, promote, economy, rural area, -ism, speed up, 
society, improve, perfection, agriculture, enhance, policy 
Topic 3 
village, Yuan, ten thousand, villager, household, township, village, town, factory, in, top, 
income, mountain, mu[unit of  area, equal to 0.0667 hectare], plant 
Topic 4 
insurance, company, industry, insur-, -rance, China, market, service, employee, in, business, 
insure, old-age, types, develop 
Topic 5 
law, labour, law, represent, supervision, whole country, People’s Congress, problem, congress 
committee member, department, situation, in, audit, state, supervision/inspection 
Topic 6 
work, day, meeting, month, central government, state council, whole country, 
problem/issue, point out, important, Party, committee member, report, new, premier 
Topic 7 
health care, hygiene, doctor/medicine, hospital, illness/sick, hospital, Shenzhen, fee, service, 
staff, Shanghai, medicine, room, month, protect 
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Topic 8 
bank, invest, fund, management, finance, commune, loan, fee/charge, institution, 
funding/money, money, individual, amount, bank, saving 
Topic 9 
project/engineering, wood, district, construct, protect, eco system, ten thousand, region, 
water, tree, resource, environment, migrant, conduct, bureau 
Topic 10 
in/China, China, people, work model, one, group, one person, love, study, spirit, model, 
hope, one individual, learn, day 
Topic 11 
control, birth, talents, education, work, give birth, technology, population, teacher, school, 
high, state, career/public institution, staff, in/China 
Topic 12 
old, elderly, elderly care, population, age, society, family, old people, old age, life, women, 
development, service, -ish, years 
Topic 13 
increase, billion, ten thousand, Yuan, increase, point, country, percent, ten thousand people, 
year-round, ton, invest, price, production, yearend 
Topic 14 
society, social protection, institution, insurance, basic, health care, care, establish, system, 
elderly care, life, coverage, township/city, perfection/perfect, our country 
Topic 15 
insurance, old age care, employees, fee/pension, retirement, enterprise, fee/charge, society, 
pay, individual, staff, basic, fund, coordination, salary 
Topic 16 
money, old, in, one, old people, do, buy/purchase, nowadays, two, life, children, no, have 
not, car, home/family 
Topic 17 
farmer, country side/rural area, industry, agriculture/rural, agriculture, urban-rural, land, 
city, city, township, -nization (urbanization), recruit, migrants, three 
Topic 18 
reform, economy, market, institution, system, management/administration, establish, 
mechanism, development, society, -ish, government, deepen, perfect, system 
Topic 19 
development, economy, district/zone, -ify, new, industry, industry, city, market, high, 
municipality, explore, achieve, construction, technology 
Topic 20 
finance, Yuan, a hundred million, center/central (government), tax, income/revenue, 
fund/capital, budget, expenditure, increase, local, policy, arrange, support, project 
Topic 21 
enterprise, state-owned, employees, operation, system, production, factory, assets, company, 
middle/in, benefits/profits, collective, bankruptcy, business/industry, conglomerate 
Topic 22 
district, Macao, administrative, special, Hong Kong, government, problem, staff, public 
service, committee member, law, basic, people, group, committee 
Topic 23 
labour, work unit, contract, regulation, employment, should, department, salary, line, work, 
according to the law, law, overseas Chinese, work 
Topic 24 
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Zhang, journalist, no/have not, one, business/things, month, Wang, Liu, money, in, vice, 
Chen 
Topic 25 
Society, development, principle, construction, Party, people, China, economy, insist/persist, 
harmony, general public, new, political, ideology/thoughts, important 
Topic 26 
employment, labour, employee, laid-off, staff, unemployment, work, service, enterprise, 
occupation, work/staff/worker, power, training, position 
Topic 27 
cadre/official, village, general public, Party, county, organization, work, leader, party 
member, grassroot, secretary, city/ municipality, level, rural area, committee 
Topic 28 
municipality, Yuan, ten thousand, province, whole, county, this year, month, reach, whole 
city, last year, current, household, name, protection/insure 
Topic 29 
government, economy, month, US, country, day/Japan, president, dollar, pension, Russia, 
China, Russia 
Topic 30 
problem/issue, economy, our country, one, income, in/China, should, state, solve, 
need/necessary, level, development, no, cannot, -ish 
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Hand coding: flowchart and second coder 
To classify the documents into different key categories, I use both supervised models 
and human coder. In Figure A24 below, I presented the flowchart for coding category “Locus of 
Responsibility” (the other classifications such as Praise/Denounce are quite intuitive). In 
addition to myself, I also asked a second coder (trained PhD student) to code the 400 randomly 
selected documents in order to validate the stability, reproducibility, accuracy of the labelled 
dataset. The table below presents the Cohen's Kappa for 2 coders. It can be seen that the coding 
of Responsibility and Praise is performed less satisfied compare to other categories.  
Table A24. Coding Validation 
 Mean_Coder 1  Mean_Coder 2  %-Agree Cohen’s K (unweighted) 
Responsibility 0.6 0.52 86.8 0.675 
Praise 0.17 0.16 91.2 0.684 
Denounce 0.047 0.048 98.5 0.834 
National Situations 0.05 0.0675 97.2 0.752 
Foreign Experience 0.0675 0.05 97.8 0.757 
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Figure A24. Flowchart of Hand Coding 
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Validation of classifiers 
To select the best classifier, in this section, I present the comparison of estimation 
performance with different classifiers (Naïve Bayes, Lasso Regression, Support Vector Machines, 
Random Forest) using the full corpus. From the superficial number of precision, recall and F1, 
the models seem to perform decently. However, as shown in the balanced accuracy, the models 
cannot provide predictions that is distinguishable from a random guess. The reason for the high 
precision & recall can be attributed to the large number of negative events, as shown in the two 
example confusion matrices below. Therefore, the supervised models perform less satisfactory 
than expected. It can be the issue with the definitions of classifications since many of them are 
difficult to identify from the text, especially the responsibility allocation. Considering the 
normally rigid format of Chinese official news reports, it’s the subtle tone and usage of phrases 
that distinguishes the various categories. As explained in the main text, my analysis about the 
classified text is based on a combination of SVM classification and hand coding of the full 
corpus.  
Responsibility classification (test set) using Naïve Bayes model:  
  Reference 
  0 1 2 3 4 
Prediction 
0 400 14 7 7 3 
1 66 25 2 4 0 
2 69 4 26 8 9 
3 33 0 0 4 1 
4 5 0 0 0 2 
Foreign experience classification (test set) using Naïve Bayes model: 
  Reference 
  0 1 
Prediction 0 623 3 1 49 14 
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Table A25. Performance of Supervised Models 
  Responsibility Praise Denounce National Situations 
Foreign 
Experience 
Performance Models66      
Precision 
Naïve Bayes 0.93 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Lasso 
Regression 0.84 0.89 0.99 0.97 0.96 
Support 
Vector 
Machines 
0.81 0.88 0.98 0.98 0.99 
Random 
Forest —— 0.88 0.98 0.97 0.98 
Recall 
Naïve Bayes 0.7 0.69 0.95 0.91 0.93 
Lasso 
Regression 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Support 
Vector 
Machines 
0.97 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Random 
Forest —— 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Accuracy 
Naïve Bayes 0.66 0.69 0.93 0.95 0.92 
Lasso 
Regression 0.83 0.89 0.98 0.97 0.95 
Support 
Vector 
Machines 
0.50~0.5467 
(balanced) 
0.568 
(balanced) 
0.56  
(balanced) 
0.65 
(balanced) 
0.72 
(balanced) 
Random 
Forest ——
69 0.5
70 
(balanced) 
0.5 
(balanced) 
0.5 
(balanced) 
0.5 
(balanced) 
F1 
Naïve Bayes 0.8 0.8 0.97 0.95 0.96 
Lasso 
Regression 0.91 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.98 
Support 
Vector 
Machines 
0.88 0.88 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Random 
Forest —— 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.99 
 
66 Naïve Bayes and Lasso Regression models are performed using quanteda package, Support Vector Machines 
and Random Forest models are performed using caret package. 
67 Using svmLinear with 5 fold cross-validations and 3 repeats, range is for balanced accuracy for all the classes. 
68 Using svmLinearWeights2, same with other binary classifications. 
69 Not performed due to computing power constraints. 
70 Using ranger method (from caTools) for binary classifications.  
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Additional results: Topic with covariates 
In the following table, I present the statistical result including “denounce” as the 
covariate in the topic proportion model. 
 
Table A26. Topic proportion by multiple covariates (“denounce”) 
 Topic 19 Topic 9 Topic 25 Topic 2 
Government/Party 0.058** 
(0.014) 
0.075*** 
(0.013) 
0.022* 
(0.011) 
-0.022* 
(0.009) 
Individual/Family 0.148*** 
(0.016) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
0.106*** 
(0.014) 
Enterprise 0.151*** 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
Social coordination 0.307*** 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.02) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.016) 
Denounce 0.059 
(0.045) 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
National condition -0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.029* 
(0.014) 
Foreign experience -0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.033* 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
Government/Party* 
Denounce 
-0.143 
(0.14) 
-0.092 
(0.099) 
-0.074 
(0.086) 
-0.000 
(0.093) 
Individual/Family* 
Denounce 
-0.214 
(0.195) 
0.000 
(0.137) 
-0.084 
(0.169) 
-0.101 
(0.13) 
Enterprise* Denounce -0.039 
(0.073) 
0.02 
(0.049) 
-0.038 
(0.041) 
-0.028 
(0.047) 
Social coordination* 
Denounce 
-0.208 
(0.242) 
-0.023 
(0.142) 
-0.048 
(0.12) 
0.035 
(0.132) 
Note: *P < 0.05; * *P < 0.01; * * *P < 0.001. In all the models, the mode of  
uncertainty is set as “Global”.  
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A4. Additional statistics for Chapter 4 
Table A27. Descriptive statistics of the main demographic variables 
Variable Years of  Survey  Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Urban/rural 
2004 2708 0.534 0.4998 0 1 
2009 2572 0.488 0.4999 0 1 
Gender 
2004 2708 0.476 0.4995 0 1 
2009 2572 0.522 0.4996 0 1 
Age 
2004 2708 41.486 13.112 18 70 
2009 2572 44.245 13.726 18 70 
Minority 
2004 2703 0.094 0.288 0 1 
2009 2543 0.087 0.282 0 1 
CCP Member 
2004 2708 0.075 0.263 0 1 
2009 2515 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Education Year 
2004 2689 7.333 4.696 0 22 
2009 2431 7.323 4.692 0 22 
Income 
2004 2428 14630.26 40448.03 0 1500000 
2009 1832 23423.17 28633.99 250 250000 
Income (log) 2004 2403 8.924 1.152 4.605 14.221 
2009 1832 9.453 1.240 5.521 12.429 
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Table A28. Case list71 
Case Age range Gender Ethnicity Education level Occupation Place Non/Local Time 
1 Post 1985 Female Han Postgraduate Student  Shanghai Non-local 2019.6 
2 Post 1985 Female Han College Government  Chengdu Local 2019.6 
3 Post 1980 Female Minority College Public sector Shanghai Non-local 2019.6 
4 Post 1980 Female Han College Public sector Nanjing Non-local 2019.6 
5 Post 1980 Male  Han College SOE; Government Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
6 Post 1990 Female Minority Postgraduate Private Enterprise Beijing  Non-local 2018.11 
7 Post 1995 Male Han High school Private Enterprise Suzhou Non-local 2019.6 
8 Post 1995 Male Han Postgraduate Private Enterprise Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
9 Post 1980 Male Han Postgraduate SOE Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
10 Post 1985 Female Han Postgraduate New media  Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
11 Post 1985 Female Han Postgraduate Foreign Enterprise Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
12 Post 1950 Male  Han College Retired (Private sector) Shanghai Local 2019.6 
13 Post 1980 Male Han College Commercial Media  Beijing Non-local 2019.6 
14 Post 1990 Male Han Postgraduate Student London Non-local 2019.6 
15 Post 2000 Female Han High school Student Xi’an Local 2019.6 
16 Post 1950 Male  Han Junior High school Retired (SOE) Tianjin Local  2018.11 
17 Post 1950 Female Han High school Retired (SOE) Tianjin Local 2018.11 
18 Post 1950 Male Han College  Retired (Public sector) Jilin Local 2018.11 
19 Post 1970 Male Han (Hong Kong) PhD Higher Education Beijing Non-local 2018.12 
20 Post 1970 Male Han PhD Higher Education Beijing Non-local 2018.12 
21 Post 1960 Female Han High school Public sector Yuncheng Local 2018.11 
22 Post 1960 Male Han College Government Yuncheng Local 2018.11 
23 Post 1990 Female Han College Finance sector Beijing Non-local 2018.12 
24 Post 1990 Male Han College  Unemployed Beijing Non-local 2018.12 
25 Post 1990 Female Han Postgraduate SOE Beijing Non-local Observation 
26 Post 1960 Male Han PhD Higher Education Overseas Non-local Observation 
27 Post 1980 Female Han PhD Higher Education Overseas Non-local 2019.6 
 
71 The list is for both the interviews and some of observation cases.  
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A6. Survey Experiment Design of Chapter 5 
Survey experiment design  
Many studies use list experiment, endorsement experiment and conjoint experiment to 
reveal respondents’ true attitudes to sensitive questions. People are likely to conceal or refuse to 
give their true opinion when directly asked in a survey. A survey experiment is useful because it 
measures the sensitive item by indirect questions. For instance, list experiment combines random 
experiment with the item count technique, asking the respondents—who are randomly assigned 
into either a treatment group or a control group—to report the numbers of items they agree on 
rather than asking them specifically about each item. Therefore, the respondent enjoys greater 
freedom and privacy and presumably is more likely to report true preferences. To estimate the 
treatment effect or affirmative answers to the sensitive item, if certain assumptions hold then 
simple mean difference will do the work, though scholars have adopted more complicated 
approaches (Blair & Imai, 2012; Imai, Keele, Tingley, & Yamamoto, 2011). Endorsement 
experiment uses another type of clue: subtle changes of the question, where treatment stimuli are 
embedded in the wording. Respondents are randomly assigned to groups (treatment, control, or 
placebo) and are asked to rate or report their agreements with the issue. For instance, in the 
control group, respondents are asked to rate their support of a specific policy and in the 
treatment group, this policy is endorsed by a certain actor. The difference between the 
respondents’ outcome across groups (again, when the randomization assumption holds) can be 
regarded as evidence of support for the specific actor (Blair, Imai, & Lyall, 2014). Normally 
researchers use a set of parallel policies as cross-validation. Conjoint experiment is frequently 
used to address the compound treatment effects—in which the treatment that is of interest has 
various components or factors. It normally asks the respondent to “choose from or rate 
hypothetical profiles that combine multiple attributes, enabling researchers to estimate the 
relative influence of each attribute value on the resulting choice or rating” (Hainmueller, 
Hopkins, & Yamamoto, 2014, p. 2). The unit treatment effect can be identified directly as the 
difference between the two potential outcomes under those two sets of profiles; and the average 
marginal component effect (AMCE)—the marginal effect of certain attributes averaged over the 
joint distribution of the remaining attributes—can be nonparametrically identified as a function 
of the conditional expectations of the observed outcomes under certain assumptions 
(Hainmueller et al., 2014). In Figure A25, I describe the research design of investigating falsified 
compliance (at different levels) and the respective identification strategies that I proposed for the 
survey experiment. 
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Figure A25. Survey experiment design on falsified compliance 
 
The design of the questionnaire consisted of three subsections that corresponded with 
the hypotheses above: falsification, mechanism and potential actions72. The section of 
falsification covered questions about the respondents’ general political support for authorities at 
different levels (endorsement experiment questions Q1, Q6 and Q8), attitude to specific political 
issues (such as lifting the limit number of terms that a top leader can serve) and official 
propaganda using list experiment question Q2 and Q5 in turn. Both the control items in Q2 and 
Q5 used a negative correlation design to minimize the potential floor and cell effect (Glynn, 
2013). In measuring actions and action preferences, I used a list experiment in Q10 to see if the 
respondent had ever done such things as petitioning, appealing and so on; and in Q11 I asked if 
the respondent would rather move to another country (if this were possible).   
The subsection of mechanism measures the coercion and pressure from the authority 
using the respondents’ perception of the government’s capacity to tackle social unrest (Q9c). I 
also measured the degree of powerlessness felt when facing politics (Q9a) to serve as the index 
of inner political efficacy and government accountability (Q14e) as the index of external political 
efficacy. Some other related mechanisms were also investigated, such as the intention to put 
pressure on others (Q9b) (Kuran, 1997) and pluralistic ignorance (Q9d). In Q7, I used a simple 
(3*2*2) conjoint experiment to measure the awareness of political rewards for loyalty. Given a 
scenario of recruiting party members, the respondents were asked which of two candidates 
would they select if they were the secretary of the local branch of the party. Each candidate’s 
profile had four attributes: age, family background, occupation, performance history on critical 
political events. The age was a random number between 35 and 45, typical for a non-student 
applicant. The levels of family background included workers, farmers and cadres (officials). The 
 
72 The content of this survey is richer than the hypotheses in this chapter and could be developed in separate papers 
in the future. The full questionnaire is shown in the appendix. 
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occupation of the candidate in this question did not exhaust all the possibilities in normal social 
survey, but focused on 2 levels that were of interest in my research in this chapter, namely cadre 
and enterprise employee. The final attribute was the candidate’s historical political performance, 
which consisted of two levels. One was the expression of positive loyalty: the candidate 
“positively supported and implemented the basic line, guiding principles and policy issued by the 
party and kept in line with the centre ideologically and politically”; the other one was a neutral 
statement: the candidate “have a clean record of political history”. 
All the statements in the control items, the attitude-related questions in Q9 and the 
control items in the list experiments used the wording or modified wording from existing 
questionnaires such as the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), World Value Survey (WVS) and 
China General Social Survey (CGSS). I also included in the questionnaire a scattering of reversed 
statements to keep a check on the quality of the returned answers. In order to avoid the 
possibility of design effect, I presented the questions in an order that fitted the framed cover 
story of “a study that explores netizens’ cognitive style and political attitudes regarding the latest 
news”. The survey distribution was designed to take the form of blocks of scenarios, resulting in 
(4*3) 12 groups (four groups—Xi, Party, Local Government, None—for the endorsement 
experiment questions Q1, Q6, Q8; and three groups—control, treatment and placebo—for the 
list experiment questions Q2, Q5, Q10). The planned total sample was to be 3600, 300 samples 
each group, in order to achieve reliable power of the survey. During the implementation of the 
survey, the items of each question would be randomly disposed to avoid contamination from 
sequences. 
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Questionnaire 
Preface:  
Thank you for your interest in our research. If you agree to participate in this study, you 
will be asked some questions about your opinions on several latest news and lifestyle issues, then 
some questions about yourself. There are 20 questions in this questionnaire and your 
participation will take approximately 5-10 minutes.  
Your participation is completely voluntary. You are free to withdraw from the study at 
any time by closing your browser window. If you choose to withdraw from the study, your data 
will be deleted and not used for analysis. You will be paid 10RMB for completing the survey. If 
you do not complete the survey, or we feel that you completed it in an unsatisfactory way (i.e., if 
you do not follow the instructions in the survey), you will not be compensated.  
Your responses to all the questions are completely confidential. There is no item in the 
survey that asks for identifiable information. Participation in this study imposes no risks or 
benefits of which we are aware. If you have questions, comments or concerns about the survey, 
you may contact the research associate Yan Wang (Tsinghua University) at 
ywangsocio@outlook.com. If you agree to participate in this research, please click to see the 
questions.  
 
• Q0. Have you done surveys on this platform before? (Never; 1-3 times; More than 3 
times) 
 
I. I know news  
• Q1. [Group 1: President Xi suggested in his one of his visiting recently; Group 2: CCP 
calls for; Group 3: One city leader calls for; Group 4: None] we need to experience a process of 
downgrade What’s the maximum cost you would like to pay for a success of China in the trade 
war with US?  
I would like to pay nothing for this; 
1% deduction from income (salary, bonus, extra cash and so on); 5% deduction from 
income; 
10% deduction from income; 
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15% deduction from income; 
Anything!  
• Q2. Please take a look at this list of statements and tell me how many you generally 
support:  
People with little or no education should not have as much say in politics as highly 
educated people;  
People receive state aid if they are unemployed; 
Individual’s ability is important for his/her career; 
The government should collect information broadly from the public before issuing a 
policy;  
for treatment group We should abandon the term regulations if a political leader is doing a 
good job 
for placebo group The national congress represented the interest of majority 
for control group None 
Support: 0 1 2 3 4 [5]  
• Q3. On average, how often do you use the internet (through weibo, wechat, headline, 
newsapp etc.) to obtain information and maintain social network?  
5 hrs or more every day 
2-5 hrs every day 
1-2 hrs every day 
Do not use interwork to obtain information and maintain social network  
• Q4. There are many popular words created by netizens online, which groups of popular 
words can you recognize? (Here I only show the category of the wording, not the exact Chinese 
words; control words are generally relating to entertainment news)  
Group 1: Control; Control; Control 
Group 2: Problem about social justice; Control; Control 
Group 3: Control; Problem about government accountability; Control  
Group 4: Control; Factional strife from anti-corruption campaign; Control  
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• Q5. Please take a look at this list of statements and tell me for how many you think is 
(are) true:  
Policy reform is a complicate process and normal people can’t understand;  
Wealth and poverty, success and failure are all determined by fate;  
Rural immigrants contributed a lot to the urban development so they should be treated 
equally with their urban counterparts;  
No matter born in eastern coast or western part of China, as long as contribute same 
efforts, Xiao Li’s probability of success is the same.  
for treatment group Official propaganda is intentionally constructed to cultivate people 
for placebo group Should allow the media speak for certain social class or interest group 
for control group None 
True: 0 1 2 3 4 [5]  
• Q6: Group 1: President Xi; Group 2: CCP calls for; Group 3: One city leader calls 
for; Group 4: None is considering raising funding for solving the severe environmental 
problems by issuing environmental tax on individuals, what’s the maximum acceptable tax rate 
for you?  
I would like to pay nothing for this; 
1% deduction from income (salary, bonus, extra cash and so on); 5% deduction from 
income; 
10% deduction from income; 
15% deduction from income; 
Anything!  
• Q6a: Due to the process of aging, the issue of how to take care of the elderly and who 
should take the responsibility is getting more attentions nowadays. Someone suggest that, 
increasing the governmental fiscal support for the basic pension insurance program is the most 
efficient way of dealing with the elderly problem, do you agree with this statement? We would 
like to know if you are reading the questions on this survey. If you are reading carefully, please 
ignore this question, do not select any answer below, and click “next” to proceed with the 
survey. 
Strongly disagree  
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Somewhat disagree  
Somewhat agree 
Strongly agree 
 
II. I have attitudes  
• Q7. If you are party branch secretary of your unit, and two of your colleagues are 
applying for party membership. Please read the description of their profiles, which of the two 
would you personally approve to be an applicant (candidate)? 
Factor Levels 
Age Random whole number between 
35-45 
Family 
background 
Worker; Peasants; Cadre 
Occupation Cadre; Enterprise employee 
Political 
performance history 
 
Positively support and implement 
the basic line, guiding principle and policy 
issued by the party, keep in line with the 
central ideologically and politically; 
Have a clean record of political 
history 
 
• Q8. G1: Under the lead of CCP; G2: Under the lead of Xi; G3: Under the government 
of local authorities; G4: None, how much do these following statement match your impression 
in recent years?  
a. Education promoted social mobility is slowing down;  
b. Economy performance worse in recent years; 
c. People still may fall into poverty because of illness; 
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d. Dual track of pension system still exists  
• Q9. Please tell me how you feel about the following statements. Would you say you 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree?  
a. People like me do not have any influence over what the government does.  
b. If some teachers suspected of spreading false (politically incorrect) ideas, should send 
someone to the class to check.  
c. The government is capable of tackling any political unrest.  
d. Most people in our society are aware of the social, political and economic problems 
but prefer not to discuss in public.  
• Q10: Please take a look at the following list of common activities that people engage to 
deal with daily problems. How many of the activities did you engage in any of these activities 
listed previously?  
Kidnapped by aliens; 
Comment or forward posts about political issues online;  
for treatment group File an appeal or sign a petition, request gov information publicity, or 
write to the mayor;  
for placebo group Handle administrative affairs at Local Administrative Service Centre;  
for control group None 
Distributing gifts (yourself or with your family) to relatives in spring festival; 
Seeing a public hospital doctor in the past 12 months; 
Engaged: 0 1 2 3 4 [5].  
• Q11: Given the chance, how willing would you be to live in another country? (Very 
willing; Willing; Not willing; Not willing at all; Don’t understand the question; Can’t choose; 
Decline to answer)  
 
III. About Me  
• Q12: Demographic factors: respondent’s age, gender, education, occupational type, 
marital condition, CCP membership, income group, ethnic group (minority or not), time of 
starting your job.  
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• Q13: Have you been abroad or not? (Many times; once; never but plan to go; never and 
no willingness to go) 
• Q14: Please tell me how you feel about the following statements. Would you say you 
strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? 
a. I have a great deal of trust in our political system.  
b. I am very proud to be a citizen of the PRC. 
c. I believe that most people in the society can be trusted. 
d. Most people in our society have high political support regarding the system.  
e. Our government is accountable regarding people’s requests.  
f. The economic situation of our country will be better a few years from now.  
g. The economic situation of my family will be better a few years from now.  
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Appendix B Data Replication 
Appendix B presents a brief explanation of the statistical methods used in the empirical 
chapters and instructions on the replication file for Chapters 3 and 4 (code and data). 
B1. Text analysis (Chapter 3) 
As explained in the main content, I use quantitative text analysis (QTA) to show the 
persuasive efforts of the government when intentionally producing truth and knowledge about 
pension benefits, social fairness and the allocation of responsibility. The QTA part of my 
research included two subsections: an unsupervised Structural Topic Model to identify the main 
topics in the text relating to pension reforms and supervised methods to label each document 
with categories that were of interest to my research. The main software used here was Rstudio 
(version 1.1.447) and the main QTA packages including Rwordseg, tmcn, stm, topicmodel (all 
available on https://cran.r-project.org/). Helpful literature for further understanding the method 
can be found in Hopkins and King, 2010; Grimmer and Stewart, 2013; Lucas et al., 2015; and 
Roberts, Stewart & Tingley, 2014.  
I provided code and data files necessary to replicate some of the main results reported in 
Chapter 3. Due to the large amount of original data, I share the DTMs and metadata. Since text 
segment and software simulation can be different each time, it may not be possible to replicate 
the exact results reported in the chapter, but as long as the replication uses the same version of 
the packages, the results should be similar. It should be noted that the original data are in 
Chinese, and therefore the direct results (such as the generated topics) are also in Chinese. 
QTA1904_layout.R & QTA2002_revision.R replicates all of the results in the chapter and 
analysis.RData contains the data necessary for the analysis. 
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Table B29. Codebook for Chapter 3 
Variable name Variable Label and Measurement 
X Document number 
Title Title of  the document 
Author Author of  the document 
Date Date of  the document 
Year Year 
Month Month 
Day Day 
Year_Month Year-month  
Edition_name Edition name of  the document 
Column Column of  the document 
Text Full text of  the document 
Responsibility 
Identified welfare responsibility of  the document (categorical 
variable), “no clear direction of  locus”=0, “state/party”=1, 
“individual/family”=2, “enterprise”=3, “social coordination”=4 
National.condition Whether the document emphasis national condition (Yes=1) 
Foreign.experience Whether the document emphasis foreign experience (Yes=1) 
Praise Whether the sentiment is positive (Yes=1) 
Denounce Whether the sentiment is negative (Yes=1) 
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B2. Causal inference (Chapter 4) 
In Chapter 4, I use Difference in Differences when examining the causal relationship 
between the trajectory of welfare reform from state socialism to shared responsibility and 
individual changes of perception. The idea of causal inference here is that the causal effect of a 
treatment on some outcome can be assessed. The causal effect of the treatment on the outcome 
for unit i is the difference between its two potential outcomes: an observed outcome in a treated 
situation and an unobserved outcome in a control situation (i.e. something counterfactual). 
However, in practice, it is impossible to observe the values of Y1i and Y0i on the same unit i. 
Therefore, in empirical studies, scholars rely on statistical solutions to the fundamental problem 
of causal inference (Winship & Morgan, 1999). Commonly used approaches include randomized 
experiments (e.g., Fisher, 1960; Gerber & Green, 2012); matching and weighting on covariates 
(e.g., Hainmueller, 2012; Iacus, King, & Porro, 2012; Morgan & Harding, 2006); difference-in-
differences (e.g., Ashenfelter, 1978); a synthetic control method (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003); 
instrumental variables (e.g., Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996); causal mediation analysis (Imai, 
Keele, & Yamamoto, 2010); and regression discontinuity design (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; 
Thistlethwaite & Campbell, 1960).  
The difference-in-differences method was developed from the “simple difference 
estimator”, which used the post-treatment outcome (Y11) minus the pre-treatment outcome (Y01) 
for the treatment group. However, due to the existence of the time factor, the Y11 -Y01 estimator 
is not actually the treatment effect. Therefore, the DID approach takes advantage of the control 
group, which did not receive any treatment of intervention, such as a policy/programme. If the 
assumption of a parallel trend holds, the estimator (y̅treat, after-y̅treat,before)-( y̅control,after-y̅control,before) can be 
treated as the treatment effect of intervention. In the following figure I present a graphic 
illustration73 of the DID setup. 
 
73 From class material, lecturer David Hendry, MY457, “Causal Inference for Experimental and Observational 
Studies”, Methodology Department, LSE. 
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Figure B26. Simplest Difference-in-Differences Setup 
 
We signed a confidentiality agreement to use the survey data (with Martin Whyte) and 
therefore cannot post the original data. Instead I share the code (Pension.pilot1904.R) used to 
generate the results in the chapter. The relevant codebook (individual level and provincial level) 
is presented in the table below. 
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Table B30. Codebook for Chapter 4 
Variable name Variable Label and Measurement 
Urban Hukou registration (Urban=1) 
Gender Gender (Male=1) 
Age Age 
Minority Minority ethnic group (Minority=1) 
CCP_member Member of  CCP (Member=1) 
Edu_year Years of  education 
Age_grp Age group 
Edu_grp Education levels 
Income_log Annual income of  the household (log value) 
Unit_Enterprise Occupational variation (Enterprise employees=1) 
Unit_Governmental 
Employee Occupational variation (Governmental employees=1) 
Old-age dependency 
(oldcare_n) Numbers of  old-age person the family need to take care 
Treated Provinces being treated or controlled (treated=1) 
Duration Years each province being treated 
Wave Provinces in different waves of  experiment 
Post Survey year (year 2009=1) 
Province_n Province code, 22 provinces in total 
Respon_old Locus of  responsibility regarding old-age caring (attitudinal preference, individual responsibility=5) 
Respon_med Locus of  responsibility regarding health caring (attitudinal preference, individual responsibility=5) 
Respon_edu Locus of  responsibility regarding compulsory education (attitudinal preference, individual responsibility=5) 
Respon_job Locus of  responsibility regarding employment (attitudinal preference, individual responsibility=5) 
Trust_central Political trust for central government (most trust=4) 
Trust_province Political trust for provincial government (most trust=4) 
Trust_local Political trust for prefectural/city government (most trust=4) 
Province name Province name 
province_n Province code 
Year_Prov Year-province panel 
All news All article number 
Related_news Identified article number relates to Pension insurance/old-age 
social insurance 
Related_news_ratio Ratio of  Identified article number relates to Pension 
insurance/old-age social insurance compare to all articles 
Accumulated 
Related_news_ratio 
(3 years) 
Related News (2002+2003+2004)/All News (2002+2003+2004) 
Related News (2007+2008+2009)/All News (2007+2008+2009) 
Accumulated 
Related_news_ratio 
(5 years) 
Related News (2000+2001+2002+2003+2004)/All News 
(2000+2001+2002+2003+2004) 
Related News (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009)/All News 
(2005+2006+2007+2008+2009) 
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Directly related news Identified article number relates to Fully funding the individual 
accounts pilot policy 
Direvtly related 
news_ratio 
Ratio of  Identified article relates to Fully funding the individual 
accounts pilot policy compare to all articles 
Accumulated Directly 
Related_news_ratio 
(3 years) 
Directly Related news (2002+2003+2004)/All news 
(2002+2003+2004) 
Directly Related news (2007+2008+2009)/All news 
(2007+2008+2009) 
Accumulated Directly 
Related_news_ratio 
(5 years) 
Directly Related News (2000+2001+2002+2003+2004)/All News 
(2000+2001+2002+2003+2004) 
Directly Related News (2005+2006+2007+2008+2009)/All News 
(2005+2006+2007+2008+2009) 
Wave Wave of  pilot policy 
Municipal_n Number of  municipalities of  certain province 
County_n Number of  counties of  certain province 
GDP_total Province GDP (Yuan) 
GDP_per capita Province GDP per capita (Yuan) 
GDP_index Province GDP Index (previous year=100) 
Residents_n  Yearend population of  certain province (10 thousand) 
Urban_residents  Urban population of  certain province (10 thousand) 
Rural_residents  Rural population of  certain province (10 thousand) 
Population growth rate Population growth rate (‰) 
Population Population (census) 
Old_population Population of  people above 65 (census) 
ODR_cens Old-age dependency rate (census) 
Urban_employees  Urban employee population (10 thousand) 
Fin_budgetary revenue  Local Fiscal general budgetary revenue (hundred million) 
Fin_revenue  Local Fiscal revenue (hundred million) 
Fin_specific purpose 
revenue 
Local Fiscal specific purpose revenue (hundred million) 
Fin_non-tax revenue Local non-tax revenue (hundred million) 
Fin_general budgetary 
expenditure 
Local Fiscal general budgetary expenditure (hundred million) 
Fin_general public service 
expenditure 
Local Fiscal general public service expenditure (hundred million) 
Fin_social security and 
employment expenditure   
Local Fiscal social security and employment expenditure (hundred 
million) 
Fin_health and medical 
expenditure 
Local Fiscal health and medical expenditure (hundred million) 
Saving_deposit Saving deposit (hundred million) 
Ur_employee participants Urban employee participants for Old-age social insurance (10 
thousand 
Ur_in service employee 
participants 
Urban in service employee participants for Old-age social 
insurance (10 thousand 
Ur_retired employee 
participants 
Urban retired employee participants for Old-age social insurance 
(10 thousand 
Pension_revenue  Basic Pension Insurance Funds revenue (10 thousands Yuan) 
Pension_expen Basic Pension Insurance Funds expenditure (10 thousands Yuan) 
Pension_balance  Basic Pension Insurance Funds balance (10 thousands Yuan) 
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